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Article 133, FRY Constitution 
 
“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the Army which defends its 
sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional order…” 
 
 
“Accused Aca Tomic, Mikelic Borislav and Vuijcic Dragan, 
 
in the course of 2002, in Belgrade, have become involved in a 
conspiracy hatched by late Dusan Spasojevic and Milorad Lukovic 
Legija, described in item I of the indictment, through the accused Aco 
Tomic's contacts established on several occasions with late Spasojevic 
and Lukovic, both in the headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, 
security service in the Knez Milosa Street and in his apartment where, 
in addition to discussions on current political situation, he disclosed to 
them information gathered through "wiretapping measures"; he 
argued that after the arrest of general Perisic on suspicion of 
espionage, whose deputy immunity was not suspended by the 
Parliament, the entire government should be put behind bars which 
would be then followed a coup d’état; that they should maintain 
consistent political views with respect to the authorities, otherwise the 
country will end up in the hands of traitors; that the Yugoslav Army, 
VJ, special units "Cobras" would not interfere and confront the Special 
Operations Unit, JSO, as well as suggesting that Ljiljana Buha, who 
was under Spasojevic's protection in New Belgrade, should be 
transferred to another, more secure place. Also, during one of their 
meetings in the Yugoslav Army, VJ, security service headquarters, Aco 
Tomic received a Nokia cellular phone with a camera as a gift from late 
Spasojevic, while the accused Mikelic was a point of contact, setting up 
appointments with Tomic for Lukovic and Spasojevic; on several 
occasions he went to meet Spasojevic and Lukovic in Silerova Street or 
received them in his own apartment to convey the information as to 
whether Carla del Ponte had brought indictments against Legija and 
Seselj, whose arrest, as he put it, was supposed to be spectacular. The 
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accused Vuicic was conveying information about Spasojevic and 
Lukovic which he collected through his contacts with the people in the 
government as well as a piece of information that the Special 
Operations Unit, JSO, members would be handed over to The Hague. 
Through Mikelic, Vuicic also arranged for meetings between the 
defendant Lukovic and late Spasojevic on one hand, and the defendant 
Aco Tomic on the other.” 
 
An excerpt from the indictment against general Aco Tomic, former 
Yugoslav Army, VJ, security service chief 
 
NOTE: 
Original documents were written in Cyrillic alphabet which the author of 
the book did not want to correct notwithstanding many typing errors. The 
text of the author are in Latin alphabet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            6  
 6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this book to my tragically deceased brother Goran 
Vlajkovic Viraga, born on August 14, 1966, died on December 
28, 2002.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"History is a mere list of crimes and misfortunes" 
Voltaire 
If history teaches us what life is all about, and this is true, then books 
are testimonies assisting history to show to the next generations 
where we are and why we have made mistakes instructing us not to 
stumble twice upon the same obstacle. "Military Secret" is a 
testimony which came to existence by a concurrence of peculiar 
circumstances and thanks to my own aspiration to expose entirely 
and at any cost the position and the role of the top military brass in 
preservation of an insane regime, alien to both the Serbs and the 
Montenegrins, at the beginning of the 21st century. Having been 
drawn into the games of big security services, dragged out of 
anonymity and motivated by my personal hardships and suffering, 
but also thanks to good people from the military and the police, I was 
in a position, amongst other things, owing to kindness of other 
people, to influence, perhaps, certain currents of history in, judging 
by everything, now former Yugoslavia. I am aware of the fact that 
the state is grateful to an individual only while it needs him/her. 
Hence, devoid of an urge to revenge and without any repentance in 
relation to what I have done, I shall try to present in the pages that 
follow my own story about the persecution by the regime as well as 
authentic evidence on the abuse of public office and the actions 
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undertaken by politicians and generals to the detriment of the people 
to which they belong. The book is not dealing with the evil inflicted 
upon other nations but primarily suicidal instincts at the national 
level induced in the minds of generals whose badges of rank acljuired 
by destroying all the distinguishing features of Serb and Montenegrin 
soldiers – their honour and bravery. With all due respect to some 
generals, only a few of them, I shall try depict closely for the reader 
in the most authentic manner the places, the people, the events and 
the decisions which pushed this nation to the verge of an abyss – the 
point from which you cannot escape easily. By portraying collective 
madness of army generals embodied in ljuotations from excerpts of 
the minutes of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, Chief of Staff cabinet 
meetings, without even correcting grammatical and spelling 
mistakes, I shall endeavour to shed some light on the darker side of 
our recent history and expose the crimes committed against their 
own people stamped with "Military Secret" label. This book was 
born in the aftermath of the prime minister Zoran Djindjic's 
assassination as an expression of outrage and despair at the fact that 
the people from the Milosevic's era had been kept in their high-
ranking positions which was why we became their hostages torn 
between Scylla of the dying nationalism and Charybdis of imposed 
cosmopolitism.  
Had the lustration of the Milosevic's oligarchy been effected, had 
there been no assassination of premier Djindjic, had the immoral 
ones kept silent and the wise ones spoken up, this book would have 
never been written. I would have kept it to myself even if every 
sensible person had been showing evidence about the most shameful 
days in the history of the Serbia-Montenegro's army. For the sake of 
giving a chance to the people who inherited a chaos in the state and 
embraced responsibility for the future of the nation; for the sake of a 
possibility that mistakes were made with the best intentions, I kept 
ljuiet even when I should not have kept my silence. Had I written 
what I am writing now, perhaps, someone would have woken from 
his deep sleep, and perhaps, premier Djindjic would have still been 
here today with his son Luka and his daughter Jovana. Given that 
the situation is directly opposite to the common sense, hopes and 
expectations of the normal people, I opted for the most radical form 
of presenting the evidence to the public so that it can make its 
judgement, but hopefully this applies to courts of the state of Serbia, 
in which I believe, as well. Gentlemen from the patriotic bloc wasted 
fifteen years of each and every citizen of this country, which would 
amount to eternity if we were to measure it by the number of this 
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country's citizens. Unfortunately, they also took the lives of many of 
our citizens. 
In addition to my personal knowledge and the testimonies of 
individuals, the authenticity of the document is further corroborated 
by our harsh reality in the past couple of years.  
The book encompasses the period immediately before the bombing of 
our country in 1999 to date. Therefore, dear reader, here is another 
warning.  As you open this book, you are about to enter the world of 
"Military Secret" which kept under a veil of secrecy the crimes 
committed. For this, the Military Court may sentence you to up to 5 
years' imprisonment. Hence, be cautious and do not tell anyone what 
you have read.  
 
Author 
 
 
 
Individuals and their posts mentioned in the book 
 
Yugoslav Army General Staff, GS VJ; Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, 
NGS VJ 
 
No. Org.unit.GS 
VJ 
Rank, name and 
surname 
1.  FRY 
President  
Mr.  
SLOBODAN 
MILOSEVIC 
2.  Federal 
defence 
minister  
Army general 
DRAGOLJUB 
OJDANIC 
3.  GS VJ Chief 
of staff 
colonel general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC
4.  Deputy  
NGS VJ  
colonel general  
SVETOZAR 
MARJANOVIC 
5.  PNGS for 
OSP 
colonel general 
MIODRAG SIMIC 
6.  PNGS for 
KoV 
colonel general 
LJUBISA 
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STOIMIROVIC 
7.  PNGS for 
RV and PVO 
colonel general  
BRANISLAV 
PETROVIC  
8.  PNGS  for RM rear admiral 
VLADE NONKOVIC 
9.  PNGS for  
PM and SP 
colonel general 
STAMENKO NIKOLIC
10. PNGS  
for SONID 
colonel general 
ZLATOJE TERZIC 
11. 
 
PNGS  
for VI and ED 
colonel general  
GRUJICA 
USKOKOVIC 
12. PNGS for 
LOGISTICS 
colonel general 
BRANISLAV 
OBRADOVIC 
13. VJ inspector 
general  
lieutenant general  
NINOSLAV  KRSTIC 
14. Military 
security 
service 
lieutenant general 
MILAN DJAKOVIC 
15. GS VJ 
military 
intelligence 
department  
lieutenant general 
BRANKO  KRGA 
16. Departmnet 
for  
I and M GS 
VJ 
lieutenant general 
MILEN  SIMIC 
17. 1. department 
of GSVJ 
lieutenant general 
DJORDJE  CURCIN 
18. Head of NGS 
VJ cabinet 
lieutenant general 
DRAGAN ZIVANOVIC
19. Head of 5. 
department  
lieutenant general 
ZIVORAD VUJCIC 
20. 1st Army 
commander 
colonel general 
SRBOLJUB 
TRAJKOVIC 
21. 2nd Army 
commander 
colonel general 
MILORAD 
OBRADOVIC 
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22. 3rd Army 
commander 
lieutenant general 
VLADIMIR 
LAZAREVIC 
23. RV (air force) 
and PVO 
(antiaircraft 
defence) 
commander 
colonel general  
SPASOJE SMILJANIC
24. RM (navy) 
commander 
admiral  
MILAN ZEC 
25. head of the 
FRY 
president's 
army cabinet  
colonel general 
dr. SLAVOLJUB 
SUSIC 
 
 
 
 
Other individuals 
 
Name and surname Position 
 
Goran Matic FRY federal information minister 
Vlajko Stoiljkovic Serbian interior minister 
Rade Markovic Serbian security service chief 
Filipovic Dragan special operations department chief 
Momčilo Perišic former VJ chief of staff and Serbian deputy 
prime minister 
Aca Dimitrijevic former military security service chief 
Budimir Scepanovic special advisor for national security to Vukasin 
Maras and former acting director of 
Montenegrin security service 
Vukasin Maras former Montenegrin interior minister and 
deputy defence minister 
Dragan Lestaric former member of Serbian security service 
Zivadin Jovanovic former FR Yugoslavia's foreign affairs minister 
Nikola Sainovic former federal deputy prime minister 
Miroslav Filipovic Belgrade daily Danas journalist 
Wesley Clark NATO commander for Europe 
Ahtissari UN secretary general special envoy 
Chernomyrdin  UN secretary general special envoy 
Nebojsa Vujovic Yugoslav diplomat  
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Borislav Milosevic former Yugoslav ambassador to Russia and 
brother of Slobodan Milosevic 
Geza Farkas former military security service chief 
Sekulic Miodrag analyst at the Yugoslav Army chief of staff 
cabinet 
 
 
 
SERBIAN STATE SECURITY SERVICE, SDB, 
WIRETAPPING THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, VJ 
 
"A thief starts out with saying the lie resembles the 
truth, but  
ends with saying the truth resembles the lie". 
Balzac  
 
 On the eve of who-knows-which war in a row in the Balkans, a 
diplomatic initiative and all sorts of various initiatives aimed at 
helping reason overcome chaos and vanity were approaching their 
final stages. In a geographically small area in Europe, a.k.a. the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, various interests and 
influences were intersecting and overlapping, but also converging on 
a single direction, and this was the ultimate conclusion, or for some, 
ultimate confusion, where the main actors ran away to shelter 
themselves in the bunkers while the extras stayed to wait for the 
bombs which will also be the most influential critics of the theatre 
production called war. After a short break lasting only two years 
during which Slobodan did not manage to find another enemy and 
start a final battle in which each and every citizen in his Suffer Suffer 
Land1would end up dead and buried, the armed conflict in Kosovo 
erupted. In the place where his rise to power had originally begun, 
his political and military suicide and, subsequent burial, was to take 
place. Into this abyss he dragged his people and the country which 
gave him birth and placed him on the throne of the ultimate leader 
riding on a wave of nationalism, unseen even in the 19th century. This 
was the kind of throne he would hardly leave without much pain, 
suffering and blood spilt. As a philosopher once said:: «Stupidity is a 
disease which does not kill the patient but the people around him ».  
 
                                                 
1 Stradija, the title (and the name of the imaginary land) of a satirical short story by the 19th century 
Serbian writer Radoje Domanovic.  
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Several years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
temporary break, in late 1997 and early 1998, what was left of the 
degraded (in terms of personnel) army with outdated equipment 
became a part of the overture which would push us to the edge, on 
the brink of the abyss of no return. Slobodan Milosevic sacked the 
Yugoslav Army chief of staff colonel general Momcilo Perisic and 
replaced him with intellectually and militarily far inferior general 
Dragoljub Ojdanic. The appointment of an inferior officer to the top 
commanding post was the first sign that Milosevic wanted to have an 
army which would entirely be under his control, while the Supreme 
Defence Council, VSO, was meant to retain the control in name only. 
 
Before Perisic, Jovica Stanisic, the then Serbian security service, 
SDB, chief, had been sacked and replaced by Rade Markovic. 
Personnel management in the state was taken over by a political 
party without voters – the Yugoslav United Left, JUL. Therefore, a 
political mutant took over the finances, the army, SDB, as well as 
media. With such a disastrous personnel policy, the only thing one 
my expect is unconditional and catastrophic submissiveness which 
would only bring misfortune to this people  that has not been seen 
ever since World War II. During the short period of time under the 
Milosevic's rule, they managed to turn our allies into our enemies, to 
reduce economy to the level of a collective farm in the country, to 
reduce intelligentsia to a bunch of the deaf and dumb, while the army 
was reduced to a social welfare institution consisting of people torn 
between their ideals and their desire to have a state citizenship.  
 
The decision to sack general Perisic was made at the Supreme 
Council session held on November 24, 1998, in Belgrade. FRY 
president Slobodan Milosevic chaired the meeting. Serbian and 
Montenegrin presidents, Milan Milutinovic and Milo Djukanovic 
respectively, attended the meeting. The official record of the 
proceedings at the meeting reads as follows:  
 
* * * 
 
Having opened the discussion on personnel issues in the Yugoslav Army, 
VJ, president Slobodan Milosevic pointed to the necessity to change the 
army's chief of staff, given that colonel general Momcilo Perisic had 
already been for too long at that post. President then said there were 
several candidates for the position among the generals: 
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• the first is colonel general Ljubisa Velickovic, but he has already been 
appointed federal defence deputy minister; 
• the second is colonel general Dragoljub Ojdanic, now the deputy of 
the chief of the VJ general staff. He has been discharging several 
important duties in the army so far.  
 
The current chief of staff colonel general Momcilo Perisic would be 
appointed the defence advisor to the federal government. 
 
President Milosevic also presented his view that in the future it should be 
taken into account that the army's chief of staff should not be for too long 
at that position where three generals had been changed in the past five 
years. 
 
In relation to the personnel issues in the army, President Djukanovic 
presented his view:  
 
• firstly, he is in favour of reorganising and optimising the general 
staff and the federal ministry of defence, SMO, as it is in other 
countries. This deserves to be dealt with and it should be 
restructured conceptually.  
 
• secondly, he is not in favour of replacing the current VJ chief of 
staff general Perisic, irrespective of the fact that he has been for a 
long time in that position; according to president Djukanovic, 
general Perisic is a proven authority; he has enormous experience, 
he preserved his authority  and the constitutional position of the 
Yugoslav Army; his is what he has done not only in the country but 
abroad as well.  
 
General Perisic has good cooperation with the Montenegrin leadership. 
He was in positions where he had to defend the interests and the 
reputation of the Yugoslav Army at the international level. According to 
president Djukanovic, general Perisic is better prepared and more 
capable than other candidates. 
 
Concerning the change of the chief of staff, president Milan Milutinovic 
had a different view, although he did not dispute what president 
Djukanovic had said. He pointed out that we needed a chief of staff who 
was an excellent at the operative level. General Perisic was acting at the 
international level in accordance with political instructions of the legal 
bodies of political authorities in this country. This was, undoubtedly, 
successful. However, he had been for a long time at that post and a 
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change should be made. We now have parallel institutions in general staff 
and the federal defence ministry, i.e., we have overlapping of certain 
activities, which is irrational and expensive. 
 
Regarding the good reception of general Perisic had at the international 
level, we should be reserved about it and we should not pay much 
attention to it. We will solve our internal problems in the manner we think 
would be best for us, and not in line with their interests. 
 
General Ojdanic, perhaps, is not well known in public, but his no less 
capable in comparison to the current chief of staff. 
 
President Djukanovic reiterated the decisive element for him was that 
general Perisic had been working as the army's chief of staff for a long 
time and that he had been doing his job well; that this was the only 
reason why he was not in favour of general Perisic's dismissal from the 
post.  
 
Addressing Djukanovic, president Milosevic said he was not that well 
acquainted with general Ojdanic pointing out, amongst other things, that 
general Ojdanic, when he was the commander of the First Army, 
conducted an anonymous survey among his subordinate officers who 
filled in a questionnaire. The questionnaire had 36 questions and the 
results showed Ojdanic enjoyed very high authority among the 
subordinate officers in many elements. He had M.Sc. degree in military 
science. This is a very honourable and good general. President Milosevic 
acknowledges the suggestions made by president Djukanovic, but 
believes general Ojdanic should be the VJ chief of staff. This is a natural 
change in the army.  
 
President Milo Djukanovic replies to this that he Supreme Defence 
Council operates the way it operates. If you are in favour of this, then it 
will be so. I am against it. Please, I want this to go on record. As a 
Montenegrin member of the Supreme Defence Council, I am against the 
dismissal of the army's chief of staff general Perisic. This is not only my 
view, I am presenting here the view of the entire republic's leadership. 
 
President Slobodan Milosevic, among other things, expressed his belief 
that the position of the Montenegrin president was not aimed against the 
new candidate but that president Djukanovic was only in favour of 
retaining the current chief of staff at his post.  
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In reply, president Djukanovic reiterates it must be stated in the official 
record of the meeting that Montenegrin president has a negative view 
with respect to the dismissal of the VJ chief of staff Momcilo Perisic. He 
went on to say the regulations concerning the powers in relation to the 
army were clear, but that this was not a good thing to abandon the 
earlier practice in the work and the decision-making process in the 
Supreme Defence Council. 
 
President of the Republic issued a decree appointing colonel general 
Dragoljub Ojdanic to the post of the VJ chief of staff and colonel general 
Momcilo Perisic as defence advisor to the federal government.  
 
* * * 
 
The assessment of the VJ security department chief, colonel general 
Aca Dimitrijevic, was very realistic and very rational. All the more so 
given that it had been made on the eve of the bombing in Kosovo 
when the importance of that assessment was to measured in 
thousands of human lives and billions of dollars in possible damages 
to the country. Having found out that the VJ units on the territory of 
Kosovo and Metohija were used without the knowledge and approval 
of the VJ general staff, the then chief of staff colonel general Momcilo 
Perisic addressed a letter to the president Milosevic with a warning 
that such a practice might ruin whatever was left of the once 
reputable army. This letter also contributed to his dismissal from his 
post of the chief of staff. General Perisic demanded from Milosevic 
that the army units should not be deployed without prior 
introduction of the state of emergency in Kosovo and Metohija, as 
this would help avoid the misuse of the army's Pristina Corps. This 
was contrary to the policy conducted by the establishment. Namely, 
the policy was not to acknowledge the existence of problems in 
Kosovo, including the armed rebellion and flourishing separatist 
movement, which could, at any given moment, set Serbia and the 
Balkans ablaze. The people in the West saw what the master from the 
Boulevard of Peace could not see…  
 
Milosevic did not like bad news, but general Aca Dimitrijevic was not 
the man willing to pursue his career by ingratiating himself with "the 
boss" and passing only the news "the boss" wanted to hear. At the 
collegium session held in January 1999, general Dimitrijevic, the VJ 
security department chief, presented the following assessment on the 
possible chain of events: 
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* * * 
 
colonel general  
ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC  
Mr. General, regarding the security situation in the country, including 
the army, in comparison to the previous collegium, there are no any 
substantial changes and I would not have anything more to say on this 
either, but I would like to say something about the main issue for today's 
collegium session.  
Above all, I'd like to say and I believe that, at this moment, for this 
country, the best solution would be to accept the offer made by the 
Contact Group and start negotiations. Any other solution would not be a 
good solution, and that would be against this country. Last time I 
acquainted the collegium with operative information collected by the 
service about what the Contact Group had been preparing, and 
unfortunately, it was all confirmed. According to the information we 
have, if we do not accept negotiations, the offer of the Contact Group, the 
same sources say, air strikes would start immediately, on February 20th 
already, against all the army's facilities, while the UN Security Council 
would declare Kosovo a territory under control of the Security Council, 
or to put it in another way – a protectorate, and this would be an option 
where we definitely lose Kosovo. Therefore, this option with accepting the 
proposal, i.e., the Contact Group's demand, I think is the best at this 
moment because it would allow the possibility to arrange some things 
differently through smart policy and intelligent work in the next three or 
four years – regardless of how this might be defined – in order to have 
the West "work for us" instead of this situation where we constantly poke 
the West in the eyes with our fingers. 
I'm afraid none of us is familiar with this document, except for those 
things published in the press, which is the basis of the forthcoming talks. 
Therefore, the basis is some modified version of the Hill's plan2, and the 
state, the highest state organs know what's written in it. What's important 
for us, and what is important in terms of the territorial integrity of FRY, 
is that the issue to be discussed in the talks is not the army -  nor defence, 
borders, customs, currency… all those elements which make up a state.  
                                                 
2 Hill's plan was rejected by both the Albanians and the Serbs in early 1998. Its author is Christopher 
Hill, an American diplomat. The Albanians expected independence, while the Serbs expected 
centralised authority; the options which were not envisaged in the plan. 
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Given all this I have the right to say and to reiterate again that the option 
is to accept the talks where we could, at this moment, achieve the 
maximum through wise negotiating, which means to create conditions 
because the Contact Group either did not suggest anything that would 
refer to a third federal unit, or a republic, or a separation, or secession, 
i.e., the change of FRY borders. I think these are the important elements 
of this offer.  
When it comes to sovereignty, I wouldn't agree with general Marjanovic. 
This is what political leaders might say for internal political use in the 
country that our sovereignty was seriously undermined the moment this 
state signed the agreement with OSCE3, when those so-called 2,000 
civilians entered the country to do what they are now doing.  When the 
verification from the air was accepted, the minimal price for where we 
were in October.  
Therefore, I think, about this – whether we should say that this or that 
would mean the loss of sovereignty… I think I've already said here and 
we've discussed it already that there is no absolute sovereignty, that every 
state is ceding a part of its sovereignty to the community. Therefore, I am 
not advocating here the deployment of the troops in Kosovo, but this 
means that sovereignty, as a notion, is relative, and I think we can say 
even at this moment that it's been undermined by the presence of the 
OSCE verification mission and the verification mission from the air. 
In fact, this is about the Russians. Some are wondering how Russia has 
changed its position. Please, according to our information, during the 
Albright's4 visit to Moscow and talks with Primakov5, Russia had its 380-
billion debt reprogrammed for the next 20-year period. Hopefully, we're 
all smart enough to see what that means to Russia, and if someone really 
expects that Russia would take up arms and fight the war for us… I think 
this shouldn't be even criticised.  
 
* * * 
 
The price for bombing Serbia had already been set and approved, it 
was like a carte blanche. The final preparations had been done for 
what would push Serbia down to the lowest level in the past two 
centuries, ever since it had come into existence. That was why the 
negotiators from the West were so confident that Russia would not 
intervene or interfere in any other way with possible bombing of 
FRY. This was why the efforts of the military and political leadership 
                                                 
3 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
4 Madeline Albright, US state secretary. 
5 Yevgeny Primakov, Russian prime minister. 
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to motivate the brothers from the Ural Mountains to help in any way 
during the bombing of FRY failed.  
 
I'd like to point out that, at the same time, the Albanian lobby has 
not only been active in Washington but in Moscow as well. Perhaps, 
less aggressively so in Moscow, but equally efficiently. These 
activities in Russia were subtler and less straightforward because of 
the specific presidential system there. I think this went in two 
directions. The first was through controversial Albanian 
businessman, who is also one of the main financier of Albanian 
paramilitary groups on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, Bexhet 
Pazolli, ex-husband of Italian pop star Anna Oxa. At the time, he was 
on friendly terms with Boris Yeltsin, Russian president. Pazolli was 
also under investigation conducted by the then chief state prosecutor 
of Switzerland and current chief prosecutor of The Hague tribunal, 
Carla del Ponte, because of some financial malversations with the 
Russian president. Their friendship and business interests, of course, 
were stronger than Yeltsin's love for the Slavs. 
 
The second direction for the lobbying activities was Albanian mafia, 
which had good contacts with its Russian counterparts, and the 
Russian mafia had in Yeltsin's time an enormous influence on 
Kremlin. Of course, what played into their hands was also the old age 
of Yeltsin which affected his ability to make decisions, and this was 
indeed under a big question mark.  
 
As the war was looming large, becoming almost imminent, the 
replacement of "disobedient" generals was also becoming inevitable. 
Of course, general Dimitrijevic was the first on the black list. General 
Ojdanic took part and did his best to help dismiss general 
Dimitrijevic. Ojdanic did it more so because he estimated well what 
"the boss" wanted since he was not capable enough of coming 
forward with such a proposal on his own. Given that general Aca 
Dimitrijevic was a well-informed person, sincere and 
straightforward, he presented his report on the personnel policy and 
prospects stemming from such a policy at the collegium session held 
in February 1999.  
 
* * * 
 
colonel general  
ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC  
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Talking of the Pristina Corps and the cooperation we had yesterday, I'd 
like to point to an important fact. Namely, security organs found out these 
days that the entire command of the Pristina Corps was practically under 
the control of the state security service. This means that the state security 
service are wiretapping 34 telephone lines at the Pristina Corps 
command. I want to ask a question: is someone issuing orders to control 
the army? what's the purpose of this? Is the goal here to see what the 
army is doing or tomorrow this will the aim – to see what the army has 
been doing, and who's doing what in the army individually?  
For these reasons, and bearing in mind that the scope, the room, for my 
work has been significantly reduced recently, given that some illegal 
activities aimed at my dismissal and the appointment of a new head of the 
department, are under way, the activities in which You, unfortunately, are 
taking part or it's some manipulation with Your name, I demand to have 
an appointment with the FRY president.  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB  OJDANIC  
Are there any questions, or disagreements with what general Dimitrijevic 
has said? No. Do you have some evidence for such claims that the entire 
Pristina Corps command is being wiretapped?  
 
colonel general 
ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC  
Absolutely. For every word I've said.  
* * * 
 
Terrorism which began taking roots in Kosovo, and which in its 
initial phase didn't have strong support of the Albanian people, had a 
huge advantage thanks to flexibility of the terrorist groups and 
secrecy which was made possible by Albanian traditionalism and 
conservativism. Due to lack of political dialogue and reluctance to 
acknowledge the existence of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija 
on the part of the ruling elite in Belgrade, popularity of all sorts of 
Jasharis rose among the Albanians to the level myth and legend. In 
such a sensitive situation, when we couldn't count on support from 
the West, and even less so – from the East, the regime decided to 
crack down on terrorist groups in a rather inadequate manner which 
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was detrimental to our own interests. Namely, the orders to deploy 
the army units were increasingly more frequently bypassing the VJ 
general staff and the regular chain of command, and instead relying 
on generals loyal to the party, above all, general Pavkovic, whose 
promotion had been earlier disputed by general Perisic. Pavkovic's 
swift advance in his career, began in the Pristina Corps, but was to 
end in scandalous affairs and prison cells. On the eve of the bombing 
of FRY, general Aca Dimitrijevic was also dismissed from his post as 
the head of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, security department, better 
known in public as KOS (Counterintelligence Service), as the last 
general, together with lieutenant general Blagoje Grahovac, who had 
also opposed such a policy. At the collegium session held on March 
18, 1999, seven days before the bombing, general Ojdanic informed 
those present about his conversation and the offers made by general 
Wesley Clark, NATO forces commander in chief. 
 
* * * 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
OK, as Panic has already done this, let me acquaint you with the details 
of my half-hour conversation with general Clark. General Krga was also 
there.  
Clark pointed out he was sorry I hadn't come last week to the NATO 
headquarters. He said he wanted to explain to me the implementation of 
the agreement on Kosovo and Metohija from the military aspect. 
According to his information, so this was the day before yesterday, he 
said today the Albanians should sign the entire agreement in Paris.  
After that, Clark said he wanted to tell me about a serious problem, 
which was that the Yugoslav Army would be destroyed if it opposed 
NATO. If the NATO was ordered to do that, it would destroy the 
warehouses, the barracks and the forces of the Yugoslav Army.  
He emphasised he wanted to make himself clear. If this were to happen, 
the Yugoslav Army would lose within a couple of days everything it had 
been investing in during the past fifty years. He went on to say VJ 
wouldn't recover from this.  
Please, do not manipulate with these talks. Anyway, it's well known they 
are only threatening and trying to frighten us. He added they wanted me 
to convince the state leadership not to make a mistake which would make 
NATO to use force. He asked whether I would do that.  
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I said I would convey these views to the authorised state leadership and 
that the further actions would take place in accordance with the mood of 
the people to defend its inalienable part of territory – Kosovo and 
Metohija. I stressed I didn't believe that a decision could be made to use 
force against the Army, particularly so as it couldn't be justified because 
the Yugoslav Army, VJ, wasn't doing anything contrary to the 
Constitution.  
I went on to say we warned there were still terrorist actions in Kosovo 
and Metohija with, in my view, two objectives: to discredit negotiating 
process in Paris because some Shqiptars believe all their aspirations 
won't be fulfilled, and secondly, to provoke the Yugoslav Army to 
retaliate in response to their actions, and thus win over NATO to act in 
support of the Shqiptar terrorists.  
In realisation of those objectives there was a note – the Shqiptars are 
inflicting casualties to their own people just like the Muslims did in 
Sarajevo. It's indicative that they're trying to involve the NATO forces in 
Macedonia, that the Shqiptar terrorists are intensifying their activities in 
the border area, near that republic, aimed at dragging NATO into the 
conflict.  
The tasks of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, are well known, so I reiterated to 
them these were the security of the state border, military facilities, 
communications, deployment, and in some cases when there was an 
attack near the Yugoslav Army units.  
All our actions have been a reaction to provocations and we can't see 
what the reason is to make a decision which, as general Clark put it, will 
have such consequences for the Yugoslav Army, this country and this 
people. The way out of this situation lies solely in a peaceful solution in 
accordance with the principles laid down by the Contact Group and 
supported by our state delegation. 
To this, he replied the following. The Yugoslav Army was breaking the 
promises given by president Milosevic in October and general Ojdanic in 
December last year. He demanded that the Yugoslav Army forces return 
to their original positions, except for three companies in the field which 
would be allowed to stay, and that the measures be undertaken to take 
away from the Ministry of Interior heavy artillery and antiaircraft 
systems supplied by the Yugoslav Army. He added military forces can't 
defeat the so-called UCK and that there were not such military 
operations which would lead to its destruction. The use of the Yugoslav 
Army in conventional military operations only resulted in the destruction 
of Kosovo and Metohija and the lives of the people. This was why he 
emphasised the need to accept the proposals of the Contact Group on the 
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deployment of NATO troops which would help all the forces in Kosovo 
and Metohija. He claimed they had no intention to undermine the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.  
I asked him whether general Clark was demanding something from the 
so-called UCK6? To this question, Clark replied they had to respect the 
agreement, and that demilitarisation should take place, that they should 
hand over the weapons, stop wearing uniforms, and generally be 
disbanded. He asked me if I had the opportunity to read the military part 
of the agreement, To this I replied that I'm partially acquainted with the 
document.  
Clark went on to say that the military part of the agreement was in our 
interest. You will all have to read it, so look up this page to see what it 
says there. It's horror what the document says there; we don't have the 
state, we don't have anything. I beg you to read this carefully, we have to 
do it because of the contacts with these people, but I won't accept any 
telephone calls anymore. You can't have such serious talks on the phone; 
you always miss something, and secondly, it's exhausting. If you sit here 
like this, then it's something else.  
Clark then said the military part of the agreement was in our interest 
because it allowed the Yugoslav Army to stay in the border areas, and 
you see yourselves that we should protect the borders meaning I'm 
protecting the Shqiptars, while they do whatever they like there. In this 
country, they're doing whatever they want, the state above the state – the 
way it's envisaged in that political agreement, that draft – to stay in the 
border areas and in command posts inside the country. You don't have 
this in annex 7. There is no withdrawal, and this is exactly the deadline, 
here's the 170-day deadline for the chief of staff to present a detailed plan 
for withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army units within 30 days.  
He particularly emphasised that the members of the so-called UCK 
wouldn't exist in such a situation, if this were to be accepted, that it would 
look like Serbia won the day, and instead of our forces foreign troops 
would be in charge of the implementation of the agreement, while the 
Yugoslav Army could continue with modernisation, establish cooperation 
with the NATO, solve the problems with salaries, pensions, etc. This 
would cost NATO about one billion deutschemarks while Yugoslavia 
wouldn't have to pay any money. He called me once again to come to 
their Command and discuss this all.  
                                                 
6 UCK in Albanian; Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, a terrorist organisation which operated on the 
territory of Kosovo and Metohija which the FRY forces were fighting against from its formation until 
the 1999 withdrawal from the province.  
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I thanked for the invitation and asked him to have understanding for the 
fact that it cannot be implemented now, and that I can't go to Brussels for 
the time being, so I suggested he should come to Yugoslavia.  
I added I'd acquaint the top state leadership in the country with views 
and assessment of general Clark. This is what I have already done. He's 
in Macedonia now, it wouldn't hurt him to come here – and  I wouldn't be 
sitting here alone, and he wouldn't be alone – to discuss our arguments.  
In his reply, general Clark stressed it was a bad idea for him to visit 
Yugoslavia because this could be perceived as if he came to threaten, and 
that wasn't his intention. He probably heard some discussions after our 
first meeting. He added he didn't invite general Ojdanic to the NATO 
headquarters to threaten him, but to explain to him the purpose of the 
proposed agreement. He wanted me to understand that if NATO were to 
use force, it would destroy the Yugoslav Army; the Yugoslav Army 
wouldn't survive, that's a fact. He asked that this be passed on to the 
highest state leadership. Clark emphasised he wanted to be sincere and 
pointed out that a new army would be born after the bombing, but not 
with the current VJ chief of staff, and that there wouldn't be any facilities 
now used by the Yugoslav Army.  
Commanders of the new army will be asking why the bombing hasn't been 
prevented. He particularly pointed out that he was asking me to help 
protect the Yugoslav Army, that everything should be done with the state 
leadership of the FRY to avoid making a mistake and avoid the bombing. 
That was the essence of the talks between the NATO forces commander 
Clark and myself, general Krga was present there and an interpreter. If 
you're satisfied with what Krga said and this that you've heard now, we'll 
move on. General Aca. 
 
* * * 
 
Since the generals were straining their ears to hear what the couple 
from Dedinje was thinking in order to put forth proposals and make 
their assessments accordingly, it could not have been expected that 
Ojdanic would clearly and unambiguously tell Milosevic, even in the 
form of ultimatum, that we could not allow ourselves to get involved 
in an adventure of waging war with the most powerful countries in 
the world. After Milosevic had come to power, and perhaps even 
earlier, perfidious games were being played as to which security 
service would ingratiate itself to a larger extent with the boss. Silent 
war between the military and civilian security services was being 
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waged with the ultimate objective that the winner impose itself as a 
supervisor over the loser for the imminent chain of events that was to 
take place in these parts. The Serbian state security service, SDB, was 
always closer to the boss because its financing and personnel matters 
allowed Slobodan to abuse them. The estimates were that the war 
would take place, but that it would not last too long as well as that 
some issues like the Albanian one would be solved as part of the same 
necessary evil called war. Hence, everything was ready for the 
beginning of the end but no one dared or wanted to forcibly remove 
the evil that would rule the day in these parts for over ten years, and 
thus spare the army and the citizens of humiliation and suffering. 
Slobodan knew he was losing his last ace up his sleeve in the form of 
Russia and that he would not be able to control the situation in the 
country. US state secretary Madeleine Albright clearly stated during 
one of her pre-war visit to the FRY that Russia would limit itself to 
mere rhetoric in terms of protection of the then Serb interests. In 
fact, the biggest damage to us was inflicted by the Russians. Slobodan 
saw in them an older brother who would help us, but the Russians 
saw in us a chance to solve their internal problems, i.e., the conflict in 
Chechnya, by letting Serbia go down the drain. Our tragedy was that 
our leaders were short-sighted politicians who could not see anything 
beyond their own noses. Intense courting by their advisors and 
generals to which they were exposed did not allow them to see the 
threatening reality looming large on the Serbia's horizon. General 
Aca Dimitrijevic had presented the following facts at the collegium 
session immediately before the bombing started: 
 
* * * 
 
colonel general  
ALEKSANDAR DIMITRIJEVIC  
General, when it comes to the security situation, we may say there haven't 
been substantial changes with respect to the previous week in terms of the 
current situation on the territory. However, despite the fact that this is not 
under jurisdiction of the Security Department, I'd like to speak about 
what's been happening externally, at the international level, which is 
directly related to the situation on the territory. 
Namely, the security service possesses certain operative information 
leading to the conclusion that the issue of Kosovo and Metohija is 
definitely brought to the stage immediately before the ultimate 
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dénouement. Unfortunately, it's what we warned against much earlier – 
we're approaching the stage where we would have take-or-leave-it 
option, and this isn't much a choice. 
Namely, all these activities unfolding in the past few days at the 
international level, in my view, should be a strong indication for all of us 
that the decision is near. This could only be a misconception of some that 
Russia and some other factors would play a more substantial role, but we 
were constantly warning we shouldn't rely on them and that the Kosovo 
issue for them, in fact, is instrumental in solving their own much more 
serious problems.  
 
 
WHY HAVE I BEEN ARRESTED? 
 
"The state has all the rights, and the man has not, 
instead of vice versa" 
Antun Gustav  
 
On March 24, 1999, as predicted by the more sensible but smaller 
part of the Yugoslav Army, VJ, general staff, the bombing of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, started. All sorts of bombs 
were falling almost incessantly on military, commercial but often 
civilian targets as well. Everything that had been previously declared 
as possible targets was destroyed. Military infrastructure, bridges, 
traffic arteries, airports, plants and telecommunications centres was 
being targeted constantly almost until the end of June 1999.  
We were at war for over 70 days, the people was almost driven mad, 
the economy was on the verge of collapse, power stations were 
knocked out of the electrical grid… There were rebellions in the VJ 
units in south Serbia.  
In such a situation there was precious little time for a more serious 
political manoeuvre. Slobodan was wasting the lives of other people's 
children while opposing the western civilisation. Everything was in 
vain. A land invasion of the FRY was in preparation. Only 
irresponsible people could have believed it would be possible to 
defeat by conventional means the nineteen economically most 
powerful countries on the planet. Slobodan was certainly one of 
them. The army was investing superhuman efforts not to win but the 
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protect itself from total annihilation. We did not have the resources 
for a victory, let alone material reserves.  
At the time, I was assisting the garrison commander colonel Radoslav 
Stamenkovic both in terms of material resources and information I 
had to go through it with as few casualties as possible. Encouraging 
news were coming through the media from Belgrade that an 
agreement to stop the bombing might be reached. At the moment, 
people were awaiting only that sort of relief. Slobodan's mistake was 
that over 300,000 people, who, he thought, shared his views and 
ideology, actively took part in defending the homeland. However, 
these people were just defending their homeland but did not share 
the views of the Belgrade regime. Rebellions in some army units 
clearly corroborated this. We were all ready and prepared to defend 
our country, but I also expected the final showdown with the regime 
would ensue in the first days of the ceasefire, which, unfortunately, 
did not happen until the assassination of the prime minister, but even 
then, it was only partial.  
Sometime in early 1998, I had a conflict with some local leaders of the 
Yugoslav United Left, JUL, municipal branch in Obrenovac. My 
conflict with the people from JUL, i.e., Dusan Bratic, lawyer 
Ljubomir Dragacevac and Boban Filimonovic from Obrenovac, 
started with the construction of a building on the land owned by the 
army in the centre of the town, and reached its climax with my arrest 
on the last day of the war. The location where my company began 
constructing the building was very attractive, while the benefit that 
the Obrenovac's branch of JUL and its "cashiers" could derive from 
it was "zero". In a clear conflict of interests, and without my 
willingness to cooperate financially with this party, they resorted to 
that good, old method of intimidation and blackmailing. They first 
sent a memo to Danilo Pantovic, the head of Vlajko Stojiljkovic's 
cabinet and a member of the JUL main board (look up appendix 1, at 
the end of the book), in which they informed him of my "evil 
intentions" with respect to them. Soon after, "comrade" Danilo 
Pantovic forwarded the memo to the Obrenovac local police which 
summons me for a questioning. The interview at the Obrenovac 
police station was conducted by lieutenant Jordan (I do not know his 
surname), an honest and decent man, who had a strictly formal 
approach to the matter because he was aware what was behind it. On 
that occasion, he informed me what was actually going on, and he 
even copied a document for me where you could see who had 
suggested this interview should take place. I am grateful to him for 
that. With that document in my possession, I brought charges against 
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these "secret service correspondents" – comrades Bratic, Filimonovic 
and Dragacevac. The Obrenovac municipal court fined both Bratic 
as the signatory to the document and myself. He was to pay 3,000-
dinar fine, while I had to pay 5,000. This only irritated these 
comrades so they persisted in completing the party assignment they 
had been given. In the course of the judicial proceedings, I requested 
that JUL issue an official statement about the activities of the 
"comrades" mentioned above. JUL indeed responded to this by 
"apologising to myself and my family" which probably made me the 
only citizen who had an official apology from JUL dated February 
17, 1999 (look up the appendix 2 at the end of the book). After you 
receive an apology from such a political party, arrest is what is in 
store for you. Since the regular police had refused to arrest me before 
the NATO bombing of FRY started, even though they had received a 
note from Danilo Pantovic ordering them to do so, "the comrades" 
turned to a much more disciplined institution – the Yugoslav Army, 
VJ. Instead of the civilian police force, the tasks was done by the 
Yugoslav Army security department. At the same time, the military 
police also arrested the garrison commander colonel Radoslav 
Stamenkovic, security chief for the Obrenovac garrison lieutenant 
colonel Milovan Jankovic and myself – the author of this book. After 
the search of my house in Obrenovac and a brief interrogation, they 
handed to me a decision on my 30-day detention signed by colonel 
Srpko Djokic.  
They took me in a patrol wagon to the Central Prison in Bacvanska 
Street. I was arrested because I had a legally licensed pistol which I 
presented to them during the search of my house as they had not 
found it. Captain Dzudic, who was acting decently and was not aware 
of what it was all about, was involved in the search. The irony of it 
was that on the first day of the NATO bombing, I gave my car to the 
army, bought satellite equipment so that they could follow what was 
going on and allowed them to use the building which was in the first 
place the main reason for my arrest "by JUL". The Obrenovac 
garrison command was located in that building during the whole 
war. I took the risk that it might be bombed just like other military 
facilities. My reward for it was the arrest by the same institution 
which I was helping to survive in the garrison where we had families.  
As I was entering the Central Prison in the military police patrol 
wagon, I heard the creaking sound of the heavy gate which blocked 
the light of the June early evening leaving my freedom on the other 
side of the walls. After a detailed search, as if I was the worst kind of 
criminal, I was taken to the solitary confinement cell on the ground 
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floor. I think the cell's number was 16. With my hand behind my 
back, looking ahead of me, as the house rules prescribe, I was taken 
to a dark small cell. This was June 9, 1999.  
My cell was a tiny room 2x3m, without windows. The walls were 
done in oil paint - half of the height to the ceiling. There was a 
military-style bed, a small table, rusty latrine in the corner above 
which there was a leaking tap. On the table there was a plastic bowl 
and a glass for tea or water. I did not have any cleaning substance to 
wash the dishes, nor did I have hot water. Light from the corridor 
was timidly penetrating almost opaque glass pane above the metal 
entrance door with a tiny slit for passing the food to prisoners. There 
was no window or natural light in the cell. 
The moment I crossed the threshold of the prison, there was only one 
thing on my mind – how to get out of this place and how to take part 
in the most effective manner in a radical change of the government. I 
must admit, from that moment onwards, this was my personal 
conflict with "political monsters" a.k.a. "the JUL people". October 5 
proved there were at least one million people who shared my views. It 
was terribly cold in my new "home". I was killing time by reading 
the messages on the wall, whenever there would some light from the 
corridor, inscribed by former inmates or by counting my steps while 
walking back and forth across the room. When the light in the 
corridor was turned off, this was a sign for the last post.  
My first morning in prison broke at 5 a.m. – that's the time for 
getting up. The sign for waking up was a bang with a baton on the 
metal door. When I woke up, I was not sure whether this was a 
nightmare or reality. A prison guard brought me back to reality 
when he barked the order to make my bed. The army, which was 
guarding us, were at the time dressed in the uniforms of the Central 
Prison civilian guards because they feared they might be bombed as 
the state of war was still in effect.  
Soon, a lid over the slit on the metal cell door opened, which was a 
sign the breakfast was coming. The breakfast was a bowl of tea 
without sugar, and they put some butter in the glass. In addition, I 
received 400 grams of stale bread, as black as farmer's furrow. I 
decided to throw it away except for the bread which I broke in two 
halves, though with great difficulties. My biggest problem was how to 
clean the greasy glass with cold water. No one came in the morning 
or asked any questions. Around noon, they ordered us to take the 
mattresses and blankets out into the corridor, and then they took us 
outside where trucks were waiting for us. We loaded everything we 
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brought out of our cells onto the trucks. Then, they pushed us into 
patrol wagons and transported us to the Military Prison in Ustanicka 
Street. There were captured Shqiptars and a bloke, conscientious 
objector, who refused to take up the arms, together with me in that 
patrol wagon. He told me he had been kept in prison for the past 
three months. When we were going out of the patrol wagon inside the 
Military Prison, we heard insults hurled at us by the guards and the 
prison staff. Obviously, we all received the same treatment – 
smugglers, terrorists and political dissenters. 
Military Prison was in much better shape than the civilian one. After 
I had been taken there, captain Dzodic and another two lieutenant 
colonels began interrogating me. Interrogations were conducted in a 
kindergarten near the Revolution Boulevard. First, the captain 
would interview me, and then tomorrow, another lieutenant colonel, 
and yet another lieutenant colonel on the third day. The 
interrogation process was conducted decently, without any physical 
or psychological harassment, and these lasted about two hours. They 
were the most interested in the construction of the building which 
made it clear to me what the source of all problems was. After the 
questioning, captain Dzodic allowed me to phone my wife Verica and 
tell her I would be back home tomorrow so she should not send me 
any food or clothes. This was the day before the weekend, I think – 
Friday. On Saturday and Sunday, no one came to see me or release 
me from prison. The captain told me he would suggest I should be 
released from custody as there was no reason for detention. I believe 
he really meant it. However, colonel Djokic, the top security officer at 
the supreme command, thought otherwise. 
Days were passing horribly slowly in the Military Prison. At the 
beginning, I was had a special treatment – without the right to 
newspapers or some other form of "entertainment". I had to wake up 
very early, make my bed, wait for breakfast, and then I just did not 
know what to do with myself. The worst thing of all was that they did 
not allow me to lie in the bed, instead I was walking in the cell the 
whole day. The guard would light cigarettes for those wanted a 
smoke, and that was all. Before lunch we would have an half-hour 
walk on the prison grounds where you can see only sky, but from the 
cell you see nothing. The prison was circular in shape. The central 
part, surrounded by tall buildings, there was prison ground where 
the detainees were walking. This area was divided in four parts, and 
it was encircled by a high wall so that prisoners could not make 
contact amongst themselves if they were in prison because of the 
same offence. At the time, there were different groups and 
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individuals from various countries there. Some were accused of 
espionage – I think these were Australians, others were accused of 
atrocities committed in Kosovo – I believe they were Russian 
volunteers. There were also many reservists accused of war 
profiteering, thefts of petrol in their units, etc. There were a lot of 
Shqiptars who were captured and transferred to the Military Prison 
from Kosovo.  
After the walk with hands behind our backs, looking in front of 
ourselves, we would go back to our cells. The walk presented a 
unique opportunity for guards, especially for one of them who was by 
origin from our coast, to harass the Shqiptars. He would often slap 
the prisoners who did not understand the language, and certainly din 
not know why he was being beaten. They forced them to sing Serb 
Chetnik songs. There was, among us, a Shqiptar with a metal 
implant for his thighbone who would most often fall down after the 
first slap on his face.  
I was always wondering at those "brave" military policemen who 
were watching this with sadistic delight or taking part in harassment 
of powerless prisoners from Kosovo. This is not something that 
distinguishes a Serb soldier. In their stupidity, those guys did not 
even think about what would be in store for the Kosovo Serbs when 
these people return to their homes. On my release from prison, I 
informed about this judge major Spasojevic, and later colonel 
Trifunovic, president of the Military Court, who compiled an official 
note on this. As far as I know, no measures have been taken against 
the people who were beating prisoners without any reason, and thus 
tarnished the good name of the army which they belonged to. I could 
not find excuse, but to some degree I could understand when 
someone on the front lines violates the code of conduct with respect to 
the enemy. I cannot accept, though, that someone who spends the 
whole war enjoying himself in Belgrade, is allowed to do those 
repugnant things. Probably, psychiatrists would have some 
explanation for such actions.  
The warden would sometimes make a tour of the cells with detainees 
but there would be always one of the guards accompanying him so 
that no one would dare complain about anything.  
After a couple of days, they shaved our heads and beards so that this 
all looked more like a prison camp in the mid-forties than a military 
prison at the beginning of the 21st century. I did not know myself why 
they did it. If they wanted to humiliate us, then they chose the wrong 
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place because someone's pride was not in his hair or beard, 
irrespective of how it looked like to them.  
Days in the military detention were passing slowly in monotony and 
reflection, and I was gradually getting used to life in prison. I have an 
innate adaptation system which has always helped me in situations 
like that one. I thought to myself, "What if I had some car crash? 
What if I was lying here with my limbs in plaster?" This was better, 
after all. I expected they would soon allow me to receive the 
newspapers which would help me a lot. They denied me the right to 
talk to my lawyer but also the contact with my family and friends, 
which, in the beginning, was a huge problem for me. I had already 
spent over twenty days in detention, and no one had asked me a 
single serious question. Meanwhile, they were bringing in some 
wretched people who had not received a notice to report for military 
duty or refused to accept it. Some of them would stay one night, in 
the morning they would be interrogated and then they would let 
them go or put them on trial immediately. Our people working and 
living abroad, the gastarbeiters, had the worst treatment. One of 
them was brought to my cell. This man was on vacation in his native 
village, near Pozarevac. He had been living for years in France. He 
was married to a French woman, and they had a little baby. On his 
way back to France from Yugoslavia, he was arrested at the border 
crossing with Hungary and transported back to Belgrade. His wife 
remained in their car in Subotica. This man had a confirmation 
issued by our embassy in Paris that there had been no notices to 
report for military duty sent to his address as well as that there was 
no arrest warrant on these grounds. He was crying almost the whole 
afternoon. They took away his passport. He did not know what had 
happened to his wife and eight-month-old baby who had been left at 
the border crossing. They took him for interrogation and told him he 
had been sentenced in absentia to six years' imprisonment for 
dodging his military duty. The trial had taken place in Kragujevac, 
without anyone, including himself, knowing anything about it. 
On the twenty-eighth day of my detention, the president of the 
Military Court, colonel Trifunovic (I think he was lieutenant colonel 
back then), came to visit me. He asked me:  
- Why are you here? 
- I'm in that group from Obrenovac – I replied.  
- Have you given the statement to the investigative judge? – he 
asked me again.  
- No – I said. 
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- You'll give the statement tomorrow. Do you need anything? 
- No, thank you. 
Tomorrow, investigative judge major Zeljko Ivanic summoned me to 
his office. 
Our conversation was very brief. Had there been no typing of the 
minutes of the proceedings, the interview would have probably lasted 
only a couple of minutes. Then I met for the first time my lawyer 
Slobodan Bozic, a friend of mine to this day. My wife Verica was with 
him.  
After judge Ivanic had finished with interrogation, I asked him: 
- Isn't there anything else? 
- Should I ask something more? – he said, smiling.  
- No, but did I have to wait for so long to say two sentences?  
- Go to your cell and pack yourself, you're going home. – Instead 
of an answer, I received an order. 
Escorted by the guard, I returned to my cell delighted that I would 
finally breathe in again some fresh air. The guard appeared no 
sooner than tomorrow morning bringing the judge's decision which I 
was supposed to sign. When I signed the paper, I saw this did not 
refer to my release from prison but it said that my detention was 
extended to another thirty days.  There is an adequate popular term 
for such a behaviour of this judge, but those words are not for this 
book. 
I was finally set free on the basis of the Decision No. KI 153/99 after 
32 days in detention. 
  
All the while, deep underground, in the shelter of the Supreme 
Command headquarters, which was well befitting the future national 
hero, Slobodan Milosevic was in secret talks with Ahtissari and 
Chernomyrdin on how to sign the capitulation and relinquish a part 
of the country, and yet present it in public as a glorious victory. 
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NEGOTIATIONS ON SUSPENSION OF 
BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRY 
 
The war, it is a massacre of people who do not know each 
other, to the profit of people who know each other but do 
not massacre themselves." 
Eisenhower7 
Belgrade, June, 1999  
 
Ambassador  
BORA MILOSEVIC  
General, I've just talked to Chernomyrdin8, and he said Albright sent him 
a message several minutes ago. She knows the talks have started, she says 
she's got direct communication and she's told him – when You make a 
deal with your American interlocutors, that is, the NATO people, and 
when that document is signed, when its implementation starts – the same 
moment the bombing will come to a halt, and the request is  that I pass on 
the message.  
I'm  telling this to You, I should pass on the message to Jovanovic9 and 
others, but OK now, as we've been in touch about all this, he's asked me 
to convey this and that's what I do. He calls his ambassador to Belgrade 
to tell him, he doesn't know whether he's received the order… this 
lieutenant general of theirs… (inaudible).  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
C'mon, come, I'll be waiting for you (inaudible). Last night Vujovic sent it 
with original text so that the other thing is increasingly less important. 
But will they succeed to get the plan approved – the action plan for 
withdrawal, not something else. 
 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC10 
                                                 
7 The author, Vladan Vlajkovic, is wrong. This is Paul Valéry, a French poet (1871-1945), not Dwight 
Eisenhower. 
8 Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, Russian diplomat, United Nations Secretary General envoy for 
the talks with Milosevic. 
9 Zivorad Jovanovic, FRY foreign affairs minister. 
10 Colonel Negovan Jovanovic, official interpreter  - Serbian into English. 
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Thanks. General Ojdanic is here. What's the problem? 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
The problem is that general Ojdanic should instruct your delegation how 
to proceed with negotiations and to work on the entire agreement. They 
are refusing to discuss anything except for the article 2.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
General, general Ojdanic cannot see what the problem is because this 
morning the agreement was reached to have the teams work on the action 
plan for withdrawal of the army units, and we agreed on this.  
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
No, we didn't. Obviously, we didn't agree. I also thought we'd reached the 
agreement. The entire document should be discussed because there's 
nothing in that document which is political in its nature. It contains only 
what's been previously agreed. This is what your parliament approved of, 
what your president accepted.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
You see, general, the document also contains instructions on the mandate 
and the structure of the forces, and the United Nations Security Council 
is absolutely the competent organ to define this. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
This is not true. This has already been agreed at the political level, and I 
want you to give the instructions to your team to accept that mandate. 
We've talked about that, but it'll be discussed today. This had been 
demanded before reaching the agreement on withdrawal.  
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colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
Yes, Sir, if we agree that the mandate and the structure of the security 
forces are under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, why should 
we discuss this issue now?  
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Because the way it should be done technically is that the Security Council 
endorse what we've accepted. To approve it, this is the way to do it.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
Sir, you see, we do not perceive the mandate as a technical issue. This is 
absolutely something about which the Security Council should make a 
decision, and we're authorised to discuss the action plan for the military 
forces, or to be more precise, to set the date for the beginning of the units' 
withdrawal whose goal is to stop the bombing. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
The date for the beginning of the withdrawal cannot be determined until 
after the mandate of the forces is defined. When we suspend the bombing, 
you'll have to withdraw, and when you withdraw, we'll have to arrive 
afterwards. And the agreement on this must be reached today. 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
General, you see, as soon as the Security Council specifies the mandate 
and the structure of the forces, it will be possible for those forces to enter 
the territory of Kosovo.  
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
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But this is what will not happen because you will work today, together 
with us, to define the mandate and the structure of the forces, and then 
we'll submit this to the Security Council to endorse it. We won't allow that 
the Security Council do that because, if this were the case, we wouldn't be 
able to stop the bombing.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
Sir, referring to the agreement again, there's nothing in it about the 
mandate and the structure of the forces. The beginning of the withdrawal 
is what will lead to the suspension of the bombing. Let's please work then 
on specifying the moment when our first units should start pulling out, 
how this could be verified, and you ---- 
 
general  
WESLEY CLARK 
--- allow to complete the withdrawal, and you may pull out if you want, 
but we'll continue bombing until the structure of those forces is 
determined, and we won't be able to stop the bombing until after that 
document is adopted. 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
Sir, finally I'd say something about the principles which have been agreed 
and accepted. Nothing's been said about the structure of the forces and 
their mandate. I've only been told the bombing will stop with the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army units, and then – 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
General, we should also agree to adopt the five principles because if you 
want to define the mandate and the structure of the forces, then he must 
adopt the principles concerning the presence of the international security 
forces, and he hasn't done that, and therefore, we cannot stop the 
bombing --- 
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colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
But, Sir, the decision on the presence of the international security forces 
should be made by the Security Council. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
No, this isn't so. This is only under the auspices of the Security Council; it 
doesn't have the powers to do it. There's nothing in the agreement saying 
that. The agreement reads that this should be under the auspices of the 
UN, and it's up to us to make a decision on this. That's just the same as 
we did in Dayton. 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
General, what we want to suggest now is that the boys in the field, the 
group working on this, in order to save time, to let them work on the 
withdrawal plan. We'll discuss all other aspects afterwards with you and 
other individuals. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
We must discuss it now, immediately, because we cannot finish it today. 
We want the bombing to stop now, just like you. We must agree on the 
structure so that we can proceed. Therefore, the mandate and the 
structure, which we should accept today, it doesn't matter whether it'll be 
done in person now, on the phone or whether these people down there, in 
the field, will do it, it's probably easier because they can do it in stages, 
but the agreement on this must be reached today so that we can continue 
working on the suspension of the bombing, and then this could go to the 
Security Council.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
General, the latest instructions are… could you pass on the message to 
your team, and the message, i.e., the order will be issued to our team also 
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– to continue working on these principles which we've accepted. We'll 
call you later on in connection to the issue of the mandate and the 
structure of the forces. 
 
general  
WESLEY CLARK 
When will you call me? 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
I don't know. Wait please. General, we'll get back to you in about two 
hours. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
All right. I'll tell the team to continue working, but I want to make myself 
clear that we, either down there – in the field, or now – on the phone, 
must adopt the remaining part of the document so that we could, then, 
work on the verification of the starting point for the withdrawal in order 
to suspend the bombing. We all want the same, we just need to cooperate 
and work on this together. 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
All right, general, we'll be working on this and we'll call you again. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Alright, I'll be waiting for your call. Thank you. 
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
Thank you. 
* * *  
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In Kosovo and Metohija, special political headquarters had been 
established that was practically commanding the army and the police 
in the province. The headquarters chief was Nikola Sainovic, 
nicknamed Patton, probably after American general. Milosevic's 
longstanding associate and friend was advocating the concept 
according to which the problems did not exist if they did not appear 
in the press. Such a concept was also embraced by the Serbian 
government and its prime minister Mirko Marjanovic. The 
internationalisation of the problem was not what the Serbian regime 
wanted, and this was one the reasons for the conflict between 
Belgrade and Washington. Terrorists saw their chance in this and 
fully took the advantage of the opportunity.  
This organ had effectively commanded the operations conducted by 
the security forces in Kosovo and Metohija before the bombing 
started. During the very NATO aggression on FRY, Milosevic pulled 
another loser he had up his sleeve. Given his age and the roles he had 
played in the Milosevic's era, this individual would better be amateur 
chess player in the Kalemegdan park with other pensioners than a 
general. Of course, we refer here to Aleksandar Bakocevic. Slobodan 
rewarded him with the rank of lieutenant general and appointed him 
the head of the morale and information department. Hence, this was 
the department which conducted the propaganda war against the 
aggressor. 
Advocating the above-mentioned thesis that the problems do not 
exist, if the media do not see them, this general was in favour of 
strengthening the morale through informing the public in the 
following vein – "keep on battering us, we can't feel a thing". And 
while the Shqiptars were producing refugees where there were not  
actually any, and while we were hiding ours even in places where 
there were some, enraptured crowds were shown dancing with usual 
suspects – female singers. Militarily, we could not defeat the stronger 
enemy, while we lost the propaganda war the moment it was formed. 
Sympathies of average western citizens were targeted, but instead of 
seeing on their TV sets deserted Serbian cities, queues for food, 
candles instead of lights, they actually saw enraptured crowds which 
turned the other cheek after being slapped once. I often wondered 
what the purpose of that was. You could make no one cry with that in 
London or New York.  
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Nikola Sainovic, the then federal deputy prime minister, was 
Milosevic's right hand and as such he was present at almost all the 
talks on Kosovo crisis.  
 
* * * 
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
There are new moments here. Clark has just called to say he's got a 
problem with our team because they want to discuss only the issues under 
the article 2, that's the withdrawal plan, and he says it's totally 
unacceptable, and that everything must be accepted, and we said that was 
out of the question, that it wasn't defined, etc. And he said: "I know the 
Security Council hasn't adopted it, we have to adopt it", and the Security 
Council would endorse it.  
We told him three times our team was authorised to discuss the 
withdrawal plan, and that no time should be wasted, that he should work 
with our people on the withdrawal plan and there's nothing else we've got 
to discuss now. He says yes, but then I have no powers to stop the 
bombing.  
We told him this was our position, and our next conversation is in two 
hours. 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
This is our position, we should come up with (inaudible)  
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
I have two proposals. The first is to try to re-formulate, to discard from 
this text everything that's not for this text… to try because it means our 
people said these general provisions and general things shouldn't be 
discussed. Now we could put it in a preamble, one sentence that 
Yugoslavia will accept the forces which the UN Security Council in 
accordance with the Charter or the way it says in that paper… He says 
the structure must be known, well, it must be known the way the Security 
Council defines it, and Clark says this should be specified today, 
otherwise if it isn't specified today, there would be no suspension of the 
bombing tomorrow.  
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minister JOVANOVIC  
We should say we've got no authorisation to specify the structure. 
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
We've already said to him, and he absolutely understands we're right, but 
he's got other orders. Meaning, we've got to organise ourselves 
immediately to deal with it. He's got orders to go public and say 
Yugoslavia hasn't accepted the first paper from this document, and that's 
the withdrawal of forces, and they point to the withdrawal as the crucial 
thing in this document, and says… We told Clark, our people who have 
the powers down there to work on the withdrawal plan. Please give 
orders to your people to do it as well; the fact that you've got additional 
questions, this shouldn't slow down the work on the withdrawal plan. 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Let our people draft a proposal in writing…  
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
But we can't do it, it isn't realistic to burden the people down there, that's 
what we should do here, because they were fighting until this morning, 
until now, and they've come this far. This means we still don't know 
what's been specified, and the withdrawal plan and the withdrawal of the 
first contingent has been determined, not with that, but their condition is 
that we adopt the structure of the troops, the forces which the UN don't 
mention, where NATO command is the political leadership of the North 
Atlantic Alliance and the rest, it's known what's written there, and that's 
scandalous distorting of the agreement.  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
It's a deal.  
* * * 
 
general MILOVANOVIC  
(inaudible)  
 
colonel general  
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DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
This should unfold under the auspices of the UN, and they won't accept 
that only the withdrawal plan is to be made, but they encroach on the 
competencies of the UN Security Council and the UN aren't  mentioned 
anywhere in the text. 
 
general MILOVANOVIC  
(inaudible). 
 
* * * 
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Hello general, do you have any news from above? 
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
We've got news, first Clark called and he continues to dispute that we 
have to accept the complete plan, or so to speak, the proposed plan, and 
to sign it and to start pulling out, until that moment there is no suspension 
of the bombing. 
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
That plan is being drafted bilaterally, not unilaterally.  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
He was told again about this article 1 where there's no mention of the UN 
Security Council, but which stems from these principles we adopted or 
attached to the deployment of the troops under the auspices of the UN.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
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Yes, our forces will be deployed under the auspices of the UN, this means 
– until the UN do not establish those forces, how could they be deployed?  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
We told him that in the first conversation and in the second conversation 
we reiterated that. However, he says the things have ground to a halt 
down there because this group is only discussing the article 2, which is 
what we authorised them to do – to draft this plan for the withdrawal of 
forces from Kosovo and Metohija.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
The UN should give them the mandate, not us.  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
That's what we and deputy prime minister Sainovic pointed out, but he 
wasn't satisfied with that so we agreed to talk again in two hours, and 
that this work continues exclusively on this document regulating the 
withdrawal of our forces. 
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Of course, regarding their powers, their must be empowered by the 
Security Council, and not ourselves – we're part of the agreement. I'd 
suggest to You to call – just like you've talked to this one – to call 
Sergeyev and talk to him, to see why their people are not participating in 
this as promised… Chernomyrdin said in front of Ahtissari, the Finnish 
and the entire delegation, that the deal was made, and they take part, and 
simply to have a talk with him to say it's a very serious handicap because 
they took part in the talks which they brought to us as the result, they 
participated … in the presence of… and now they aren't participating in 
the talks. That's a big handicap, it was even announced yesterday they 
were coming from Moscow, but they didn't come.  
Therefore, call him, have a conversation with him, insist that they come 
and participate down there. You don't need only military envoy, it may be 
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military envoy, but those generals who took part in talks with them in 
Moscow and Bonn and everywhere should be there – those people who 
can do their job. Have a conversation with them. Draft the theses 
together with Nikola and explain to them what it's all about, above all, in 
terms of the agreement reached with them, and finally, you've made an 
agreement with them, and I did it afterwards with Chernomyrdin, and he 
event talked about it with Talbot, and informed us – both us and 
Ahtissari, and his people and our people, you were there, I was there, I 
even talked to Talbot – he was suggesting some Finnish bloke if they 
wanted, and they said for the time being they couldn't, but they agree 
totally this should go, they should be the ones. Accordingly, the doors are 
open for them, and taking into account the tripartite agreement and the 
need for us to be there. We cannot explain why they aren't here.  
In this respect, draft some theses and tell them what this man insists on, 
etc., and you should insist that they join in so that the best solution could 
be found. Make sure you have that conversation.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
We suggest – before our next call for Clark – to have the concept for our 
proposal. I'd call it preamble to this text of the agreement which would 
include what we're insisting on all the time, and that's to have this and 
that done under the auspices of the UN.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
That mandate should be determined by the UN, and not us to propose this 
to them. This issue of the mandate and their presence is not in the hands 
of Yugoslavia or NATO but it's in the hands of the UN. This isn't 
something you do by reaching an agreement between Yugoslavia and 
NATO. Through the agreement we adopted – brought by Cernomyrdin 
and Ahtissari – we accepted the international forces under the auspices 
of the UN. This means the UN must first establish those forces, declare it 
in a decision, and the representative of those forces, which are effectively 
under the UN … with the representatives of those forces – those could be 
all that people who are there, but, of course, others as well because we're 
talking here about the forces under the UN auspices… he would discuss 
these other details, and we assumed the obligation only to negotiate this 
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withdrawal plan, the beginning of the entire story, and when it starts, to 
stop this to give a chance to the UN to issue a resolution.  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
All of that, we've just told him.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
We're there really in good… in the basic document we adopted it says the 
forces would be deployed under the UN auspices. Therefore, this part 
now which is discussed with them – these aren't the forces under the UN 
auspices but NATO, so that, regarding the mandate, it's their right, etc. 
This isn't the issue for our agreement with them but for the UN mandate 
which we will influence with our suggestions aimed at UN, and not some 
agreement between us and NATO. These are elementary things. If such a 
preamble suits you, you may put it in writing, but that's only an 
explanation.  
 
colonel general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
That's only an explanation to make them assume the obligation so that 
they understand what's instructed…  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Of that plan which envisages the deployment of troops under the UN 
auspices we expect that the UN make a decision to establish such forces, 
and only after these forces come into existence after the approval of the 
UN Security Council, they can conduct talks on their mandate and the 
preparations for the deployment plan. If it says the troops under the UN  
auspices would be deployed, then these troops must first exist, you can't 
do anything with the forces which are not under the UN auspices. That's 
clear, and you talk but keep amongst ourselves and them, those that we 
battle with over the pattern of withdrawal and the model for the 
beginning when they make here this plan.  
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deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
Everything you've said is absolutely clear... (inaudible).     
 
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Good, our obligations entail that we accept the forces under the UN 
auspices. We cannot go beyond the obligation which has been accepted. 
Accordingly, what he demands is more than what the agreement says. If 
that is so, we really cannot exceed the limits laid down in the agreement, 
and this should be clear to him. Our organs, the parliament and the 
government, have accepted such a formulation under the UN auspices. 
Therefore, we may talk about these forces, those forces will exist; a child 
can't get a job before it's born. The forces will be (.... foreign language). 
Insist on this paragraph. Do insist you are to stick to that paragraph and 
that you're not having any new demands, while he puts forth a demand 
which is not covered by that paragraph, but because of that, let Ojdanic 
speak to Sergeyev and let Ojdanic present this to Sergeyev, but he should 
insist these people should come. First, these forces must be established, 
and we can't talk about their mandate before they're established. This 
isn't our job, this is something UN has to do, they should be given their 
mandate by the UN, not us. We're taking part in this.  
This should be explained to Clark and his interest is to make a deal on 
these principles, which needn't be at all in accordance with his model, but 
this normal, realistic model, and his interest is to have a break as soon as 
possible because this would allow that UN resolution be drafted. And 
since they know they've got the biggest influence on the Security Council, 
they also want this resolution to be adopted. Therefore, before you 
establish those principles and put on paper what's been achieved so far, 
what all the sides agreed on, you should dictate when  the withdrawal 
would start, impose that the beginning of the withdrawal be then 
demonstrated and that it be clear and visible, etc. They can announce the 
break, but you should meanwhile continue with the talks, while the 
Security Council would have an open door to draft the resolution. The 
resolution may then be finished in two, three days.  
    
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
(inaudible).  
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FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
The point is not whether someone from here empowered our delegation, 
for example, I  or I don't know who, but the thing is that this text of the 
document has been adopted in our parliament, and it clearly states – the 
forces under the UN auspices, and you can't go beyond that.  
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
(inaudible) 
 
* * * 
 
The war had to be stopped and it could have been stopped. Western 
analysts had thought Milosevic would have succumbed under the 
bombs after a couple of days. And he also had thought the war would 
have come to an end under the pressure exerted by the public in 
western countries at the time. This was the conflict of two stubborn 
opponents, at loggerheads with each other, and one of them was, so to 
speak, just an infant. Horrible days were passing by wasted in these 
efforts to outwit the adversary and the efforts to conceal and hide. 
Actually, negotiations were never put on hold at all. At the beginning, 
we could have stopped the war in a situation that was much more 
favourable for us, and more importantly, with considerably fewer 
casualties. As the time passed, there were increasingly more 
initiatives coming from all quarters, from reputable people involved 
in global politics all over the world. The destruction was increasingly 
more devastating. There were threats the death toll, the cost in 
human lives, would be much higher. All the while, while other 
people's children were dying in Kosovo's wasteland, but in the 
Belgrade boulevards as well, the son of the "supreme commander" 
was surrounded by bodyguards from the state security service, SDB, 
put on display his military skills in Pozarevac and its surroundings, 
and, at times, in Belgrade itself. Marko was in love with firearms, 
cars and women, just like any other spoilt brat would be. He was 
given loads of weapons even though he hadn't served the army. All 
that did not stop him from strutting around in his newly found role. 
His mother praised him in public saying she was proud of her 
"soldier without a day of military training", and probably, at the 
same time, she was very happy that he did not have to be in the 
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border area, in Kosare, Kosovo, where death was a privilege and life 
pure hell.  
 
 
* * * 
minister JOVANOVIC  
I talked to Milosevic. He'll immediately talk to Ivanov and he knows what 
the problem is, what's the heart of the matter here. He'll suggest Ivanov 
should talk to Albright. There's no ministerial meeting, that is, Russia and 
Ivanov won't attend the G8 summit tomorrow. The things are getting 
more complicated on the Russian political scene.  
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
(inaudible) Russians expect of us to ease up a bit....  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Alright, that's OK, and we can say, based on the principles which have 
been adopted, we're ready to talk and reach an agreement on the cost of 
the withdrawal and technical issues related to this pursuant to the 
provision contained in the 10th principle, and nothing of this that we 
aren't ready, what's the Security Council, what's this, what's that – I 
wouldn't even mention it.  
Regarding the issue of the Security Council, that should be separated. 
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
Mandate, structure, dynamics, numbers, and everything else should be 
determined by the Security Council in a resolution and the authorised.... 
and we're ready.... (inaudible).  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Send me a car so that I can go there.  
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
Done.  
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* * * 
minister JOVANOVIC  
I've got a car, I'll come, I'll come in my car.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
Good. 
 
 
* * * 
 
(inaudible) 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
Blagoje11, we'll do two things. The first is to work with all the participants 
to ensure in all possible ways the authenticity of the 
Ahtissari/Cernomyrdin agreement. Already this first article on this paper 
is trying to change this radically. Therefore, that the agreement has been 
reached on this without my knowledge, that Ahtissari has talked to Zika 
Jovanovic, this is simply not true, the former or the latter, that's not true. 
This only shows what they're prepared to resort to.  
Secondly, you should go on like this, which means that your position and 
when they come out.... you're there to continue working on the agreement 
to withdraw the forces. You must not accept that it's suspended. Try to get 
it. Clark and Ojdanic agreed that the fact that there are some contentious 
issues shouldn't stop the work on reaching the agreement on the 
withdrawal. Therefore, this Clark-Ojdanic agreement exists.  
Clark and Ojdanic will talk again, but you should now work on what 
you've already been empowered to do. That's number one. 
Number two, Zika is preparing something to send to you. He'll send it by 
fax, some of these general issues which are not related to the withdrawal, 
but the UN forces and the rest. So, anyway, you've got to say you're in 
consultations with Belgrade over other issues, but you should work with 
them on those things for which you've been authorised. As soon as we put 
it together, we'll send it to you. We're working on this, and we'll try to do 
it as quickly as possible. You've got the text, I think Vujovic has the text of 
                                                 
11 This is probably retired general Blagoje Kovacevic, who was asked to help out the army when the 
1999 bombing started. He was involved in the talks in relation to the Kumanovo agreement.  
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the Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin agreement, and it's item 3 where it says these 
forces are to be under the UN auspices, etc., and the whole text which 
was adopted in its entirety by the Serbian parliament and the federal 
government, and no one can write now something else. You'll get the 
formulations. We're working on this to include others, and you should 
stick to the task at hand, say it to them well, so that we wouldn't waste 
time, let's at least work on this....  
 
........... 
They should compile a list of the destruction, according to some 
information, there are about 2,000 injured, and in another paper it was 
1,500, and then in another we had 6,500, and we also have 10,000 in one 
the documents. Which figure should we take?  
   
minister JOVANOVIC  
Regarding the casualties, put down thousands of murdered civilians, and 
speaking of the injured, say, it's over 6,000, over 6,000, seriously 
wounded civilians. 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
President, Ahtissari called through my office. He wanted to speak to You 
and he left the phone number: 993589661133.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
When did he ask for it? 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Five minutes ago.  
 
FRY president 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Ok, bye.  
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PREPARATIONS FOR SIGNING THE 
KUMANOVO AGREEMENT 
 
"Once you hear the details about the 
victory, it is hard to distinguish it  
from a defeat." 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
Ever since the moment Zika called me until now I've talked to Ahtissari 
and he told me they're collaborating splendidly, that their spirit is 
exceptional, that there is some general, whom he informed that they were 
working professionally, but that the problem was that they weren't 
authorised to sign some things. He asked me to authorise them so that 
they can finish the work. I told him they're totally authorised to stick to 
the document, but this isn't the authorisation in question; the issue is that 
something more than the document is demanded, and that provision and 
the basic principle of the document were the forces under the UN 
auspices and that the decisions on them are made on the basis of the UN 
Charter, all of which is written in that provision.  
Accordingly, before these forces are established, and only the Security 
Council is authorised to set up these forces, we cannot discuss the 
mandate of the non-existing forces, and then I explained this all to him, 
and I told him as a politician – as you remember, we said in the 
conclusion of our assembly that the main qualities of this plan were: first, 
the fact that it guarantees sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
secondly, that this plan emphasises the role of UN and shifts the whole 
affair into the hands of the UN.  
This is what we've told our people, this is how we explained it to them, 
this is the most sensitive issue, and now You explain as a politician to 
generals that the UN should make the decision on KFOR12, which before 
the UN "establishes" it, as he himself put it, does not exist on the basis of 
the UN Charter. Accordingly, we cannot discuss the mandate of non-
existing forces. He understood it, he'll talk to the generals, he proposed 
we should be in contact because it is very important to finish this all, in 
order to announce the break. I told him that there'll be a session of the 
                                                 
12 Acronym for foreign troops deployed in Kosovo under the UN auspices.  
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Security Council, that this isn't in our hands, but your hands, but both 
them and I believe that they negotiating very well and very professionally 
about the withdrawal plan. Yes, he says, its absolutely clear there must be 
no vacuum, yes, I said too, this is what's written here and the assumption 
is the main and the only objective is the safe environment for all the 
inhabitants of Kosovo.  
Therefore, I'm glad they've reached an agreement on this main objective, 
and that they will work accordingly, but they can do what is a part of the 
document you've brought, not us, and which our parliament adopted. 
Explain to the generals that I cannot go beyond the limits set by this 
document, and in this respect, we had a long conversation, and it was 
perfectly decent. He said he'd be in touch with them; finally, he'd been 
UN undersecretary for all those years so that he should be able to explain 
to them what I said. I told him a child cannot get employed before it's 
born. They want to employ KFOR which hasn't even been established by 
the Security Council; when it's established it won't bother us to have 
those same people, personnelwise, the same representatives, but they 
must be authorised by the Security Council, which is to make a decision 
on establishing KFOR, and that's the only crucial issue, and since this is 
one of the two essential elements of the document and of two crucial 
conclusions of the Serbian parliament, then this element must not be 
neglected.  
Therefore, the issue is not whether I authorise someone more or less but 
what's in the document. In the document, which he understands very well 
is this, and he reiterated it several times although he knew KFOR would 
be established, KFOR will be established by the Security Council, and I 
said – exactly, just what you've said, only when it's established, then we'll 
decide what its mandate should be. This is the issue for the Security 
Council, and not a bilateral agreement between us and NATO. In the 
agreement which you and Chernomyrdin brought we have as the forces 
under the UN auspices, and when the Security Council sets them up, then 
this will be an issue to talk with them about. I think I explained to them 
the whole story, much better than I've just explained to you, because you 
know everything so I don't have to go back, but he understands as well 
and I've asked him to explain to the generals political dimension and 
political sensitivity of this issue, and that this isn't something that can be 
neglected. This is one of the two crucial elements of the agreement which 
both Chernomyrdin and himself highlighted as an element. 
Well, that's all. He says they're working fine, they should keep on working 
like that in order to speed up the suspension of the bombing. I said I was 
in favour of this, but if the sequence of further steps is in some confusion, 
either before or after – this isn't in our hands – the fact that you made as 
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a plan to have a Security Council session isn't in our hands, but actually 
in your hands, so here you go – solve the problems in your hands now. 
We'll bona fide, that is in good faith discharge our obligations, but don't 
make us go beyond what the document contains, the one which you and 
Chernomyrdin have brought, and it says, I had the original document in 
my bag, and I quoted it, and he said it was so, now I'll call the generals 
and we'll see what they will pressure him into… I mean Clark and the 
rest, but I think that he should be able to explain this to them as a 
professional from the UN and a politician who is aware of the sensitivity 
of the issue.  
Do you have something for me? 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC   
I just want to tell you well receive it by fax. Kovacevic called and said he 
was relatively satisfied and also said the other party was OK in this 
military part, and it's almost completed, that they've made certain 
concessions in relation to what's been predetermined and offered 
previously. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
It's important they've understood there must be no vacuum, and that's 
perfectly all right, while KFOR is not there, it doesn't exist; and NATO is 
not the one to achieve this, but KFOR, and KFOR will come into 
existence when the Security Council establishes it. 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC   
We've got an agreement to talk to Clark again. May I refer to your 
conversation?  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
You may say the president talked to president Ahtissari; president 
Ahtissari called president Milosevic and they completely understood each 
other. This issue is one of the two most important elements because 
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president Ahtissari publicly mentioned here one element that was 
important – the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, the second element which was 
important being that this is to be under the UN auspices, and this element 
mustn't be neglected, and in this respect this is the main argument 
presented to the public and we're hoping president Ahtissari will explain 
this to you.  
Say president Ahtissari called president Milosevic and they had a 
complete understanding regarding these crucial elements. These are on 
the paper, and there's no difference between them. I think Zika and Saja13 
would understand this very well.  
     
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC   
Well, they're listening to it, and at 8 p.m. they'll be at home, they'll have 
telephone at home Sergeyev, and I'll have the conversation you've 
ordered.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
President, we've received a Russian recommendation which has two 
items. It says the Yugoslav leadership should give a statement about its 
readiness to start withdrawing its forces from Kosovo in accordance with 
the timetable and along the roads that have been suggested, or now we 
can already say harmonised with NATO but under the condition of 
simultaneous suspension of the bombing.  
Two. All the other issues related to the solution of the Balkan crisis, as 
envisaged by the Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin plan, must be solved through 
decisions made by the Security Council.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
This isn't bad, but this should be checked once again, and with these 
people down there, if such a statement would satisfy them as well, and 
particularly we should check out what they agreed, not in terms of 
specific days but the quality – what's been done – to avoid the vacuum.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
                                                 
13 Zivorad Jovanovic and Nikola Sainovic, foreign minister and deputy prime minister respectively. 
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Of course, we'll get it now, and probably they mean if the talks do not 
succeed there, then such a statement should be given.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
I think it'll work. I hope so because I explained it to Ahtissari in crystal 
clear terms how sensitive this political issue is. It's impossible that he 
won't be able to explain this to the generals.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
That's clear. If it's totally clear to Clark, then it's clear to everyone.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
What they've told you, you can tell them, I mean those two points.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
We've been thinking about it in case this isn't closed, or if we have a 
problem, to prepare some statement. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
No, not that statement. They can give it to them down there, and then they 
could say they've stated it, to say that everything down there is agreed 
and ready to start with, and that other issues are for the Security Council, 
but they can tell them this as well.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
They can give it to them as our final position.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
As one position, never say 'final'. 
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Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
As a position, but this could subsequently presented to the public.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
First see how they agree. I hope everything will be all right because we 
really have no reason not to look someone in the eye because we'll meet 
all our obligations sincerely, this isn't a contentious issue and I think the 
army people will find mutual common ground perfectly.  
We talked about this, about the fact that one must hand over, while the 
other must accept.  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
Since this reached Ahtissari with so many details, then they reached an 
agreement with even more details. Otherwise, how come he should know 
what we talked about here.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
They're, as you might say, common-sense people, why should they cause 
any troubles for themselves? Now that someone be killed because there's 
no concern in place to effect the transfer in a timely manner so that some 
are coming in, while others are leaving. Good.  
 
general  
WESLEY CLARK 
You think this is a misunderstanding.  
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
Yes. 
 
general 
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WESLEY CLARK 
I don't think so. But, listen, will you be here for some time.  
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
Yes. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Alright, we'll call you back right away. Is there anything else you'd like to 
tell me?  
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
No, sir. May I call you in 10 minutes. I'm not in my office.  
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Alright. Call me in 10 minutes. Would you like to tell me something more 
in relation to this? 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
OK. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Wait, what I don't understand is what you're telling me, what you've told 
me that Ahtissari and Milosevic agreed on. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
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About all the objections we've talked to you about previously, about the 
proposed Agreement.14 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
In other words, you don't agree with respect to the mandate and 
structure. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
This is the problem that should be considered.  
 
general  
WESLEY CLARK 
And Ahtissari, you say, said this should be done after the passage of the 
United Nations Security Council resolution. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
I haven't told you that. I don't know if you're aware of the details of that 
conversation, but generally speaking, he accepted what we suggested, our 
objections.  
 
general  
WESLEY CLARK 
Here's what's my problem. We can't stop the bombing until after this 
document is accepted, and this is why this document must be accepted. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
We understand what's your problem. May we suggest you to talk to 
Ahtissari first, and then we'll call you in 10 minutes.  
                                                 
14 The reference is the Kumanovo Agreement which provided for  the cease-fire in June 1999.  
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general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Alright, we'll call Ahtissari. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
Please, do it. And then, I'll call you in 10 minutes. 
 
general 
WESLEY CLARK 
Alright, thank you. 
 
colonel  
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
Thank you, sir. 
 
* * * 
 
All of our diplomacy, or to put it better – what was left of it, was 
working frantically in those days. The war had to be stopped at any 
cost because this was a unique chance to survive and stay in power. 
There was a serious danger that Slobodan Milosevic might disappear 
from the political scene after a possible rebellion in the army or a 
miners' strike, it was all the same. The situation was in every respect 
extremely unfavourable for the regime and the slightest incident 
could bring about the Romanian option in terms of toppling the 
current government. The West appointed Ahtissari, while the East 
selected Chernomyrdin as their special representatives and envoys 
respectively, who conducted political, not military, negotiations on 
behalf of the UN. NATO generals were in charge of military talks. 
Milosevic saw a way out for himself in foreign troops in Kosovo but 
under the UN auspices. At the time, he could not care less which 
army was arriving – it might have well been the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, KLA, if they were under the banner of the UN. Mere 
formalism which left Milosevic enough room to manoeuvre so that he 
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could present the defeat as the victory of the UN principles in which 
he never believed, or should I say, in which he believed only when it 
suited him.  
 
Ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
There will be talks with those people there in about twenty minutes, and 
it's important to stop this, not to allow it to continue. I think it's 
unacceptable what's going on down there. They will go public now; 
they've asked me to agree to that – whether they should call the 
representative of the embassy, and then to insist that this would mean the 
usurping of the Security Council role. 
I'll contact you later. If there's need to write it all down, I'll do it 
afterwards, but that's disputable. This is it essentially, they'll have now… 
this colleague of yours… he'll speak with those people there at half past 
ten, my local time, and then there goes this main news which would be 
something like – according to the information from the embassy 
representative in Moscow... and then political commentary on this, 
condemnation, etc.  
Everybody knows everything and that paper which had been submitted 
was accepted. 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
With what they would like to go public – this also depends on the outcome 
of their talks.  
 
ambassador  
BORA MILOSEVIC  
They also know that.  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
They should say the talks which are being conducted, which have started, 
should focus on technical issues and the withdrawal plan, while the talks 
between military experts cannot deal with the issue of the mandate, the 
structure of the forces or their chain of command because these forces 
will have a mandate, this should be under the UN auspices, and look… 
it's no good, they needn't use us to cover this. They shouldn't mention us, 
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they know – this is no secret, that's the document, they don't have to 
mention the Yugoslav embassy, or the Yugoslav side in this. Instead they 
should state the talks being conducted now should focus on technical 
issues related to the implementation of the peace plan, and this means – 
the plan and the timetable for withdrawal.  
Regarding the mandate, the structure and leadership…  
 
ambassador  
BORA MILOSEVIC  
Ok, I know that. The question is now whether this commentary will like 
that the way they plan it, or will it be different.  I can say they shouldn't 
mention us. They've asked me whether they could say the representative 
of the embassy informed them…  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
No need. Don't give it to them.  
 
ambassador  
BORA MILOSEVIC  
I haven't given them anything. I gave them what you said.  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
There should be no mention of the Yugoslav embassy, the talks are under 
way, they're not suspended. We should talk, and we mustn't now make it 
more difficult. Don't let them quote you, this would mean we're 
complaining to the Russians. They are there where we're heading, etc. If 
we wanted, we would have it from Belgrade. We didn't want it, nor we 
want it now. We're still waiting for the final moment to squeeze something 
out… if it cannot be done, it's never too late for that.  
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
First, he said there's an agreement that in two hours your statement will 
be released in Belgrade, that it's agreed.  
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minister JOVANOVIC  
I haven't agreed on anything with anyone, nothing's been agreed. I'm in 
the headquarters, Bora, I have no one to make an agreement. No 
statements are agreed with the head of the state, and all others are here.  
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
Good, Zika, I asked him to stop it, and he said he would blow a whistle 
now, but it's not certain whether it'll be so… Well, is it so essential?  
 
minister JOVANOVIC 
Well, it is essential. It's crucial that the talks continue. We're constantly 
in contact with Brussels, with Macedonia where our people are. We're 
working on this, we're struggling, we don't know what'll come out of it… 
we're talking with Ahtissari, we're talking to this one and that one. 
Everything's in motion, nothing's completed. 
What's know to them as a state, it's that text, and they shouldn't pretend 
they don't know anything about it – they've got the text.  
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
They say they're not acquainted with this, the Russians. They don't have 
it. Where from could they get the text? 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
We gave it to them. We didn't give to ITARTAS15 but their ministry and 
the government. 
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
I understand it all.  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
                                                 
15 Russian news agency. 
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OK, well then… bye.  
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
The man tells me he tried to stop it and now their man will call me to see 
how to word it, or I should, if it can't be done like that, remove that news, 
but they think it's much better not to keep silent but to see what's there, 
not like to vacillate about it, but to attack it clearly. He spoke like that, 
these are his words.  
Now a man should get in touch with me..... 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
They should only remove the source. 
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
They can't publish it then. 
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Well, if they can't, I can't do anything about it. 
 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC  
There's nothing else I can do but to wait for that man.  
 
minister JOVANOVIC  
Well, OK now, if it's gone, then it's gone. Well then, bye.  
 
colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC  
General and for the minister… says they are… the talks and in agreement 
that our senior political representative will arrive tomorrow down there 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            64  
 64
and the talks this issue are continuing, and now he says – while the talks 
are under way, the bombing won't be stopped.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
This is why I think it's totally adequate… due to the fact that those basic 
elements were presented at the beginning of the Document, technical 
modalities are something else. If they make an agreement on total 
withdrawal, we may say the Agreement on Withdrawal has been reached 
and we're prepared to continue with the withdrawal, and other problems 
should be resolved at the level of the Security Council. This is what's 
logical and normal. We can't now talk about the KFOR mandate and the 
agreement on this cannot be reached because, and you know it better 
than me, this is totally in the hands of the Security Council, it's not up to 
us. Besides, KFOR, as you agreed on this an hour ago during our 
conversation, will be established by the Security Council. If this is so, and 
please, bear in mind the political sensitivity of this issue, the idea to 
cancel anything of this wouldn't even cross our minds, and we've no 
reason for something like that. If we accept your plan, what does it mean 
to us if within some period of time there's a delay of two or three days. 
Nothing. We are, therefore, ready, and we're doing everything we can 
with the best of intentions, without any problems.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
What you're telling me is that you oppose any detailed outline in the 
preamble of the technical agreement.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I must tell you I've no agreement in front of myself. I was only informed 
today at noon what the problem is.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
May I try, because we must, I think both of us want this whole thing to be 
resolved. Let's see how we can proceed from here to reach the position 
that this issue is under the UN auspices, as you yourself have said, that 
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this military agreement must be adopted by the United Nations Security 
Council.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
But this is different from what we agreed on yesterday. Please, president 
Ahtissari, we were not expected to take over the powers vested in the 
Security Council or to reach an agreement with NATO. The agreement 
could be, say, negotiated between KFOR and ourselves, due to the fact 
that only KFOR .... 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
But, please, how can you withdraw under the NATO bombs if you haven't 
reached any agreement with them.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
We've agreed on the plan, as you've mentioned while we were talking, the 
agreement on the withdrawal plan, and then we we'd start pulling out. 
They would be able to see it from the air, to see if we were really 
withdrawing  so that it would be satisfy them, so that they could say OK, 
we can stop it now.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
A moment, please, I think both sides should demand .... I'm trying to say 
how we can avoid what your officers are also concerned about, that there 
is no security vacuum.  
 
President  SRJ 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
That there's no security vacuum.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, while your people are withdrawing, others should come in.  
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President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but president Ahtissari, who is expected to arrive? KFOR. KFOR 
may only arrive after the Security Council gives its approval for KFOR to 
come in....  In item 3 it's clearly stated – I haven't got this in front of 
myself – but I'll try ----- 
 
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
President Milosevic, allow me to try to explain it to you. I think, if I've 
been listening to your carefully, I've just received the Military Technical 
Agreement, I've got it here. What you're talking about is that the KFOR 
activity should not be defined in a manner in which it's been done in the 
Military Technical Agreement, that the agreement should focus on 
withdrawal.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but.. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Because the military-technical agreement must exist. Otherwise, we can't 
have NATO stop the bombing.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Why can't they stop, please, president Ahtissari. If there's a clear 
agreement on the withdrawal plan, and if its implementation starts ....  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, but president Milosevic, this is what military officials are trying to 
do, to get the details on the withdrawal. I see you object to the fact that 
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the Military Technical Agreement contains things that should be, in fact, 
resolved by the Security Council.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I'm only referring to the item 3 in our document, which you and 
Chernomyrdin presented to us, where it's clearly stated: deployment of 
civilian structures of security forces in Kosovo shall be under the UN 
auspices, and this shall be decided pursuant to the UN Charter; so we 
explained to our citizens that the main reason for their accepting this was 
that these troops, which are to be present in Kosovo, would be under the 
UN auspices. This is indeed an important element, president Ahtissari, 
you can't avoid it.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, this is undisputable, but you're well aware of the sequence of events. 
Above all, we've got to reach an agreement on how to effect the 
withdrawal, because – if this is not verified, bombing will not be stopped.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but they can verify from the air.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
That's true, but the agreement must be reached on how you're going to do 
it, and I think this military technical agreement contains details in this 
respect.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I'll read the Military Technical Agreement to you, and I don't know 
what's the problem now, given the simple fact that we'll pull out. 
Therefore, there are no....... 
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President 
AHTISSARI 
 
No, no. Before the withdrawal, suspension of bombing may be 
manipulated, this is why we need to sign the Military Technical 
Agreement with you and your forces and NATO. After the suspension, this 
will lead to adoption and approval of the Agreement by the Security 
Council as well as creating the possibility to establish KFOR troops, and 
KFOR will soon after arrive in order to avoid security vacuum.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
This is what I've assumed, that we won't create any sort of security 
vacuum.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
The Security Council session cannot be held until after the bombing is 
stopped.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I understand, but this is not in our power – to plan all those steps, it's up 
to you.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
No, no, this is not even in my power. I'm not a representative of the 
Security Council, I'm not even a member, there you have only permanent 
members. But this is the way the things go, and we must try to follow it.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but president Ahtissari, wouldn't it be enough if - I don't know yet, 
but I'll check it out; I suppose the military representatives have reached 
an agreement on withdrawal plans. If the plan for pulling out was 
accepted by both sides, and if we started pulling out - and they can see it 
from the air and prove it – then they could simply say - it's verified that 
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the withdrawal started, we'll stop the bombing now, and all other issues 
will be solved by the Security Council. And we can say we agree with the 
withdrawal, we'll start pulling out as agreed, while the Security Council 
will be authorised to solve all other problems. This is not our problem, 
these are the problems under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, 
which also relate to ourselves as well.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
But Mr. Milosevic, we also have to work in a way which will not lead us 
to an impasse in the Security Council, which in turn will result in a 
renewed bombing.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Why? 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Because I'm very concerned that this Military Technical Agreement could 
be such that it wouldn't allow the suspension of the bombing to be 
manipulated; I'd love to see the Security Council giving its approval for 
that Agreement, and very soon, after the approval of this agreement, that 
this enables the establishment of the KFOR troops. KFOR will then come, 
so that we'll avoid this --- 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
As soon as the Security Council establishes the KFOR troops, KFOR will 
be able to come, given the fact that it's envisaged in the agreement you've 
given to us. Therefore, the only problem is that the forces enter the 
province under the UN auspices, not in some other capacity, but only 
under the UN auspices. These will be the same forces, these will be the 
same people, everything's the same, but we need this political element to 
be clear – under the UN auspices, this is what we've explained to our 
people. Sorry, please ... 
 
President  
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AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, this is indeed the sort of operation we had in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The decision-making process at the level of the Security Council will be 
the same.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
This is up to the Security Council. I've no objections to what the Security 
Council will be deciding. The only objection I have is related to the fact 
which is stated in your document that the arriving troops will be under 
the UN auspices, and nothing more. That's, you know, what we explained 
to the people in political terms, and nothing more. I realise that this issue 
is essentially no different, but symbolically – there's a great difference.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Mr. Milosevic, as I've already told you, these are not traditional 
peacekeeping forces, as I've already said it to you.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Whichever decision the Security Council makes, we're under obligation to 
accept it, president Ahtissari, because this what we have in the 
documents. But the only problem – you know we were not pleased with 
your document – but even now we're not objecting to it; we believe 
Chernomyrdin and yourself when you said this was the best you could 
achieve. We replied to this that it's alright, and then we suggested to our 
parliament to accept it, which it did. And there were only two elements, 
which were valid arguments to accept the document. These are the 
following: the first, that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our 
country are confirmed; and secondly, that those forces will be under the 
UN auspices. This is what we have in the parliament's decision, and this, 
as you may see, is not particularly strong argumentation – only these two 
arguments were presented to the people. Now, concerning this second 
argument, we cannot simply tell the people it is not so important whether 
it is so or not. We cannot simply explain to the citizens that there's a 
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difference between our agreement and reality. Therefore, if you may get 
the Security Council resolution today, I won't have any objections.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
I've told I can't do it because there are Council members which are in 
favour of the suspension of bombing, and it may not happen, as I already 
told you, Mr. Milosevic, in Belgrade before the signing of the Military 
Technical Agreement. Please, look up the Military Technical Agreement.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
But let's have the Military Technical Agreement implemented only in part 
concerning the withdrawal plan and the timetable for pulling out – not 
the things which are under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. This 
isn't our job.  
 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
I'll try to talk to them and see --- because I've just seen this for the first 
time, in person, because we've got to have this Military Technical 
Agreement verified, to have the bombing stopped, I think, if that Military 
Technical Agreement is signed, it would be the most convenient that both 
sides request that the UN approves of this Agreement, and that it will 
have the powers to establish the KFOR forces.  
 
* * * 
These were painstaking and exhausting negotiations which no one 
enjoyed. The West wanted to stop the war, which lasted much longer 
than planned and cost much more than they thought it would. It was 
increasingly more difficult to explain to the allies and their public the 
notion of the collateral damage, which increased the death toll as the 
bombing was intensifying. Of course, Milosevic was in an 
incomparably worse situation because the bombs threatened to 
undermine his prospects for strengthening his position in the 
aftermath of the bombing campaign and ahead of the forthcoming 
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elections. Slobodan expected to achieve more with the UN special 
envoys. There was no mention of the pre-war referendum in which 
the "people" said no foreign troops should be allowed to enter 
Kosovo. Principles did not matter to anyone anymore. Everyone just 
wanted the war to come to an end. NATO almost accomplished what 
it wanted – to come to Kosovo and Metohija. Though, their first 
neighbour will be the Milosevic's regime in Serbia, but they found a 
solution to this by way of imposing a ban on the flights of our fighter 
aircrafts within the 25-kilometer-wide zone around Kosovo as well as 
establishing the safety border zone which was to be 5 kilometres 
wide.  
The army managed to preserve its resources for the most part 
although the destruction and damages were enormous. Almost 
everything stationary was destroyed, like radio relay hubs and 
facilities, army barracks, depots... Air force and antiaircraft defence, 
RVPVO, suffered the most in terms of losses and casualties during 
the air strikes. Bearing in mind our outdated technical equipment, 
which almost did not allow to strike back at the enemy which was 
pounding our forces from the safe distance – but even in situations 
where we could strike back, we dared not do anything because even 
larger-scale destruction and strikes at our forces would ensue. Hence, 
there was only thing that the army could do. The army spent the 
whole war camouflaging its units in an attempt to prevent further 
destruction.  
Rocket systems like “Luna”, ground-to-ground or coast-to-sea 
rockets, which had the biggest range, were inaccurate and obsolete so 
that the risk of using these was much greater than the possible 
benefits. Rocket systems of the antiaircraft defence also had poor 
range in comparison to the altitude at which the enemy fighter planes 
and bombers were operating.  
* * * 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
President Ahtissari, they have been bombing us for 72 days, and they 
continue to drop  bombs, they drop bombs even today, they did it 
yesterday, they do that everyday, and we accepted your document, and 
there are only two arguments for our citizens, we cannot leave aside 
neither one of those two arguments. We want to see --- 
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President 
AHTISSARI 
 
No, no, I do not ask anything from you, I am explaining to you the 
mechanism that we use to achieve what we all want.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, I understand that, but we cannot say to the citizens that there is a 
mechanism, and that the mechanism is not completely adequate to what 
we said to you, and we said only the things that were written in the 
document – assignation in Kosovo under the auspices of UN, and nothing 
more.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, but before the assignation comes in to effect you have to withdraw 
your forces.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, we shall start with withdrawal.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
And we need a military agreement for that, which is also set down in the 
document.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
A military agreement as a necessary precondition for ceasefire can be 
shorter, focused only on the pattern of withdrawal, which is, as far as you 
told me, was OK, and that agreement contains the plan for withdrawal 
and we start withdrawing, and that will be enough. There is no need for 
us to deal with other elements in relation to the mandate, to who is 
authorized to use force in case of a problem. We are going to withdraw 
now. There is no need to use force, to humiliate people by doing that, 
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please. We shall withdraw and that will be visible, and starting with the 
moment of our withdrawal, you can stop bombing us, the Security 
Council can hold a meeting, you, as a deputy of Secretary General, can 
tell him to start with that, to use forces that they planned to use, that 
would be a symbolic move, that could be done under the auspices of the 
UN, and then all the forces that come to Kosovo will come under the 
auspices of the UN will be OK for us, and that all is in your hands, not 
ours, please, don't --- 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
  
I do not take sides, as I already told you 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but you are in a better position, don't tell me that we have to do more 
than we already accepted to do, please.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
You don't have, but you have to realise that, I have been listening to what 
you said about the plan for withdrawal.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
That is enough, you know, President Ahtissari, if there is good will, that 
will be enough for the beginning… and when we start, you can then start 
drafting a Resolution by the Security Council, and you can have it in, say, 
in two days, I suppose, I don't know, you are better informed about those 
things better than me.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
But we cannot reach that phase before the bombing stops, and it cannot 
stop ---- 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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Why can't it stop, we have accepted the plan, and there is a plan that has 
been accepted and when the withdrawal begins. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
No, but I have already told you that we need a military agreement. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
That is a military agreement. The withdrawal plan is a military 
agreement.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Perfect. But we are now discussing the details of the document more than 
anything else.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I was not informed about the details of the document, I do not take part in 
negotiations.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Neither do I. I am looking at them for the first time now, and I will 
consider them in greater detail, if you don't mind, we may speak on the 
telephone in the morning.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
All right, no problem, as far as I am concerned there is no problem, as 
you can see ---- 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
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I think that it is very important that we go further.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
All right, President Ahtissari, as you can see, I will call you in a few 
minutes at the latest.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
 All right. You are very good at meeting my demands. You know, I am in 
my office, too.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I have to tell you, President Ahtissari, that as far as we are concerned, 
you can be completely safe. Whatever we accepted, and you can check 
that with your old friend Richard Holbrook (15) any time, we fulfilled to 
the latest detail. Thus, we are not the side with ---- please 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
I counted on that.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, that's right. No one can accuse of not fulfilling our obligations. You 
know, I used to work as a president of a bank for 8 years, as the president 
of the biggest national bank. There is no banker in the whole world that 
can tell you that Milosevic was late in fulfilling his obligations, not for a 
second, for 8 years.  
 
Our obligations are clear, and our arguments, which we presented to the 
people were fairly weak, you have to admit that. There are only those two 
arguments, and that is why I kindly ask you to do your best in order that 
both the arguments remain unchanged and that we are able to carry out 
what we signed.  
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President 
AHTISSARI 
 
But, Mister Milosevic, you have to understand something, we cannot have 
a Resolution by the Security Council before we reach a military 
agreement, regardless of its content, we have to verify withdrawal that 
will lead to discontinuation of bombing, and only after the bombing 
ceases and has been established, the Council will meet and adopt the 
Resolution and establish the KFOR forces.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
As you have just said, the content of the agreement is critical. If the 
content of the agreement makes the technical plan for withdrawal that 
was approved by both sides, then it is very easy to achieve that and start 
withdrawing. If the technical agreement has ---- 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Because, --- I somehow received a fax message that your people are 
under impression that you do not need any agreement at all. That is why -
--- 
 
  
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN  MILOSEVIC 
 
Who told you that? 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
No, no, someone among my officers was told by your people that  ---- 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
What did my people tell them? 
 
President 
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AHTISSARI 
 
That you would not need any agreement at all, that must have been a 
complete misunderstanding.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Please, we are all serious people. I do not believe that anybody could 
have said something like that.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, that is resolved. Let's concentrate on the meeting scheduled for 
tomorrow. If need arises, can I call you again? Is there a phone number 
to reach you, or should I do through your Ambassador, as I always do? 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
You can, I do not know this number, excuse my, I will check  3616170. 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
3616170 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, that is the number in Belgrade,   3616170. 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
There must be a country code to dial.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I am sorry, yes, the country code is  381 
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President  
AHTISSARI 
 
And then I dial 3616170 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, that is the number in Belgrade, and the country code is 381. If you 
dial your international code and then  381 11 and then 3616170, that will 
be 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Will you please be kind and repeat the number to me so that I can write it 
down again 381 and then 161 -- 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
No, no, 381 11, and then  3616170 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
(Repeats the numbers). I have put it  down now. Thank you very much.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Could you please read it out to me again? ( President Ahtissari reads out 
the numbers) That is correct.   
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Thank you very much.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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Well I wish you a good night, Mister Ahtissari. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Thank you, good bye. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARRIVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN KOSOVO 
 
"In peace sons bury fathers,  
but war violates the order of nature, 
 and fathers bury sons." 
Herodotus 
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC     
 
Vujovic, we have authorised you to negotiate in accordance with the 
paper which Chernomyrdin and Ahtissari had brought. Therefore, you 
may negotiate with them everything, and that document says (foreign 
language).  So, we… when we… and they, actually Ahtissari and 
Chernomyrdin, were explaining their plan and said the two crucial 
elements which we presented to our citizens as the only arguments to 
accept the plan, which was theirs and it contained these two elements. 
 
One argument is sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and 
the other argument is that the international forces will be under the UN 
auspices. Therefore, we can't now ignore this second argument because 
this is (foreign language). It doesn't matter at all to us now whether those 
will be these same forces they're referring to. The only thing that matters 
to us is this symbolism because we've already told our people so, and we 
said it so because they presented it to us so; and in this item 3 it says 
those elements … that those forces are coming (foreign language). Before 
the Security Council passes a decision (foreign language), those forces 
do not exist, they're set up by the Security Council.  
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Therefore, how can we negotiate powers at this moment of the non-
existing forces, how can a child get employed before it's born. KFOR will 
be born the moment (foreign language), and consequently – that's so 
clear, I don't know if there's anything clearer, and particularly so given 
that this is a politically extremely sensitive issue. We indeed negotiate 
bona fide, we really don't want to avoid anything. We'll meet all our 
obligations and withdraw all the forces, and that's not an issue at all. The 
only thing is that their forces cannot enter Kosovo until those forces are 
(foreign language). What's written in the document delivered by Ahtissari 
and Chernomyrdin is that we can't give it up because it's a crucial and 
essential issue. We had only two arguments for this – the first one is 
sovereignty, and the second one is that these are the forces under the UN 
auspices - we can't deprive ourselves of this argument in any of the 
phases. 
 
Therefore, this is clear. I talked twice with Ahtissari, he called me twice, I 
explained it all and then he said "yes, it's all true", but, he said, this 
should be a technical agreement which should be adopted and agreed, 
which is a prerequisite to start pulling out, and the start of withdrawal 
and the existence of the agreement are prerequisites for a break – that's 
clear, and, in fact, the content of this agreement is contentious. The 
content should encompass what's related to our total withdrawal and the 
beginning, which is to be verifiable, and they can verify this from the air 
easily enough, and they'll be told exactly at what time, when, from which 
place, etc., this would start, and then, they can have a break because 
making a decision on these forces (foreign language) is in the hands of 
the Security Council, not ours. The decision on which powers these forces 
will have is also in the hands of the Security Council and the timing for 
those decisions is also in their hands, not ours.  
 
Therefore, here there's only one thing in question which is that they bring 
in any soldier they want, of their own choosing, but they can't do it until 
after the UN empowers them because we've said these forces will come 
(foreign language). This is the only way there is, totally clear. 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJŠA VUJOVIC 
 
I think they aren't – for sure... things could get out of control in the UN 
Security Council for them, and they're trying to predetermine the 
outcome.  
 
President of FRY 
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SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
They cannot impose on us, throw into our feeble hands the issues which 
the Security Council is to decide. We'll sketch this now and we'll see. 
You'll nicely say something like that – that you agreed on the withdrawal 
plan, that our side is ready to start pulling out – that's the document. 
Other issues are under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The 
remaining issues are neither in our or their jurisdictions. They haven't 
been authorised by the Security Council to exercise the function for those 
forces (foreign language)....  when the Security Council empowers them, 
let them hold a Security Council session to authorise them to do it, that 
it's alright, but no forces may simply come to Kosovo if they aren't 
(foreign language). This is, as I'd put it, the crucial element of the 
agreement, one of the two essential arguments which our parliament had 
before taking its decision. 
 
Ahtissari tells me they're not empowered to accept these other things. I've 
told him our people are empowered to accept absolutely anything which 
is in line with what you've brought to us. What's in keeping with the paper 
they've brought to us is that the forces entering the province may only be 
(foreign language).  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
They reacted to this argument of ours at one point, and that paper, which 
was agreed, with ten items .... that political paper has more power and is 
stronger than this paper on which we've worked today.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
No, please, I'm a lawyer and I know the legal rule well (foreign 
language). Therefore, there could be a general document which is 
stronger, but the one derived from that and concluded – this is the one 
implemented, and I think, if they brought to us such an agreement, and we 
accepted it, they cannot now deny this argument, particularly when you 
should tell them – I'm sorry, but what are you getting is one or two days, 
and which is our motive to buy some time – one or two days, if we 
accepted the crucial thing.  
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We really don't have – not even in the backs of our minds – an intention 
to deceive them. We'll honestly implement that; we'll pull out everything – 
and that's not an issue – and if you agreed on the withdrawal plan – 
that's the content of that technical paper. The content of the technical 
paper cannot be the assumption of powers from the Security Council. 
That's it – elementary.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
In the beginning, they allegedly were less interested in talks, but as the 
time was passing by, they were increasingly more into it and they 
accepted a number of our arguments, and made some changes. They 
reduced this safety zone from 25 kilometres to 5 kilometres.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
OK, that's probably what they had in their minds, they're soldiers – they 
know everything, they're professionals, just like these ours are 
professionals – that's nothing abnormal, that's totally normal. They 
now.... you've got the plan, the complete agreement may start being 
implemented; when it begins to be implemented, they announce they've 
made a break, and this – everything else is up to the powers vested in the 
Security Council. 
 
KFOR doesn't exist unless the Security Council sets it up, and they cannot 
assume the powers of the Security Council in advance. They're 
negotiating with us that we cease our fire, to draft a joint plan to pull out 
and to start implementing the plan, and they should verify it; and now, we 
can't have this .... the mandate they need so that the Security Council 
should be the issue for bilateral agreement between us and what's in that 
paper – there's no mention of the one mentioned in the paper as an entity 
which is to negotiate this with us.  
 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
                   
That's what we've told them. They react.... they say, this isn't to your 
advantage because this doesn't stop our military operations, and we 
reacted that we've got to settle the things in principle, and that they 
shouldn't be splitting hairs over a day or two until the Security Council 
resolution is adopted.  
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President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Of course, in two, three days, there will be a Security Council resolution, 
and what's wrong with that; we can't now appear before the people and 
say – here, we've accepted to do this even without the Security Council. 
This has exclusively political and symbolical importance because 
Ahtisssari and Chernomyrdin told us so, and this is what's in their 
document, and this is how we explained it to the people. Therefore, we 
can't now say – people, we lied to you, this what Chernomyrdin and 
Ahtissari said was not true; what's in the document – it doesn't matter, 
what matters is that we made an agreement with NATO. They announce 
that the UN representatives and our people are negotiating in Djeneral 
Jankovic16.  
 
 
 ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
I think there's been a lack of communication in their ranks today. Mostly 
the British have been running the show, and my instinct tells me the 
Americans will come tomorrow because they've been non-stop in contact 
with Clark and his people, and even requested instructions as to whether 
they could accept the meeting at a different place. This means – they're 
doing everything on orders.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Where's the other place in which you have the meeting? 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
In Tabanovci. 
 
President 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
                                                 
16 Djeneral Jankovic – border crossing into the Republic of Macedonia. 
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Good, once in their place, the next time here – it's alright. 
 
 
ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
That's in Macedonia. There are 60 of them in the team. Today there were 
60 of them, in the afternoon 45 – against five of us. The one in charge of 
the talks is their general – the head of the team, and then he passes it on 
to his expert associates – they were mostly British, and this Ahtissari's 
admiral, who'd visited us, was also there. 
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I explained everything to Ahtissari and asked him to explain it, as a 
politician, to the generals that this has substantial political weight for us 
because we had explained it so to our people. We can't now turn out to be 
liars and traitors, that we did something which we hadn't explained to the 
people. That's what it's all about. Therefore, the issue is not what you're 
empowered to do, you're empowered to do that what's in this document, 
and this paper says (foreign language).        
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
Can we make them tomorrow to put (foreign language) into the second 
paragraph of that document they've offered to us, and to attach ourselves 
directly to the paper with ten items.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
No, but we can't negotiate at all about the mandate. The Security Council 
resolution isn't in our hands, and it doesn't say here that our obligation is 
to take over the job of the Security Council. They're simply blackmailing 
us – it's like we won't stop the bombing until you accept more than you've 
already accepted. We've agreed to a maximum. We're the weaker side 
here – it's not them, and they now want to take away this second 
argument of the two we've been dealing with and make us real liars.  
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You just stick to the paper which Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin have 
brought. The way it says in that document. And that paper says (foreign 
language). You should negotiate a bilateral agreement... about the 
mandate which is entirely under the jurisdiction of the Security Council – 
well, that's not fair, nothing like that is requested. If we publish it and if 
we say what they're asking from us, and over which issue they're splitting 
hairs, the whole world will condemn them. If they give the mandate to 
NATO, how could I know to whom will the Security Council give the 
mandate... but that's the issue for the Security Council... we asked then 
which countries will participate? They replied – those  which want to take 
part.  
 
Therefore, the Security Council will probably say the member countries 
are invite to take part, etc., and then some will accept it, some won't. How 
could I know which ones will accept it; who's got the right and who hasn't 
got the right, etc., but this will be decided by the Security Council. We're 
not authorised here to say - from which countries... if we were authorised, 
we'd say – we don't want NATO, but we accepted it all. However, they 
shouldn't be asking from us more than what we've already accepted, and 
I don't see what they're getting. We accept it. You've made the whole 
withdrawal plan, meaning – all will pull out, we'll have the beginning and 
what now they want from us – that we close a deal in the name of the UN 
with NATO? Well, we're not negotiating with NATO over the mandate but 
the UN supposedly because they haven't got this valid legitimacy for that. 
The UN didn't empower them to do that, nor us.  
 
I think that this is clear. C'mon, could you believe it - Ahtissari told me 
some of your people said we didn't want the agreement. Who could've 
said it – on the contrary, we want the agreement. It's probably something 
imputed because I don't believe that any fool might say something like 
that.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
They're saying you don't want it – for them, it's  you don't want whenever 
their arguments are not good enough.  
 
President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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I know, but they haven't got a single argument because, look, these are 
the fundamental principles in this paper, while the technical agreement is 
the withdrawal plan, monitoring the withdrawal, etc.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
We've managed to make them cover everything around that vacuum, not 
to allow for that vacuum...  
 
President 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Well, it's logical because it wouldn't suit them either that someone 
murders people in the meantime. Please, these arguments are clean and 
clear, perhaps we'll still hear and see what's that – I haven't even seen 
that paper. By the way, Zika told me the document wasn't even translated 
well.  
 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
I didn't use the translation but the original in English.  
 
President 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Have you sent us the text you're working on?  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
We'll do it now, we'll send it right away. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Well, see you.  
       
 ambassador 
ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC  
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You send it like this. Where's Nebojsa? Do you have his phone number?  
 
.......... 
 
I've got it. We'll find him on his mobile  
 
......... 
 
Go find him, and tell him to call me: 3616170.   
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
 
We've got one instruction – to send some fax in Serbian and in English, 
which you'd present to them tomorrow as our stance, and if they don't 
accept it, then we'd give it afterwards to the public.  Here, we'll send 
the fax now. 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
 
Can you give us some fax number where the minister might send this?  
 
colonel general 
BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC  
 
We haven't got the fax here. (Inaudible). They'll give us the fax number. 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC  
 
Deputy prime minister SAINOVIC  
 
So, whatever they say, you just keep saying – let's see about this 
withdrawal plan, and this, and that, so that, on the face of it, it looks like 
it's agreed, even if they don't want to sign it, so that such an impression is 
indisputable. Well, what you get now, keep it with you and use it at the 
given moment as we've just said. Meanwhile, let's hear each other before 
it takes place.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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Hello Vujovic, I just wanted to hear from you. Please, whatever you're 
thinking, don't get lost in details – stick to the substance and the main 
issue. That's there and it's clear, you've got an agreement which we 
adopted. That's the paper, which as we all know was drafted by Talbot, 
those two brought it and they must be behind that paper.  
 
In that paper, it says (foreign language). Therefore, no agreement, be it 
technical or even strategical or whatever, cannot revoke that paper 
because this would, in fact, annul what they're asking for... this is what's 
written in that paper and that's a basic thing, and you discuss it a little bit 
with them afterwards, and about this military aspect – when this border... 
meaning when we pull out – how will they secure the border. They must 
use their troops from the Albanian and the Macedonian and our side so 
that unauthorised persons wouldn't cross... etc. All those issues are for 
the Security Council then.  
 
Therefore, you haven't got anything in which you should be interested, 
and to consult about the things in that paper with 10 items. That's the 
basic thing, they're behind this paper, they brought it, we adopted it, and 
now no other agreement may supersede now this paper – and what 
they've suggested means that paper would be effectively cancelled, and 
that's clear, and I think it's totally clear.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
Clear. I think they had to withdraw the paper and now they're consulting 
with Washington and Finland and .... to come up with a different concept 
which would take into account our firm stance.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
I know, this will be in the language, but not at the heart of the matter for 
the changes – as far as I know them. Therefore, you should be very 
careful there... because, in fact, if there's a signing of the agreement with 
their forces and our state, and if this establishing in keeping with the 
article 8 of the Charter... they wouldn't have even to hold the Security 
Council session. It would turn out Yugoslavia and NATO made an 
agreement, etc. These are the issues for the Security Council, not NATO.  
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Therefore, we're talking here about satisfying the condition under the 
item 2... that's our obligation, and the item 3 is that we accept them, the 
item 2 is that we pull out and we solve everything there; the item 3 is that 
we allow the forces in which are to be (foreign language). Therefore, in 
order for the forces to be.... they must first be..... and that's the heart of 
the matter. Therefore, in this – what you've got, the first item is clear; 
that's focusing on the withdrawal plan and the suspension of the 
bombing, all other issues are the issues for the Security Council, 
exclusively under its jurisdiction exactly in accordance with their paper 
which we accepted because this paper says in the item 3.... and then, it's 
all clear.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
..... but you're not born as far as we're concerned because there has been 
no a Security Council Resolution. 
      
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
When the Resolution is passed, then this will give the mandate to the 
forces – the forces which obtain the mandate through the Resolution – 
there's no problem there. Only then are we under the obligation to let 
them go, but bear in mind what the heart of the matter is, and you don't 
have now to.... whether they've given now this or that – you'll read it 
immediately and see. Of course, you say – we'll analyse the paper and 
during the break – one hour, two hours or three – to send it to us, though 
I think you don't even need those petty suggestions. You've got a clear 
platform. The platform is the paper with ten items. There you haven't got 
even in the 10th item an elaboration on this, there's no basis for this 
paper, especially the one which would practically cancel those basic 
principle from that paper.  
 
Therefore, the position is very strong, and there's nothing there.... you 
should be relaxed, be calm... don't get upset about this, but here – 
gentlemen – this is what it says. Is this what this reads? What does it 
entail? This entails that the Security Council makes a decision, and that 
it's empowered you to go in and nothing else. Therefore, the Security 
Council is in your hands, not ours, so don't ask from us that we take over 
through this bilateral agreement the mandate of the Security Council – 
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we're not under the obligation to do it, nor will we do it. There it says.... 
and this entails preliminary actions which are to lead to this.  
 
Always bear in mind this guiding star – that's your Bible, while the rest 
are trifles and embellishments which, regardless f how you discuss it, 
can't be good if it's not in keeping with the main thing. I think that's clear 
in your mind, don't get upset and don't be under some tensions – to ask 
them about each and every trifle – don't – because it'll turn out you're 
also negotiating the things which are not in the paper, and none of us is 
authorised to go beyond what this paper says. Therefore, no one can give 
you instructions to go beyond  that paper, which the parliament adopted, 
and there it reads ..... period.  
 
Vujovic, all the best and good luck. 
 
*** 
You've received a short text both in English and in Serbian? 
 
....... 
 
Keep it for the future. 
Should I not use it? 
 
..............           
 
You can possibly meet some local interlocutor – they've suggested we 
should give them something like that.  
 
........... 
 
This confused me a bit because here it says – in accordance with the plan 
which has been agreed.  
 
......... 
 
Well, well, we don't know whether it's going to be preliminary. This is in 
case it happens, when it happens. The talks resume. These people we're 
talking to are preparing a new variant. They've admitted in principle that 
what they've offered is not the best, and they've accepted some objections. 
However, I think they're only trying to paint in different colours what's 
the heart of the matter here. Anyway, now we've got this break in the 
talks, they've announced they would prepare the new text, to give it to our 
people and so. Our focus – only calendar and technical issues. Therefore, 
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no politics, nothing regarding the mandate, organisation, make-up, 
command chain; with respect to the media, regarding the use of force. So, 
if you read the text, in many places there's mention of....  authorisation to 
use force, etc. This is something that only the Security Council may 
decide. 
 
We, therefore, cannot repudiate a strategic initial document, which said – 
under the UN auspices, with a derived document that is technical in its 
character. We keep going back to that and their document, that is, first – 
their document and that they can't request it now. That's Talbot's 
document, and now the Americans and the British want to deny it so 
they're playing various .... We're negotiating in good faith, but only about 
technical details, not the withdrawal. The calendar, the directions, 
crossings, rhythm, etc., but nothing of those political issues or the issues 
related to the mandate or management. There are issues there which 
affect the relations among NATO, Russia, etc. We haven't got an 
authorisation for that. 
 
They've also had this approach. They say – well, this should be accepted 
but under the condition that this is approved by the Security Council. 
What factor are we now – being so battered and destroyed – to discuss 
such political issues, it makes no sense.  
 
.......... 
 
Have you negotiated this .....  
 
.......... 
 
I have. I talked to him and he had this impression when it started that I'd 
asked to see him. Well, it doesn't matter anymore. He asked for me, but 
it's all the same.  
 
I asked for him, but I was relying on my instructions.  
 
......... 
 
Well, he informed me he'd travel to take part in negotiations, the day 
after tomorrow – about the resolution in Germany, and he was interested 
in how the talks were progressing. I told him the basic things, informed 
him where those that are coming are coming from. I thanked him, 
informed him about the talks in relation to the resolution; I told him what 
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the main thing was – that the resolution should be under the chapter 6, 
not to accept the chapter 7.  
 
He said... I think he didn't comment this, but said  he'd inform me. 
Actually, he repeated he'd inform me about the outcome of the meeting.  
 
......... 
 
OK, there's that in the message as well; he saw the message. 
I thought he saw it, but all the same.... I took the advantage of the 
opportunity to reaffirm it. Perhaps, the conversation lasted about ten 
minutes or so.  
 
........ 
 
Have you published this? 
 
....... 
 
Should we publish it?  
 
....... 
 
Why not? Every  conversation is published, and not this one.  
 
...... 
 
OK.  
 
...... 
 
Exchanged views and information. 
 
....... 
 
OK.  
If there's something, you let us know.  
 
....... 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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You see how it is Nebojsa, I've had so far about half an hour of talks with 
Ahtissari. He read out  this idea to me, and I told him we haven't got 
room to manoeuvre to let in any forces which are not (foreign language), 
and that for us is the most important political fact which he explained is a 
part of their document – which is what we explained to the people, and he 
understood this, as far as I could've seen, after ten or so repetitions and 
coercion that we need a break and that this should be signed.  
 
I suggested to him – please, if it's realistic to sign it, then sign the 
withdrawal plan which our military representatives and yours agreed on, 
and we can start implementing this plan in the meantime. You can have 
that break in bombing and ensure the adoption of the resolution in the 
Security Council in a very short time because we're not the bosses in the 
Security Council but yourselves. Then, at the end now – and I shouldn't 
be too long – because we exchanged arguments a dozen of times, and I 
kept saying that this item 3 was a big political issue, and that this 
political issue couldn't be changed by the technical agreement or 
superseded by the technical agreement (foreign language), but that this 
must stay and I pleaded with him to understand it. And he said what if 
both sides address this in a joint letter – because they're afraid of delays 
in passing the resolution, which is something I don't understand really – 
who would delay the adoption of the resolution.  
 
The resolution will be probably adopted... some already have... 
resolutions that both sides address the Security Council in a letter to ask 
the Security Council to pass the resolution on Kosovo as soon as 
possible, which will resolve the implementation of this document that they 
proposed, and we accepted it in the parliament, and this is where we 
parted but to get in touch again the next morning. I said I'd ask our 
people... he read out to me what it was.... I told him we couldn't accept  
(foreign language), but there won't be any problems... this is why a 
vacuum will be created, he said... and I asked why there would be a 
vacuum – we'll start pulling out, there's no threat of attack on your part if 
we agreed cease-fire, and meanwhile, you'll pass a resolution and the 
forces will enter (foreign language).  
 
He then said we should seek a solution along these lines – as far as I 
understood him... of course, he didn't tell me explicitly that this could be 
along these lines, that this be a solution, that it be the way we've 
proposed it – to sign the technical agreement on withdrawal, which is 
your assignment, to have this withdrawal under way, that they make a 
break in bombing, and with this technical agreement we would jointly 
address the Security Council requesting that the resolution should be 
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adopted as soon as possible, which should enable this Ahtissari-
Chernomyrdin document to be implemented through the Security Council 
resolution, that is to adopt the Security Council Resolution on Kosovo in 
its entirety.  
 
 
 
ambassador    
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
They said they agreed to send to China three .... from the most influential 
countries, to get at least the Chinese....  so that China wouldn't be against 
this because of this dirty trick they played on them when the  Security 
Council votes on the resolution. They estimate they can't break the 
Russians without our consent under their pressure. This Russian who's 
arrived today was tough with them at the meeting. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
I heard about it and Ahtissari told me a Russian general made the things 
worse.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
He told them no political elements should be a part of the technical 
agreement – that's out of the question. They should stick to the 
agreement, he said.... they've got no rights to do it... Yugoslavia is a 
sovereign state. He was really tough with them. They responded 
immediately, they had it in the news here... there are hundreds of 
journalists here... the news was that a Russian general came and spoilt 
the deal, which wasn't true. Our delegation had this position from the 
very beginning. The Russian general only came and said this could not be 
done without the UN Security Council. We made a strong agreement... 
minister Ivanov, minister Sergeyev and president Yeltsin stood behind it 
and sidelined Chernomyrdin completely so that he wouldn't be in charge 
of these things – regular Russian state organs would take this over.  
 
Their crucial interests are to come to these parts, and now they're trying, 
in this way, through the Ahtissari's formula for sell-out, and here they 
totally stifled this Ahtissari's military-political advisor with whom I talked 
today ten times.... because the one who was with Ahtissari in Belgrade – 
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he's also there and I told him.... that proposal is out of the question; we 
haven't got the mandate for that and this is all in line with your 
instructions. 
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
This isn't in keeping with my instructions, but the adopted document.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
Of course, but they're trying to stifle him here.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
I understand that. However, you offer to them this proposal. We'll see 
what Ahtissari will do now. I told him that it was politically, symbolically 
important to us because we haven't got any illusions about that – that the 
forces which are designated to come – will come. But, the only thing 
important to us is that this item 3 is respected. We don't want that item 3 
to be abolished by some special agreement. This means it could be 
(foreign language), and in order to be (foreign language), we will... if this 
plan for withdrawal is made and accepted and if it starts the way you 
agreed this with them - I suppose you've finally agreed on this - .... that 
its implementation begins, and then we have an open road towards the 
UN resolution. And we could say, together with them, that we agreed on 
this military-technical document, and since it's accepted... and since this 
document – I don't know if we should mention it separately – since this 
document .... not this document, but the document envisaging a role for 
the UN... that it's the mutual desire that the Security Council... and the 
request for the Security Council to pass the resolution on Kosovo as soon 
as possible so that we have it all done as soon as possible.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
This American also told me he should have taken the plane early in the 
morning to go .... that Clinton instructed him to do so – some agreement 
in Washington – but the last time he talked to Clinton, Clinton said he 
should pass on this message to us concerning this Ahtissari's middle-of-
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the-road solution, and Clinton also told him they were ready to fight for it 
in the Group because, obviously, the Russians are causing serious 
troubles or hiding behind that... but the way this Russian reacted today 
here – this provided additional arguments that the Russians simply 
wouldn't have the draft in their hands. They tried to make the Russian 
take the draft which they'd prepared, and according to the original plan, 
it starts tomorrow.... Group 8, they wanted to prepare that resolution. 
Due to this six-hour time difference, they would like to go back to New 
York and to discuss it in New York tomorrow. The Russians responded 
and said they wouldn't even accept that paper to read it, and the Russian 
who came here confirmed this.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
  
They won't consider it before there's a suspension of bombing in place. I 
understood that. And they can suspend the bombing if they accept the 
plan which they've already accepted as a technical and military 
agreement, and when its implementation begins, there's the suspension of 
bombing. And then the Russians surely won't be refusing anymore to 
consider this resolution; and as soon as they consider the resolution, 
they'll adopt that it provides for (foreign language) in Kosovo (foreign 
language) and, then they can go in normally and effect the transfer of the 
zones of responsibility with our forces, and assume the responsibility for 
safety and security in Kosovo and Metohija. 
 
Hence, this is so logical that it should go ahead, and its totally in keeping 
with this paper. Consequently, we wouldn't go beyond what's in that 
document because I've simply tried to explain it to him some twenty times 
so far. We accepted their document. We presented that document at a 
meeting of the heads of caucuses in the parliament, and we published it in 
its entirety in public. The whole document was released yesterday for 
public. For example, I read it in daily Novosti – in its entirety, the way it 
was presented in the parliament. Therefore, the whole of our public 
understands, and that was also the decision of the parliament based on 
what Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin said, and what's written in that 
document, which is that (foreign language). Therefore, these can't be the 
troops (foreign language) but these must be (foreign language), and the 
only thing we can contribute there is to jointly express our expectations 
that the Security Council will consider the Kosovo resolution as soon as 
possible and adopt it, without going into details because we're not in a 
situation to suggest to the Security Council what it should do. And in this 
way, in fact, if they were to enter before the Security Council (foreign 
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language) there wouldn't be any Security Council session on this. Then, 
we don't need a resolution, and we'd have two things. First, they would 
thus exclude the Security Council and they'd be able to do whatever they 
like, and secondly, this excludes... they're ruining it totally except if they 
are under the NATO command, which they've already said they don't 
want. Therefore, the things would exclusively boil down to (foreign 
language) and nothing else, and this is not what it says here. It says 
(foreign language).  
 
Now this should be avoided – that you asked for a break to get 
instructions.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
I'm thinking whether I should go public and tell the journalists that it isn't 
so.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Go before the journalists and say, of course – it's not true we've asked for 
that; on the contrary, we have no demands whatsoever. Our only request 
is that the document presented to us by Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, the 
one drafted by Ahtissari, Chernomyrdin and Talbot, be respected. And we 
expect that all of them are behind that document. We haven't got any 
demands except that this document be respected. This document says 
(foreign language) and there are no other things here, and we're not 
asking for any break, on the contrary, we're interested in completing the 
technical agreement as soon as possible. I told him the technical 
agreement may not supersede the main political element of the document 
which you've brought to us, and if this were the case, this wouldn't be a 
technical agreement – this would mean the invalidation of the main 
political element. That's a political issue par excellence that this is 
(foreign language).  
 
 
The negotiations on the arrival of foreign troops in Kosovo and 
Metohija were entering the final phase. Practically, everything was 
ready for the implementation of the agreement. Milosevic was 
concerned about the play on words so that he could tell his people we 
achieved what we wanted – and that is the Security Council 
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Resolution No. 1244, which stipulated the deployment of NATO 
troops. We allegedly were granted the possibility to solve the issue of 
non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija through the 
Security Council. The truth was totally different from what could be 
inferred from Milosevic's conversations where he was almost 
pleading with the envoys to allow him the possibility to explain it to 
the people that we were right to reject previous offers and initiatives 
to negotiate, and now we achieved a maximum – and that is the 
resolution which ensures our troops would remain in Kosovo. The 
truth was harsh. The Kumanovo Agreement was effectively a 
capitulation of both Milosevic's policy and the army in this part of 
the state territory. Everyone knew the return of the Albanian 
refugees and terrorist KLA organisation would cause an exodus of 
non-Albanian population. The NATO troops, which should arrive in 
Kosovo, would be protecting themselves engaging the most of its 
soldiers and resources to ensure their own safety – not the safety of 
the local population. The manoeuvre which Milosevic would 
subsequently try to make with the arrival of the Russian troops to 
Kosovo would only additionally aggravate the catastrophic position 
of the Serbian diplomacy and the Serb people in Kosovo and 
Metohija.  
Later on in the text, I will enclose authentic transcripts of the 
telephone conversations between the representatives of the Yugoslav 
diplomacy and the NATO and UN officials.  
 
 
ambassador  
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
I expect now when I get back there .... (inaudible) that they present it to 
us, their new stance, a new question whether we accept it or not. Of 
course, we'll act in accordance with the papers an the document and 
those ten items in the document, and we'll ask for a break.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Please tell them Ahtissari talked with me. Tell them we have no other 
demands – which is what I reiterated in my conversation with Ahtissari – 
except to respect the provisions contained in their document, which our 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            100  
 100
parliament adopted, and nothing else. Ahtissari then asked me to talk 
with me again tomorrow morning. He wanted to see which option to 
suggest. Here it is, and he thought whether, in addition to what I 
proposed, this technical document should be prepared which is to refer 
only to your withdrawal plan, which was agreed, and the beginning... and 
one joint letter addressed to the Security Council which should request 
that, due to the importance of the problem which is being solved and the 
settling of issues related to peace in Kosovo, the Security Council – both 
parties would request that – adopt that resolution as soon as possible. Of 
course, consult the Russian on this because he's allegedly someone who 
should agree to this. I think a letter like this... Ahtisssari mentioned it as a 
possibility – that both sides send a letter to the Security Council so that 
the resolution could be adopted as soon as possible. For us, this doesn't 
mean we're deviating from the document because it shouldn't contain any 
references or mention anything which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Security Council.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
(inaudible).  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
No, but you there... both parties... the option that you take as (foreign 
language) only this part concerning the plan for withdrawal, and this 
plan may start being implemented. And bearing in mind the importance of 
establishing peace as soon as possible and in order to have the resolution 
adopted, both sides should ask the Security Council... which means the 
representatives who are negotiating should approach it with a request 
that the Security Council resolution be drafted as soon as possible. This 
is a plea to have the resolution adopted as soon as possible. The swift 
adoption of the resolution suits us as well, and if you are to draft this 
letter, you should consult Zivadin. I'll inform him about this .... or with 
me, it doesn't matter, and perhaps we'll be able to find that option. You 
must explain to them one thing. Our delegation, that is, you haven't made 
any demands and you're not impeding the process for seeking out the 
solution. The only thing we want is that you do it in keeping with the 
document, which our parliament adopted and nothing else, so that we 
cannot receive any troops and .... because simply the troops which are 
(foreign language) don't exist. I don't know if this is clear to you?  
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ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
It's totally clear to me. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
That's one thing, but if they're energetic and smart enough, they'll have 
the resolution in two days. Therefore, the withdrawal of our troops starts, 
this will fall into the third part or the last quarter of this business we've 
got to do when we get the resolution, and then they can start coming in. 
It's important for our people that they (foreign language) because we told 
the people -  we cannot lie to the people. We can't tell the people – we 
have it in writing they'll come under the UN auspices, but now we've 
agreed they may come without the UN. If they come without the UN, they 
won't have the Security Council meeting. Rubin's already said – if you've 
read it in today's Novosti – that the Security Council needn't get involved 
in this.  
 
You have it in today's Novosti – we don't need the Security Council and 
we don't need the Russians. If they want to negotiate with us later and 
take part – they can do it, but this should be known – who's in command, 
etc. We don't need the Security Council at all – that's what he said. 
However, we need the Security Council because we based this whole 
thing on the Security Council. Whatever he decides... ultimately I 
reminded him – please, haven't you told us we'll have a resolution, we'll 
have the right to present our objections, and then the Security Council 
will be the judge of that – but we'll accept any decision made by the 
Security Council. Therefore, we haven't got any illusions about this – that 
this decision won't be brilliant for us just like this isn't brilliant for us. 
But one thing seems clear – all the obligations we assume we'll be met 
dutifully. We aren't liars or something like that.  
 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
Should I wait to see how this will pass, and then to give a statement for 
the press or should I go before the journalists right away? (inaudible).  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC                   
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Tell them – regarding this position, Ahtissari spoke to the president. The 
president and we have no other approach to this except for the approach 
laid out in the document, and the approach outlined in the document is 
that the troops may enter under the UN auspices and nothing else... and 
you should repeat once again our instructions so that we have identical 
approaches there – instructions for you as the delegation to negotiate 
everything and find your solutions. The powers vested in you are derived 
from the document, which has been adopted by the parliament. We have 
no other (foreign language) ... we haven't got here anything to ask from 
them, nor we have some additional demands. They do have additional 
demands because if it says (foreign language) ... this is what's in the 
document, and we're only insisting on the document and nothing else.... 
and that Ahtissari now is considering the idea that we go for some 
technical agreement, which is entirely in keeping with the document. 
Therefore, we cannot accept the troops which are not under (foreign 
language) because we've explained this to the whole people.  
 
I told him also we have no political room to manoeuvre here because the 
document says (foreign language) ... politically, we haven't got that room 
to manoeuvre, and he says a politician should understand that... but he 
said he'd think about it – that bilaterally that is to say both delegations go 
for that option, the option he's now examining – to go for this technical 
agreement, which is not disputable for you, of course, if you agreed to it.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
We reached the agreement on the technical part but they constantly add 
politics on top of this. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Well, you cannot reach political solution through a technical agreement, 
this should be done by the Security Council.  
 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
They keep throwing in .... (inaudible) 
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President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Concerning the Ahtissari's proposal, I explained to him that to the extent 
the proposal allows for ... without (foreign language) the forces to come 
effectively amounts to the invalidation of this document, the most 
significant political element of the document, and he then said – ok, I'll 
consider the idea for both sides to address the council when you complete 
that technical document so that you'd have a letter, for example, for the 
Security Council urging it to pass as soon as possible the Kosovo 
resolution, bearing in mind the necessity to establish peace as soon as 
possible.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
I warned German general that they .... of the document... that they 
shouldn't shove in politics which is not agreed in the document.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Now you can .... just tell the press that the news we're listening to isn't 
true because we haven't asked for any consultations. On the contrary, 
they're the ones asking for some breaks all the time, and we haven't got 
any other view on this except that the document should be implemented – 
the document which Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin brought, which they 
made together with Talbot, which we want largely  to realise and that's 
all, without going into specific  details, but this is needed because of our 
own public here...  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC 
 
....since there are representatives from Skoplje ... (inaudible) 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
OK, but it's because of our public, I mean... because both here and on 
television word has it that we're asking for some time-outs, and the 
people are nervous thinking - why do our people now cause some 
trouble? – and our people are not causing any problems, they are the 
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only ones creating problems. And Ahtissari said to talk again the next 
morning. Now he'll start some consultations and see how... I've explained 
this again to him. Please tell him we have no political room for 
manoeuvre to go back on the crucial political element from your 
proposal, which we've adopted, and this is (foreign language). Therefore, 
this is the only thing we haven't got. We cannot... the president can't, you 
should say, go beyond what the parliament adopted at their proposal. 
Consequently, what's their problem? Their problem probably is that they 
think it might take quite some time before the resolution is adopted. Well, 
they've been bombing us for 75 days; I've told Ahtissari – so we've waited 
for this to happen – to reach some peaceful solution, so now, please, 
adopt the resolution quickly, not slowly. The Security Council is not in 
our hands – it's in yours, so pass this resolution immediately. As far as 
we're concerned, we're not an obstacle to this, but for us – it's important 
that we've agreed on the document which you, that is Talbot, Ahtissari 
and Chernomyrdin, offered to us to (foreign language), and we can't go 
beyond that because we presented it to the people as the main political 
argument which made us accept the document.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
It's all clear to me.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
So, this isn't about our inflexibility. It's about our request... I said I was 
surprised – you're head of state; you came to us and proposed this 
document. So I expect of you to stick to your document – not to suggest 
changes through some technical agreement (foreign language). Do you 
understand? This is a political element par excellence, which cannot be 
changed by the technical agreement. I think we've made ourselves clear 
enough on this, and give this to journalists and tell them, please... 
because it's always like we're demanding something... we haven't asked 
for any delays. We've been ready all along.  
 
Secondly, we have no demands except for the logical and normal request 
that everything we do should be based on the document drafted by Talbot, 
Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin, and brought to Belgrade by Ahtissari and 
Chernomyrdin, and we expect that everybody observes this document – 
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nothing else. We haven't got absolutely no demands beyond the 
document. Nothing else. I think you may do fine with this.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
Alright.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Off you go.... this guy told me that this... don't tell the journalist – 
Ahtissari and Milosevic talked, etc. Instead, when you meet these people, 
tell them Ahtissari said he'd call tomorrow. You don't have to explain 
what I've talked to him about.... that he'll call president Milosevic 
tomorrow morning... that he said he was considering a possibility that we 
jointly request from the Security Council this because he obviously 
understands the necessity to observe this item 3 (foreign language), so 
that we could ask the Security Council together to pass the resolution as 
soon as possible, but this letter should contain no solution which would 
predetermine the Security Council's solution – but only a plea to go about 
its business as quickly as possible. I think you understand this distinction 
because we cannot now put into this letter the other thing – that what we 
can't accept in this.  
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
May I call you tomorrow morning?  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Well call any time, whenever it's necessary, but please take care of this so 
that it doesn't turn out we're the ones calling time-outs. You can do it 
even before you go to start the talks. Please say – I see newspapers report 
we're constantly asking for some breaks; that's not true – we haven't 
asked for a single one. Secondly, we have no demands. We're totally 
willing to finish this. We're only adhering to the document drafted by 
Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin in Bonn and we expect this 
document to be respected. These are the only two things – nothing else. 
Bye Nebojsa.  
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* * * 
 
Mr. Zoran Lilic confirmed in his testimony in The Hague that the 
cease-fire, i.e., peace with NATO could have been negotiated as far 
back as May 1999, but what was lacking at the time was the political 
will to do so on the part of Slobodan Milosevic. One need not be too 
smart to put two and two together and realise how many human lives 
would have been saved had the agreement been reached then. We 
actually suffered the most in terms of the massive destruction and 
losses in the later phase of the war.  
Intensive negotiations on ending the conflict began as late as June 
1999. Interestingly enough, communication and contacts with the 
West were not disrupted even during the bombing. This time round, 
faced with horrific destruction and a warning that we might well 
suffer enormous losses which would be inflicted by aerosol bombs, 
Slobodan started the final stage of the negotiations:  
* * * 
  
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Well call any time, whenever it's necessary, but please take care of this so 
that it doesn't turn out we're the ones calling time-outs. You can do it 
even before you go to start the talks. Please say – I see newspapers report 
we're constantly asking for some breaks; that's not true – we haven't 
asked for a single one. Secondly, we have no demands. We're totally 
willing to finish this. We're only adhering to the document drafted by 
Talbot, Ahtissari and Chernomyrdin in Bonn and we expect this 
document to be respected. These are the only two things – nothing else. 
Bye Nebojsa. 
 
ambassador 
NEBOJSA VUJOVIC  
 
Thanks very much. Bye. 
 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC 
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            107  
 107
Hi Pavke. Well, it's good what I think... you're not going to that rally. And 
Minic and Gorica17 have been there to date. We should urge them not to 
hold any rallies but to work. First, it's the air raid. There might be 
casualties on the last day and that simply shouldn't be allowed, but you 
know what they're like.... instead of defending in a different way, different 
from political speeches at the rallies – but of responsible people... so that 
the people wouldn't dodge their responsibilities and have civilians, 
women and children at the rallies.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
There was a contact with Washington regarding, above all, this item 
under article 2, item 2, where it says... this sentence that the delay in the 
arrival of the international forces cannot be the reason for a delay of our 
withdrawal. We believe they're giving themselves the right to be late, and 
therefore, this sentence is supposed to look like... and these people in 
Washington agree with that. Because it says here the arrival of the 
international forces, KFOR, in Kosovo will be synchronised as well as 
possible with the withdrawal of the FRY forces in phases in order to 
eliminate any sort of a security vacuum. We insist that it shouldn't be 
synchronised as much as possible but that it be totally synchronised, and 
this is what it says in the Security Council resolution. If he reserves this 
for himself – in case they're late, and if we're under obligation not to wait 
for them, we must take the whole of the population - the Albanians, and 
the Serbs, and the Turks and everyone because they'll first kill all those 
Albanians because they haven't been obeying them. So explain this, and 
in this respect, you should say we've had contact with Washington and 
they agree that there must be a better wording for that. That's one thing.  
 
Under paragraph a) where it says that this new thing that was added this 
morning that the suspension will continue while the obligations are being 
discharged and until the Security Council adopts the resolution within 
twenty-four hours. We can't accept it because this would mean we agree 
that they continue bombing us. They want to use this to exert pressure on 
the Russians and the Chinese. However, it's their affair. We agree that 
they continue bombing us even though this isn't under jurisdiction, even 
though it doesn't apply to our obligations, and here you should say this 
isn't in accordance with the Belgrade Agreement, nor G-8, nor the 
Resolution because there's no gradual suspension. And now, please, go 
                                                 
17 Milomir Minic and Gorica Gajevic, senior officials of  the Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS.  
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back to article 1, but also on the same page – the last item b). General, 
we'll call you again. Why Vujovic isn't here?  
 
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Vujovic, I've just had a long conversation with Ahtissari. Before that, 
Bojan talked to Purdue. Purdue said this had to stay in order to 
accelerate it on the other side, to speed up the Security Council process. 
We decided not to accept it because then it would appear we agree that 
they continue bombing after 24 hours if the Security Council doesn't 
pass... but we solved this with Ahtissari and he suggested the wording 
and he'll notify them about it. Regarding.... let's go one by one... First, 
regarding this item 2... here this sentence... " the arrival of the 
international security forces will be synchronised entirely (interpretation 
of the agreement) in foreign language (translated).  
  
 
These two things which we said were agreed, just insert them and you 
may sign it.  
 
ambassador VUJOVIC 
 
*** 
 
BOJAN BUGARCIC 
 
I talked with him twice. The only thing he said was that he'd probably call 
again, that he shifted everything to a higher, the highest level, which 
meant they were considering this and that they would come up with a new 
text.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I've just made an agreement with Ahtissari now. Since he realised this 
was insane he suggested – not even these eleven days that we have – that 
they could continue bombing 24 hours later if there was no resolution, 
and Ahtissari suggested it and I accepted it. That's all.  
 
BOJAN BUGARCIC 
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We understood it was a sentence you suggested. This must be reinforced, 
there must be a hermetically closed border, not only control. He said he'd 
offer a new proposal.  
 
* * * 
ambassador 
BORA MILOSEVIC 
 
Marshal Sergeyev said the Russian contingent would be somewhere 
between 3,000 and 10,000 men strong, and Stepashin mentioned 5,000 
and that the sum needed from their budget would be about 150 million 
dollars.  
 
minister 
ZIVORAD  JOVANOVIC  
 
This means that this is the value of the Russian interests in the Balkans. 
We're hoping we've changed it for the better, but we've changed it on our 
own. We leave it to them. They haven't asked us a thing ... what they did 
in Bonn and then in Cologne. They didn't tell us, they didn't even deign to 
inform their brothers about this minimum – what they've achieved 
regarding the fate of Serbia. If they informed you, then you're to blame 
because you didn't let us know. I'll hold you accountable for not passing 
on faithfully the Russian views. And then, if they don't call you – don't be 
worried – to inform you what they did for Yugoslavia and their brothers 
in Cologne and in Germany. For your information, I talked to Mr. Ivanov 
before the talks on the new resolution, but he didn't deign even to inform 
me about the result. He hasn't informed me about it to this very moment. I 
don't know what sort of way is this of advocating for our interests and our 
common interests. We're stupid a little bit. We haven't been so often in 
contact with America to be enlightened, but what it means when he 
promises a Yugoslav minister that he will inform him about the result, but 
instead leave us to our own devices – in the mess he cooked up with the 
Americans, or perhaps he forgot what he said. We're so small – do you 
understand – but it would be really bad for us if we were bigger for 
America than for Russia.  
 
I'm talking to you, as my fellow soldier from Bileca, like this... don't get 
me wrong as I'm so opened. We have indestructible friendship. The fact 
that they blackmailed us and that the Russians left us in the lurch, that 
NATO blackmailed us – that's not a plus for history. Specific timetable 
was agreed in Cologne, six steps and in addition some sequence of events 
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was agreed. This means imposing another new step which hasn't been 
negotiated, etc., and Russia keeps silent about it, but they know very well 
what it's all about, and they want to see what we might win for ourselves 
on our own. Listen Bora, you know that unlike you, I sort of ended up by 
chance in diplomacy... that this isn't my place – in diplomacy. But Russia 
is writing a dark page in its history having behaved like this with respect 
to the Serbian interests. That's very dark, gloomy page. They've forgotten 
the enemy has been killing our people for two and a half months. And 
Russia is cooperating in justifying this murder through such a resolution. 
We're in trouble, Bora. We know what and how, but we're too small to do 
it without anyone's help, without anyone's support. 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH AHTISSARI 
 
"No sacrifice made by others  
is too much  
for the cause of peace." 
Karel Capek 
 
The conversation between our minister Zivorad Jovanovic with 
ambassador Borislav Milosevic in Moscow is a typical example on 
how you should not pursue your policy in the 21st century. Such a 
speech should be read out to every novice in diplomacy with an 
explanation that emotions must be excluded from diplomatic affairs. 
We were not the ones to define what the Russian interests should be 
and how much they cost, and it is indeed a big question whether 
Russia could do that for itself at that moment. We expected 
something even though it was clear to everyone we will not get it. I 
had an impression that the Yugoslav United Left, YUL, clique was 
hoping for a third world war over the conflict of interests between 
the East and the West. Our diplomats did not wake up to reality after 
Tito's death. They were dozing in the belief the virus of cold war 
would spread like an epidemic throughout the world. This virus was 
on the rampage only in the minds of our diplomats entertaining their 
illusion that we mattered and that the world would wage a war 
because of our being lost in between reality and utopia.  
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BOJAN BUGARCIC 
 
I called him twice about this Ahtissari's proposal... that his bosses 
negotiate the wording of it with Ahtissari. Concerning this issue of border 
control, he suggests our delegation should propose a draft when the talks 
start again.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Regarding this ( security vacuum and avoiding this), we agreed this with 
Ahtissari. Thank you Bojan.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Now the process is in fact approaching its end. I hope we'll be able to 
achieve the results. I understand our partners in the negotiating process 
have accepted something, but not all of what you have suggested.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I don't know what they cannot accept of what we have proposed. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
If I understood it well – they want the wording of the article 2, item 2 to 
remain intact. I think they should explain why they want it like that. They 
are ready to act within 24 hours to avoid this security vacuum.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, it is your text. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
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That's what I have suggested. On the other hand, my admiral told me they 
insisted on two things in relation to this. I mean – I'll be totally honest – 
they're concerned that if the delays are not accepted or left out, they 
would face one day a situation in which you might stop pulling out.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Yes, but president Ahtissari, bear in mind one simple fact. When they 
want to come – it's entirely up to them Therefore, if they're late, that's not 
our mistake. They must assume the responsibility for the speed of 
deployment of their troops. We can't be responsible for their delays.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
I think we shouldn't be blaming anyone here. We have to be practical, 
Mr. Milosevic. My question is... the Germans informed me if this 
document were signed urgently – today, they would have a meeting this 
evening because we are ahead 7 hours with respect to New York, where 
right now it's 10.30. We'll have the UN Security Council decision, which 
is, I hope, what you want too. I think we shouldn't be discussing the text 
anymore but focus on the main problems.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
You want to say they insist to adhere strictly to the wording according to 
which their arrival in Kosovo and Metohija would be synchronised with 
the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army as much as possible. They do not 
want, therefore, say "entirely synchronised" or "synchronised in its 
entirety".  
 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Because this would cost ----.  Well, you know, then you'll constantly have 
discussions over what "in its entirety" and what "in part" meant.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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"In its entirety" means their arrival, assuming responsibility in the zone 
of the responsibility and the withdrawal of our forces... But no one, 
therefore, will be killing civilians. The item 3 of the Security Council 
resolution draft, which was proposed by the Group 7, says – as I've 
already told you – I'm reading the text: " with which the deployment of 
the international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". My 
suggestion, the last proposal for you, would be: let them insert the text of 
the UN Security Council resolution draft where it says "the deployment of 
the international security forces in Kosovo will be synchronised". This is 
the wording – you may check this out, you've got the resolution in front of 
you. Let them use the language from the resolution – without 
"synchronised entirely", without "the minimum of this or that" – let them 
just put in what's in the resolution. "... with which the deployment of the 
international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". This is 
the item 3 in the Security Council resolution. Let them, therefore, use the 
same text. If G818 acts like that, let generals then acknowledge the 
language of G8. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
What item are you referring to?  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
The item 3 in the resolution, Have a look at the resolution. That's 
(reading the text) ... the text is blurred, you know, it was sent by fax... (he 
keeps reading the item 3 in the resolution and reaches the place where it 
says at the end of the item 3: with which the deployment of the 
international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised). The 
wording in the resolution is clear. I'm not adding to this a single letter. I 
want the wording in the military technical agreement to be as precise as 
possible, which is normal. The technical agreement must be more precise, 
but even that would be better than "synchronised as much as possible". 
There's no such a thing in the resolution. And that "delays will not slow 
down the withdrawal"... it says "synchronised". That's the text of the 
resolution, and that's what G8 has accepted.   
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
                                                 
18 G8 is the name of the political organisation of eight the most developed countries in the world which 
had a decisive influence on the global politics and the solution to the Kosovo crisis in general.   
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But you're concerned about the manner in which they're solving the 
problem they have, you must also take into account their concern so that 
if there are any delays, you wouldn't say you wouldn't pull out.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
President Ahtissari, what could it mean to us if we waited several hours 
or one day more; what is that in comparison to the lives of the citizens 
living there who will – if no one's coming, and we're retreating – simply 
leave with the army and the police, they'll go. Why should we cause such 
troubles for the people living there for centuries? Is this the principal 
reason or not?  
 
What's the main purpose of the resolution and all the activities 
undertaken to protect the civilians in Kosovo regardless of their ethnic 
background. That's the main objective. That's the reason why I simply 
don't seek the ways to play some tricks, there are not tricks. What sort of 
a trick may help us if we are present there several hours more waiting 
for, say, a brigade coming to take over the responsibility in the zone of 
responsibility. It's only because we want to make sure local villagers will 
be safe. We know the international forces, KFOR, will protect every local 
and that they won't allow murders of local residents. This is the only 
thing we want to achieve, nothing more. The UN resolution drafted by G8 
clearly says "with which the deployment of the international security 
forces in Kosovo would be synchronised", nothing more.... please. It's 
only logical and honest on my part to talk like this, and even more than 
that, that's absolutely vital for the safety of the people. Why should we 
pay the price in human lives? This may also compromise your operation, 
if someone gets killed or murdered because of the security vacuum. 
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
As far as I understood my admiral, your representative of the foreign 
affairs ministry, the deputy minister, is on his way to Belgrade to meet 
you.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I'm not acquainted with this.  
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President  
AHTISSARI 
 
This will take another six hours.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
There's no need for him to come to Belgrade to meet me.  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
But they cancelled the meeting at 9.00 tomorrow. Could your people, 
please, get in touch with your generals from the negotiating team so that 
this bloody agreement could be signed and the decision made? 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
But president Ahtissari, please, could you only suggest that they use the 
same wording from the resolution?  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
I'll try, but as I've said I'm not taking part in the negotiations between 
NATO and you.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Yes, but you're the representative of the international community so your 
responsibility for the lives of the people cannot be ignored.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
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I passed on to them one suggestion, and it was accepted, but the other 
one wasn't. Let me try. But do authorise your people to sign the bloody 
thing. Because we can finish it this evening.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Alright. Let's finish it tonight and tell them simply that instead of that 
wording ("synchronised as much as possible"), which is, as you know, the 
wording of the discussion, not the wording of the agreement... This is why 
the resolution clearly states: " with which the deployment of the 
international security forces in Kosovo would be synchronised". It is so 
clearly stated in the resolution. Why wouldn't they simply use the wording 
of the resolution with respect to this text, and thus entirely harmonise the 
text of the resolution with the text of the military technical agreement?  
 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
You see, I understand you completely, and it's clear to me, but I'm not one 
of those negotiating. I'll pass this further regardless of whether this might 
have an effect, but on your part do everything you can to finish this so 
that they can come, so that we don't wait for another day. This is what we 
can do.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Let's not wait for tomorrow, let's reach the agreement now and sign the 
agreement. I don't believe the deputy minister of foreign affairs will come 
here before announcing his visit, without a telephone call or something.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Could you please check it out?  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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I'll check it immediately, but please let's have an understanding as men. 
Do you accept that its totally logical to use the wording of the resolution, 
which is so clear....  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
But this is not the problem – what I think is logical or not. You've 
proposed something, and I'll present the proposal to those who are 
negotiating.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Alright.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
But I'd like you to be a little bit more flexible because the other side 
seems to be in a position - not to accept this 24-hour request, which you 
didn't like. You've made no concessions in this respect.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Don't, president please... how many concessions have we made so far? 
You know that better than anyone in the world. We've done every possible 
concession in the interest of peace.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Let's not talk about what you've done and what you haven't done. Please 
give instructions to your people to continue negotiating so that this 
bloody military technical agreement could be signed and the Security 
Council made a decision this evening.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
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I'll do it right away, but as far as I understand you've accepted the 
obligation to propose the same wording from the Security Council 
resolution?  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Yes, I have, but ...  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Alright.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
They must reply whether they'll be able to accept it or not. I'm not 
authorised for that. In this case I'm only a mediator. But thank you.  
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Well, Mr. Ahtissari. You're head of state, you the highest representative – 
you're not a mediator. You're politician number one in charge of this 
case.  
 
President  
AHTISSARI 
 
Let's not waste time. We may continue our conversation at some point 
during the week. Let's try have this process take its own course.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Alright.  
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Thank you for accepting my telephone call. 
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President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
If you have any news, good news as you've said, give me a call. 
 
President 
AHTISSARI 
 
Thank you.  
 
 
 
 
colonel general 
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC19 
 
When we talked with you, we discussed for about an hour down there 
those two issues. We convinced them it was necessary for us and 
explained what 24 hours meant to us. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Ahtissari said they accepted it. Ahtissari now informed me they accepted 
this with 24 hours the way the two of us agreed on this – instead of 
having it within 24 hours from the suspension – to have so quickly that 
the security vacuum could be avoided. Is it true Vujovic's heading for 
Belgrade?  
 
 
* * * 
 
colonel general 
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
 
No, he's sitting next to me.  
 
President of FRY 
                                                 
19 Svetozar Marjanovic (nickname Marjan), Yugoslav Army colonel general, the signatory to the 
Kumanovo Agreement, deputy chief of staff. Involved in a scandalous affair over having been given a 
luxury villa in the Uzicka Street, in the elite residential suburb of Dedinje, after the signing of the 
Kumanovo Agreement. 
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SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I suggested to Ahtissari, and he agreed to propose this... if they don't 
want to accept that this should be entirely synchronised to eliminate any 
sort of (security vacuum). Here we realised we had a very good argument 
– to propose instead of this what they don't want to accept, but to avoid 
what it says in their document – and it says they give themselves the right 
to be late so the people would go with the army and the police, or they 
would let them slaughter us there. Well, since they want to have this right, 
we proposed in the conversation with Ahtissari to insert instead of that 
the sentence from the resolution draft item 3. And it says our withdrawal 
and the deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo will be 
synchronised. Marjan, you must explain it to them how many houses will 
be burnt, how many civilians will go. I'm afraid they might be planning 
unleash the KLA to do some massacre. So, they've accepted this and 
that's alright.  
 
(inaudible) 
 
Here's the solution. Take the text from the resolution, item 3. The 
resolution states this clearly. The resolution may be more accurate than 
the agreement. They must accept this wording. If they don't, you tell them 
we'll go public with this. In order to have the civilians protected, there 
must not be a security vacuum. The resolution envisages in its item 3 the 
same in order to prevent that. We can say to the world – we agreed 
everything, but they're now avoiding to assume the strict responsibility 
that their arrival and the process of taking over responsibility for the 
safety of the civilians be synchronised. At issue here are the lives of the 
civilians only. I made an agreement to continue the talks immediately and 
to suggest we find some compromise so that the exact wording from the 
resolution would be adopted. This is a new proposal I've just presented to 
Ahtissari. Here, you should say, this proposal is a compromise which we 
accepted instead of this text. This is what Madeleine Albright G-8 wrote. 
They can't have some principled excuse to say they don't agree because 
they were the ones to propose it in the first place. Otherwise, this point in 
the resolution would be sidelined, then probably G-8.... Like this... G-8 
states it clearly – verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, 
police and paramilitary forces in accordance with swift .... with which the 
deployment of the international security forces in Kosovo will be 
synchronised. So this is clear. And Ahtissari told me the meeting should 
resume tomorrow at 9.00 because "your deputy foreign minister is going 
to Belgrade for consultations". So I propose, Ahtissari said, to resume 
negotiations immediately and make this more precise, and I'll call the 
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Americans to urge them to use such wording from the resolution – which 
is much better for us than what it says here. This is where the 
compromise lies. And they can't have a principled excuse to reject the 
wording from the resolution because how they would then implement the 
resolution? Safety of the civilians is the main reason to adopt the 
resolution and for your presence in Kosovo. We only want that you 
synchronise your arrival with our withdrawal because thus we're 
protecting the lives of the people and their property. We don't want any 
houses burning, murders – and this is, I presume, our common objective 
– to avoid it. Therefore, our honour is intact – the only thing we insist on 
is that they arrive on time, and they want the right to be late.  
 
You know, I used to work in a bank – when you take on the obligation 
having done all you can, or when you take on an obligation in writing to 
discharge it – this is an obligation in writing which must be discharged. 
If it says it'll be synchronised, they you can't have – as much as possible, 
but it'll be synchronised just like the resolution says. So two things – the 
first is essential, and the second is organisational in its nature. This 
essential one refers to the language we're talking about – hence, these 
sentences and the right to be late, and the second organisational one – 
that Ahtissari urges us to resume the talks immediately so that this thing 
could be agreed on the basis of this proposal of mine, which Ahtissari 
and I agreed on, so that this could be signed and so that the Security 
Council session could be held today already. It's 17.30 local time, and in 
New York it's 10.30. So if you sign this in 2-3 hours, they can have it in 
the Security Council to finish it. This was why he suggested this shouldn't 
be delayed until tomorrow. You tell them through your liaison officer that 
Ahtissari called and suggested the talks should resume immediately... that 
we have a compromise solution and that we're ready to resume the 
negotiations on the basis of this compromise solution. Go back there and 
insert the sentence from the resolution which suits us entirely. Has 
Vujovic returned with the text of the resolution? Let me talk to him.  
 
Have you found the item 3? So there's no relativisation in terms of 'as 
much as...' that's like in banking, if you sign (meaning you have an 
obligation). When you signed it, then you've got an obligation. Is the 
strategy clear? They can't possibly shun the text of the resolution. You 
should say – we can't accept the blame for that now. We'll go public and 
we'll tell them. This is an important issue on which safety of the civilian 
population depends. That's the main reason for passing the resolution 
and for your presence there. You don't want to accept even what the 
resolution stipulates that your arrival must be synchronised with our 
withdrawal so that the people would be safe, so that no one burns their 
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houses or kills civilians. Our conscience will be clear, but you should 
then explain to the international public why you don't want to accept the 
obligation to be synchronised. Well, Albright wrote the resolution, and 
they don't want to accept her wording. That's the wording of G-8 which 
became a part of the resolution, and we would then normally go public 
with this. No one could hold it against us.  
 
Therefore, they should accept it. And regarding this organisational 
aspect, regardless of whether you agreed to meet at 9.00, say Ahtissari 
called and we have a compromise solution. Ahtissari suggested we should 
resolve this immediately so that the Security Council could hold a session 
in the afternoon. It's 11.30 now there. If you finish this in the next three 
hours, this means the Security Council could meet at 5,6,7, but they'll 
have a signed agreement. He's probably talking with them, and this is 
why he had this request for me – let's do it on the basis of that 
compromise solution and have what you suggested... what the resolution 
says... you should tell him – we have a compromise proposal which we 
discussed with Ahtissari, and he said we shouldn't postpone this 
tomorrow for 9 because of the possibility that the Security Council holds 
its session in the afternoon, New York time, and we have a compromise 
solution which we may agree on .... and go there and include in the right 
way the text from the resolution. But then their right to be late must be 
left out. Here's Ojdanic to give some suggestion.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Nebojsa, since it's quite normal that this sentence related to delays in 
deployment must be deleted... then in the context of this previous 
sentence, which is taken from the resolution... I believe the following 
sentence may stay: "Delay in deployment of the international forces 
entails the same delay in the withdrawal of the FRY troops with respect to 
the plan. This is more precise – what this synchronisation means. Here... 
president says this shouldn't be added.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Look, Nebojsa, I think it's clearer and it would be easier to defend this 
with arguments if we only have the text of the resolution, and then they 
can't refuse it. But, of course, this... their right to delay should be deleted. 
Therefore, before this right to delay... this text from the resolution... the 
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sentence about the delay should be deleted, and then we have that it's 
synchronised.  
 
 
* * * 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
All the consultations and convincing are over so this team should finish it 
all and sign this agreement during the night. I think they shouldn't fail, 
not these – ours, but those with whom we had all those talks, agreements 
.... exchanged arguments... who presented some unacceptable things 
which were on the table later.  
 
* * * 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
General, what's new? 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
       
I watched a segment of the central news show. They won't take even one 
square metre until the UN concludes the deal, and then it's up to us... I 
saw these people at the university and those in the party, etc. ... that's 
good... what they've done. This secretary told me they had a break, and 
returned down there at 6.00h. 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Believe me, I haven't even asked him. I he said like this, then it's like this.  
 
* * * 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
And now Obrad Stevanovic joins them. They had a break from 5 to 6, and 
at 6.00 they went to Kumanovo again... they probably...  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
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Now there's not a single reason not to finish this tonight, this evening.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Do we have any reports? These people on television said there were some 
fierce strikes in Kosovo. I haven't got that impression, judging by those 
reports.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
No, let me tell you how it's been down there. There was some action on 
four occasions against that village 0549, for the 76th time, then near the 
village of Kosovica strikes on the positions of that same brigade, my 
former brigade. Then two missiles in Dragas and Plajnik, 5 missiles in 
the Dragas municipality – it's because it's a little isolated, and the 
population in Dragas is friendly to us, Gorani people are those. Actually, 
only 4 times with 4 strikes. Mostly, these were units deployed there. 
Consequences – unknown... possibly if it's individual... The boys are 
hanging in well...  
 
* * * 
 
minister JOVANOVIC 
 
May we meet each other?  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
No way, but I've got a request. You've received a request 3.A, one request 
in relation to the sending of these competent experts for system-related 
and status issues. Representatives from the legal department, and the 
construction and personnel departments would join in to consider all 
these issue because this must be done immediately, and they must go 
tomorrow so please... I'll coordinate this – who should general Matovic 
call, to determine the time of departure and to regulate all other issues... 
they are to go down there, to be at the disposal to analyse all those 
problems... to come up with solutions and immediately to solve those. We 
have to start pulling out quickly.  
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We announced a competition for some members of the interior ministry 
who said they would rather join the army... so we set up a special 
battalion of the military police and we offer to them approximately the 
same conditions they had there... so we're expecting some influx of people 
from the interior ministry, MUP... they expressed their wish to leave 
MUP if someone guarantees a similar status in the army, and after that... 
what's relevant now... they could return to MUP, and there would be no 
problems. Since they did it by resorting to fraud, they did what they did... 
the law protects us there. The moment they're discharged from the police, 
they should be assigned their combat positions, and I believe there are 
people who left, but have their combat positions in the army.  
 
* * * 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Zivadin's just called to say Vujovic called from their territory using his 
mobile. And they're going now so that Marjanovic will hold this press 
conference, and I said let Vujovic say something after Marjanovic in 
relation to this foreign affairs aspect, if needed. But Marjan, of course, 
will deliver the main speech and that's it. Well, I just wanted to let you 
know – now Jovanovic's called me. So if they signed it, this means 
Marjan would not sign this if they didn't include that provision. So this 
means they've accepted our position.  
 
* * * 
colonel general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
Hello general. 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
It's been signed. They've struggled the whole day. What they could 
change, they've changed. The army will be controlling border crossings 
together with the customs and other organs, and the border... but it's not 
in writing... 
 
Serbian president 
MILAN MILUTINOVIC 
 
What's going on? 
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colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
It's signed. I congratulate you on this victory. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
General, let Pavkovic tell you when they're planning to start pulling out 
because we shouldn't do anything in a hurry.  
 
The agreement has been signed. At least 24 hours we need to see and 
prepare ourselves. I wouldn't make haste too much. Let them plan this in 
detail and they should let you know when they would like to start... they 
should agree on some timetable when our people should start to 
withdraw the units from the zone 3... when they'll announce the bombing 
has been suspended... 
 
. 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
We can't leave zone 3... we can't because the Russians are supposed to 
arrive there. They haven't prepared themselves. They haven't even made a 
decision on this, let alone arrived.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
They could come. Now Sergeyev said somewhere between 2.000 and 
10.000... Shame on him, shame on him.... what can I do? Let them come. 
Let Krga get in touch with them. Let him contact them. They should say if 
they're ready to come now. You should issue orders to check out when 
they're coming. You see... let's consult on this... how they planned it? Will 
they start it tomorrow and whether it's going to be OK? I mean let's see 
what the dynamics is. I just want to draw your attention to this – don't do 
it in a hurry so that we can get out of the harm's way... but pay full 
attention to the people, resources.... everything in accordance with the 
plan and solidly so... nothing in a haste.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
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I'm convinced... what I've estimated that they're not ready for those 
deadlines they've given us ... that they can go in ... in sync.  
 
 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Perhaps, our people managed to improve these deadlines. We'll see. 
When you're on the secure line with Pavkovic, then you should see what 
and how… We don't have to hurry with the beginning now that 
everything's signed. I think no one's so crazy to bomb us, but we'll see... 
to start gathering for the D-day... it must be used to the full. And we 
shouldn't say tomorrow's a D-day, and on D-day+1 – meaning the day 
after tomorrow – and the zone 3 is empty... but then the day after 
tomorrow is D-day... it must be that the D-day starts with nice and clear 
weather... and starting in the morning, they could then verify this during 
the day and say this is done. Then we're sure of it completely. We should 
bear all this in mind. I think Marjan will give some good statement. I'll 
pop by at your place.  
 
 
* * * 
deputy prime minister SAINOVIC 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Mr. deputy prime minister, you'll owe me a drink after I tell you the 
agreement has been signed. Have they accepted anything of this? It's he – 
with the powers he's got.  
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Have a good night sleep tonight. Cheers.  
 
* * * 
colonel general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
colonel general 
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DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
We proposed this to the Russians, you see... they still have to make a 
decision on this.... the question is whether the Security Council will 
accept it so easily... so they'll have a session tonight as far as I 
understand. And they can't go in since synchronisation... we were fighting 
for this all the while, and not a single NATO soldier could enter the 
territory of FRY until the Security Council passes the resolution... this is 
the resolution draft which passed through G-8. So the president 
suggested we shouldn't do anything in a hurry, but there's one real 
obstacle there... because if the Russians take the part north of Pristina, 
Podujevo... and what we had here, according to the analyses... the most 
acceptable... they're not ready... the only option is to fly some of the 
forces there; they may land in Surcin, Belgrade, and let them take the 
first zone so that we could start. If the plan is already prepared, who 
knows when these... my people will come now. We still don't know 
anything about who's coming... we won't pull out until after their arrival. 
That's the task No. 1. This is a complex task... we're not like MUP 
(ministry of interior – the police)... they stop, then get on the bus and 
finish the job. OK, Nesa. Like Laza20... say... he's younger than us... don't 
let him fuck up. Listen, would he prefer a medal than that...but the 
medal... those are Clinton's candies. I'll admit to that when you taste it. 
Say hello... where's Laza.  
 
 
colonel general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Hi Laza. I congratulate you for making them sign such an acceptable 
solution. We couldn't have got any better solution.  I like this... that you 
say... we go on... thanks to our stoic endurance – we endured. Good, 
Laza. Have a drink with the boss. Cheers.  
 
 
colonel general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
... that we achieved a significant result in military-technical terms, that 
this was an absolutely unjustified aggression.  
 
President of FRY 
                                                 
20 Laza – colonel general Vladimir Lazarevic, Pristina Corps commander promoted to the position of 
the NG VJ assistant. Indicted for war crimes in Kosovo and Metohija by The Hague tribunal.  
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SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Fantastic. That's the most important thing – that it turned out well, and 
now tell me please: Have they accepted our stuff? Everything. Excellent. 
So there will be no vacuum anywhere. Can they keep up the pace during 
these eleven days.  
 
They say they can have this dynamics – 11 days. So we got everything we 
asked for.  
 
You're smart, but I noticed you were tired. Have you specified when we 
should begin pulling out? What? Less than 24 hours? By the way, we 
received the news from Cologne that G-8 decided the bombing should 
stop and passed it on to the Security Council. And what date did general 
Marjanovic specify... when we're supposed to start pulling out. And when 
is the D-day when the withdrawal from the zone 3 should start?  
 
..... It should begin tomorrow.  
 
I see. Do you have any other piece of information for me?  
 
colonel general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
These two will go – the American guy and Ahtissari's general – to Russia 
because they've hear the Russians want to send 10.000 strong troops.  
   
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Tomorrow is D-day. Tomorrow the withdrawal should start. Good, 
Nebojsa, so if they're late we... OK, alright Nebojsa. I just want to say 
now we chucked in the provision... we didn't to move you... the provision 
that if they're late tomorrow, and if tomorrow is D-day+1... when the 
withdrawal begins... we included the provision that after three hours... 
that the termination is on the 11th day. Our perseverance has paid off. 
Well, there you go. What's going on... shooting... Well, don't allow 
anyone to get killed.  
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WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY AND PEOPLE 
FROM KOSOVO AND METOHIJA 
 
"Never does a man get as far 
 as when he does not know  
where he is going" 
Bismarck 
 
 
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
 
General, Marjanovic is on the line. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Hi Marjan, congratulations. Anything new? Blasko should stay here. 
Fine. No, no, we have the concept of our orders. He should only refer to 
the Plan based on the army commander’s decision. All the other 
questions can be defined here. I have the concept of our orders. Since we 
have to leave tomorrow, I can send it tonight. Fine. According to the plan 
you drew up together. I accept Blasko, he can stay. You first get a good 
night’s sleep, and then leave. 
*** 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, 
 
Was it difficult for them to accept this? But, they accepted all of it. The 
important thing is that you did an excellent job. I congratulate you, 
general.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
You heard the president’s words of congratulations, and I support them.  
 
Blasko, I congratulate you. And now off to new victories. Act according 
to the agreement. I will now call Curcin and we’ll work. It will be 
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delivered in the course of the night. Here’s Marjan on TV, so the 
president wants to hear him. 
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
We will send it immediately to all units. This rules out any kind of conflict 
with… Did you discuss this, just so there is no… Only two battalions. One 
division and one battalion. I understood you. Good luck and have a rest. 
 
 
*** 
 
Major General 
SLOBODAN LAZAREVIC 
 
Yes, general? 
  
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Laza, listen. Please, by the command line, do your best to have any kind 
of expressions of sentiments, the opening of fire immediately stop. You 
will receive orders, so that fire is not opened and does not challenge 
these fools. But, I presume there is a lot of it down there as well. Officers 
should get up on their feet to visit the units and tell them that an 
agreement has been signed and that the withdrawal starts tomorrow. 
Tonight, only the air force will carry out raids, but it will not act, and the 
official termination will take place three hours, 2-3 hours after the start 
of the withdrawal of the first parts of the forces. I will send it officially. 
*** 
 
lieutenant general 
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
 
Clark called now, some ten minutes ago, and he said that, since the 
agreement had been signed, all activities were suspended, but we also 
expect from you the same kind of suspension of activities towards the 
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KLA, because the world is watching what is happening and you already 
know its story. He asked us to convey this message to you too. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
We issued such an order the moment the Agreement was signed. We have 
already forwarded the order to all the units, except if they attack us. So, 
the bombing has been suspended. Tell him that. 
 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Good morning, this is General Clark speaking. 
 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Good morning, this is Colonel Jovanovic from the cabinet of the chief-of-
staff, General Ojdanic. You wanted him to call you this morning. 
 
General  
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Yes, I did. I have an important message for him. His soldiers must 
immediately start withdrawing and a cease-fire must be established along 
the Albanian border so that NATO could suspend its air strike. Alright? 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Yes, alright. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
  
When can the movement of VJ units be expected the soonest? 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
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The movement of the units will start this afternoon, in accordance with 
the plan. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
You have to start earlier, before noon, so that this can be verified. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
We will do everything in our power to have them start as soon as 
possible. However, according to the existing plan, this was to be around 
noon, but we will do everything we can. 
 
General  
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Fine. And when will a cease-fire be established in the western part of 
Kosovo and Metohija? 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Sir, as far as we are concerned, General Ojdanic has confirmed that last 
night, immediately after the Agreement was signed, he issued all the 
necessary orders to our units to halt all activities. Just a moment, please. 
At the same time, we received promises from you that you will bring 
influence to bear on the Albanian side, and on the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) as well, to cease carrying out provocative actions against 
our units. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Yes, that is precisely what we are doing. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Alright. Wait a moment. We are especially concerned about the units 
stationed along the border with Albania, so we call upon you to use all 
your authority to put a stop to such activities. 
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General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Alright, I will do it right now. But you must use your authority to halt 
activities by the special police. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Yes sir, we understand. 
 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
I will call you from time to time. I would like to be able to learn at that 
time how your units are progressing in their withdrawal. I will make the 
first call at 10 o’clock. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
  
Yes, sir. We agree, but General Ojdanic says that, at that time, we will be 
in the phase of preparations. 
 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Fine. Do everything you can and as fast as you can, or else the 
bombardment will continue. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
General Ojdanic says that we will strictly abide by the signed Agreement, 
and that everything planned according to the Agreement will be carried 
out today. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            135  
 135
Alright. We will also abide by the signed Agreement. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
OK, sir. Just a moment, please. The general would like to ask that the 
arrival of your forces be synchronized. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
It will be. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
That would be all. Thank you, sir. 
 
General 
WESLEY CLARK 
 
We will call you at 10 o’clock to get the latest information about your 
preparations. Goodbye. 
 
Colonel 
NEGOVAN JOVANOVIC 
 
Goodbye. 
  
The VJ was faced with a serious operation – its withdrawal from the 
territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Over a hundred thousand men in 
uniform with materiel and equipment were to withdraw from part of 
their territory within the several following days. Leaving with them 
were also enormous columns of civilians fleeing in the face of the 
oncoming, revengeful KLA which no one was controlling this time. 
Rivers of people and materiel were pouring in towards central 
Serbia. Officers were moving their families from the garrisons in 
which they were serving. Some of them were experiencing the same 
Golgotha for the third time. The patriots who played war drums 
before the war, and the price for whose music was paid in blood, 
were now withdrawing together with the long-suffering people who 
did not know who and what to believe. Leaders of the ruling parties 
from the territory of Kosovo had made provisions for themselves in 
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time, and this was perhaps a unique opportunity for them to justify 
the fact that they had secured livelihood for themselves in Belgrade. 
The withdrawing operation passed more or less successfully. The 
“supreme commander” had an opportunity, together with the VJ 
chief-of-staff, to come out from his mouse-hole into the fresh air and 
to start presenting decorations and stripes to the once again deceived 
and wretched army. For the entire period of the war, none of the 
mentioned gentlemen found it necessary to go to the first front lines 
and visit those who were giving their lives in the belief that they were 
doing the right thing.  
 
 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC  
 
lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Here is how things stand. As regards this cessation of activities, this was 
ordered immediately and was ensured in all the units. Then I told him you 
had promised to see to it that the other side does the same Therefore, 
whenever there is any activity from there, we call him. He said he would 
personally take measures to ensure it. Please, since those at the time 
consider this to be certain, I want your men to inform me exactly how 
things stand. He will call me again around 10 o’clock and I will tell him 
that the forming is under way, that units are in the phase of withdrawal 
from the existing positions and that a ..... order was being formed, and at 
12 o’clock we will inform him that it had started, that he can check it out 
and officially … It should be said that the conditions of a state of war will 
not be suspended for us until we pull out of there. So, if we have to, we 
should even be a bit tough and arrest someone. Here, Colonel Jovanovic 
is sending his greetings.  
 
*** 
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC  
 
lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Here, let me tell you that Clark called me this morning. He is insisting on 
the suspension of all activities. I already issued the order the moment the 
agreement was signed. This, of course, also applies to your part. We have 
to show restraint, unless we are attacked. We cannot deviate from this, 
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because they will hit us again. He insists, asks when we will be ready to 
withdraw. I said today by noon and he said - the sooner the better. We 
cannot make it earlier, at 12 o’clock the first column will move. They will 
carry out an inspection and officially take it down. There was nothing last 
night. I told him – here, the promise has been made and you, for your 
part, see about the other side, because they have opened fire from the 
territory of Albania. And he personally will see to it to force that side not 
to provoke, to suspend activities in line with the Agreement. For us, the 
other side is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), it is them. They had a 
correct attitude after the agreement was signed, not a single shot was 
fired. There are other problems as well – the Russians in Zone 3, which 
we will be leaving first. They are now intervening through them, because 
the plan is for the Russians to come. They have not even determined the 
composition of their forces, but they already have the version predicted 
by Clark and his company. And let 1-2 planes land through an 
intervention, so that at least a symbolic number of the Russian forces… I 
would like them to enter first, although they did not pass the test in any 
way. Shame on them. It is only now that they are taking the decision 
instead of having a pre-prepared solution. This means that they were not 
even preparing to participate on the territory of Yugoslavia with their 
forces.  
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
General, I don’t know whether you have received it, but I sent you 
personally a document in which we are requesting that the ministry… 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
The team will be setting off today. I called last night, I called the minister 
since at no point did I (want him) to appoint this head of the 
Administration for status and systemic issues, the representatives of the 
Legal administration, human resources and civil engineers. They will all 
be disarmed, that will all be a civil administration. And find that Bojovic. 
Most important for you now is this with the army. Leave the civilian 
sector. Let us meet this deadline. 
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
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lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Pavke, I checked it out. General Ristic from the Defence Ministry is 
setting off with a competent team, so put pressure on them there to 
resolve everything to the extent to which it is possible.  
*** 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Good morning, general. Did you have a good sleep. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Clark woke me up. He wanted to hear whether activities had been 
suspended. I confirmed this, because it is so, except for the merrymaking 
and celebrating of the people and also in the units. Secondly, I told him 
that we could not guarantee for the other side, nor was this in our power 
or within our competencies. The other side promised to intercede with the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), not to open fire from the territory of 
Albania. He said he would do everything in his power and I see that 
Clinton also made an address and said that … and he was interested in 
the time when the withdrawal would begin. I told him that we were ready, 
in line with the agreement, and that the start of the withdrawal of the first 
echelon would be at 12 o’clock. I talked to Pavkovic 2-3 times and he 
confirmed that they were ready. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
This issue of not opening fire on the regions where the forces are rallying 
for withdrawal is not even topical now, because the bombardment has 
been fully halted. It is important always to take all the measures.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
He called me again at 10 o’clock. He will now constantly keep nagging 
me to tell him how these preparations are going, in what phase they are, 
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and he says that when it starts at 12 o’clock, they will check it out from 
the air.   
 
President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC  
 
Then they need to declare that the bombardment has been officially 
suspended. They want to carry out their procedure, but there is no danger 
there. We will all abide by the agreement we made.  
 
 
lieutenant general  
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
I intervened with these Russians, because we now have a problem which 
is creating a vacuum. You see that they are still debating, asking for the 
final decision of the Russians, of Yeltsin, and I said in that telegram that 
was sent that they should also talk to this envoy of ours and send at least 
two planes to land at Pristina airport so that the Russians are the first to 
come. That would be most important for us – to have the Russians be the 
first to enter that areas that we will leave first. Can you imagine, they did 
not count on this at all, but they are deciding now when the forces are to 
carry out the takeover. They could have had part of their forces at their 
airports on the alert and that would be that. The question is what Yeltsin 
will decide. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
And then we will say what the Russians are, shame on them. They keep 
humiliating themselves day after day. If they do not send 10,000, they are 
really wretched. General, how many of our people have been killed in the 
war, ending with yesterday. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Ending today, a total of 462 men were killed. Fifty officers, 34 non-
commissioned officers, that is 7%, then 37% of the soldiers, and 136 men 
or 29% of the reserve forces. There is something they did not manage… 
there are 71 left and that is 15% by the categories, so that it has not been 
categorized.   
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And the Albanian-terrorist forces mostly range somewhere up to 35% of 
this figure, while the rest is a smaller percentage, but let me not deal with 
figures which ....  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I have information that 114 policemen and 462 soldiers were killed. 
Among our people, one per thousand was killed throughout the entire 
war. Because if we have 400,000 people, that is one per thousand, for the 
entire period of the war, over a period of 77 days. This should enter the 
annals of the military science. I do not know how much this is according 
to military standards, what do you say about 1%.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
We have these extraordinary events - that goes separately, we register 
these losses separately. There are another 68 people. We register them as 
extraordinary events, but they were practically killed in the war. We have 
68 fatalities. These unfortunate people have to have all the rights as all 
the others, because it they had not been there, they would not have been 
exposed to danger.  
 
There is no special need for us to meet tomorrow regarding the symbols 
for the celebration of Army Day, regarding the decorations. It will be 
held at the National Theatre. The programme lasts an hour and 33 
minutes. I was in favour of it being held at Topcider, but Sava Centre 
provides a higher level.  
*** 
 
 
lieutenant general 
BLAGOJE KOVACEVIC 
 
I am with my cronies. We got together this morning at 9 o’clock and this 
process is starting today, we are planning, organizing and monitoring. 
So, I am at the old place today. I will stay today, according to the 
agreement, with Marjan, to see them off. It is important to start moving. 
Everything will go according to plan. We will inform them in time, there 
is no need for them to rush us. We will do it according to plan. I will need 
3-5 officers who know English. That will be our biggest problem. 
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*** 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
General, these 462 Army members who were killed, do you have any idea 
about their ethnic composition. We have no such information. Because, 
there were also Hungarians there. I do not want to go into any… because 
I wanted to have an idea, since there are certain things that should be 
politically emphasized and some that should not. If someone has a list, 
that is not a big list for a certain period of time, how much time does he 
need. I will call you. Let him call Susic in an hour. 
 
*** 
Deputy Prime Minister 
SAINOVIC 
 
Did our guys start the procedure. What is the information from the field? 
So, this plan, did they finally send the text? This means hat the 
withdrawal is to begin at 12 o’clock. Do you expect any problems on your 
side? 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
No. It is a bit specific, because we have envisaged that the Russians will 
come to that area, especially that part in the north, with a majority Serb 
population, and I intervened. There is still no final decision. Everything is 
hypothetical with them, from 2-10,000. Yeltsin needs to give the approval, 
which means that they had not planned to come at all, since they had not 
prepared forces to transfer them here at least in an aircraft. I suggested 
that they do so, since the airport down there can be used during the day, 
the Pristina airport can be used during the day. Let them bring in any 
number.  
*** 
 
lieutenant general 
RISTO MATOVIC 
 
I told them to make a short review which will show that as well, since we 
have a number of people whose names we do not know and we would put 
them among the others. That is what I said, and I also said that we should 
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put an explanation below saying that this is how it will be determined, 
how the data will be determined.  
 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, 
 
Call them down there at 12 o’clock and inquire about the movement, in 
case Clark needs to be informed or let them call, but it would be better to 
inform them. Call Pavkovic. Come here and maintain contacts from here, 
first with Pavkovic or Colonel Jovanovic.  
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
RISTO MATOVIC 
 
General, I talked to Kovacevic, but he says that a plan was made to start 
the movement at 1 o’clock and he says that they were informed about 
that. They will send us that plan by fax, so we will have it. So, let things 
go according to plan, let’s not have me and Jovanovic hurry it up, let it 
go according to that plan. Here, they are bringing in the plan now. 
 
A problem for Slobodan was the political marketing itself that had to 
be carried out towards his own people. For him, the dead were just 
per thousands and ordinary figures. He expected much more from 
the Russians, but got almost nothing. He was extremely angry with 
them, but could say nothing. Since he did not understand his own 
position, as it was, it was illusory to expect him to understand the 
kind of difficulties Russia was facing at the time. At its helm was 
aging and ill Yeltsin. Indecisive and surrounded by people who paid 
more attention to their own interests than the interests of Russia. 
Yeltsin was unable to do anything that could improve Milosevic’s 
position. That anarchy that was reigning in Russia at the time is best 
attested to by the fact that the decision on the arrival of their troops 
in Kosovo was taken totally rashly, chaotically and without the 
knowledge of all structures of power in Moscow. Noting else could be 
expected from a country that was facing bankruptcy, stuck in the 
mire of the conflicts in Chechnya and standing in line for receiving 
western financial assistance. It was just a pale copy of the one-time 
military and political machinery that was shaking Asia and a 
considerable part of the World. Due to its old glory, the Russophiles 
prevailing among our politicians and the hopeless situation we were 
in, all the eyes were turned to the east. Let us just recall a patriot by 
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profession, as Milovan Bojic was, and the “nyet” he uttered from the 
staircase of a Belgrade building, before the bewildered people. That 
“nyet” also had its price which was paid in Swiss francs and stacked 
away on the “comrade’s” bank account thousands of kilometres from 
here. 
  
 
The Russians’ Arrival in Kosovo 
 
 
  
June 12, 2000 
 
Ambassador MILOSEVIC 
 
Good evening. We have just started renewing the army. They tricked me 
into returning to this. I was well off in business, I had a few years of 
easier life, but now this again. The only thing is that you get good 
instructions, I listened to your conversation and I understood you very 
well. 
 
I wanted to say the following: Here is my friend, your representative is 
still waiting, he called me now. I will probably have to participate in the 
signing of that military-technical agreement between us and them. And do 
you have any idea for this to be done in Belgrade, to make in faster. 
Between Yugoslavia and the Russians, if necessary. I would just like to 
ask the following - to have someone always on duty there, so that I would 
be able to contact someone who is responsible and so that we would be 
able, if necessary.....  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
On this telephone. I will see that a team is there always, non-stop, 
throughout the night, I have my assistants, and I will sleep there were I 
always sleep. What seems to be the problem now? 
 
 
Ambassador MILOSEVIC 
 
I don’t really know. According to some newspaper reports there, that 
Talbott came back here and they started some talks again. There are 
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some tough and less tough statements, like about the Russians’ legitimate 
right to be present as well, but it seems that they are really eager to be 
there first. The press and these agencies are stirring up things even more. 
A column is coming, the Russians want to be the first, they want this zone, 
they want that zone. There cannot be a unified command. It cannot be 
unified, as far as the Russian side is concerned. 
 
I heard the foreign minister saying 15 minutes ago that they will have to 
find a solution that will not bring stability into question 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Well, allegedly those down there set off from Macedonia and they 
encountered sniper fire from those NATO members. There they killed our 
captain when we were conducting negotiations. Feel free to call if there 
is any need for any kind of consultations.  
 
*** 
...... (?) 
 
Blair’s representatives, there is information that they had ordered 
Jackson urgently, in the course of the night, to enter this area here and 
beat those from there to it. Simply to cause some kind of incident. If only 
they knew that the others wanted to enter before them. They are 
preparing to land before them in Pristina.  
 
 
Lieutenant General  
SPASOJE SMILJANIC 
 
I and General Grga are here at Surcin. For now, there is no movement 
from there, and if they do start moving, the earliest they can be here is in 
three hours’ time. You probably know how things are progressing down 
there and who is coming from there. Those down there have reached the 
General Jankovic crossing, but some kind of conflict broke out and they 
stopped. They will allegedly continue moving at 00.01 hours. Will they 
really set off, I don’t know. I suggest that we go to our rooms, while 
General Petrovic is at the observation centre, he is linked to the 
announcement and registration system and he will redirect them to go 
straight down. It is possible to land down there in night conditions and 
the time of the arrival of the data was absolutely no problem. They are 
not allowing them to use the air space, but if they do issue an approval, 
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Petrovic is on the line, I will be in the office and I suggest that Grga also 
goes to his office. He will call you if necessary.   
 
On the scene then appeared Milosevic’s tactfulness, which was 
always for single use and its visionary quality was measured by days, 
and not by years. He once again decided to set the East and the West 
against each other, neglecting the fact that Russia had already 
bought NATO boots and was only waiting for an opportunity to put 
them on. In private conversations, far from the Security Council 
which Slobodan had sworn by just a few days before, the issue of the 
arrival of Russian troops was raised. When one takes into account 
the fact that Russia is in Partnership for Peace, that it has enormous 
debts and that it too had a war on its territory, then the whole drama 
over the arrival of a handful of Russians in our territory could be 
described as Milosevic’s imagination rather than a serious diplomatic 
action in which the Russians could play the main role after the war. 
President Yeltsin, torn between old glory and the years that had long 
since erased even the slightest possibility of his authority playing any 
major role in international relations, took a catastrophic decision for 
both himself and for us. He sent to Kosovo unprepared soldiers who, 
with a forced march and under the influence of alcohol, to the 
general surprise of the west and general joy of the Serbs, arrived 
from Bosnia at the border on the south of Serbia. World diplomacy 
did everything to prevent a conflict between NATO forces and 
Russian troops. Then came apologies from the Russian foreign 
minister to his western counterparts. All the time Milosevic knew 
that this was a small tactical move which would have no effect on the 
course of history in these areas in a few days’ time. A master of 
turning a mouse into an elephant, Milosevic and his television 
maximally exploited the arrival of the few Russians in Pristina 
streets. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
General, please, there were some cases when certain units were moving – 
of course, is doing this excellently, I am very satisfied with the way he is 
doing that, but tell Laza to say that every commander of every unit should 
tell the population: “We are here, UN forces are arriving, we will not 
leave before they come”, because I saw that in Prizren the anti-aircraft 
defence had started moving and they said – we’re leaving, and God help 
you, etc.  
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There is nothing for the anti-aircraft defence to do, there is no 
bombardment and there is no need for them to make such comments. 
Take some measures so that these people of ours, who truly did fight 
heroically, would not do some damage now. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Let me tell you that I already did so when I talked to Markovic.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Here, those politicians from down there are saying that the mayor, that 
small guy, had sold his apartment in the municipality for 650,000 and 
then fled. I cannot earn 65,000 German marks, and he sold it for 650,000 
marks. It is important to order each commander to tell the population in 
every contact – your security is guaranteed, don’t worry, everything will 
function under the UN. To prevent this, Markovic gave a very good 
interview. I watched him on TV. He spoke well, and so did Laza, and they 
were down there today. I sent Vujovic to talk to all of them and to 
explain, in general to the people at the green markets, that everything 
was functioning, working. But I think that a few of those local politicians, 
who had illegally acquired a lot of money, got the poor on the move in 
order to go in front of them, since they do not know how to flee Kosovo 
with that money they had stolen. They are letting the poor go in front of 
them, so you have the people moving, and they are moving with the 
people. Those are crooks. I told Vlajko to bring back under guard any 
municipal official who had started leaving and not to let him move. So, let 
your security line also function, and let no one move from his job. 
Have the Russians arrived in Pristina? How much time do they need? 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Not yet. They passed Kursumlija because they were held up somewhere 
above Nis. They went slowly. While they poured fuel, drank at a café, they 
are somewhat intoxicated. They allegedly have problems are midnight, 
they cannot enter. There are big problems up there, they are not letting 
them carry out the flight. The Hungarians are not giving the Russians 
their approval either. They do not want to give their consent, the 
Bulgarians won’t either and they have still not set off. We spent 9 hour 
with 15 buses and 10 trucks and with both police escorts in order to get 
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the column down there. Those who come off from the plane…, but we told 
them to go to the Pristina airport, it is functional and you can also land 
in Pristina in night conditions, and now they are there. I also talked to the 
ambassador. The relations are strained. 
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
Why don’t they fly, what do they care if they will not give them 
permission. Will the Bulgarians shoot at them?  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
We have a source in England which has reported that they somewhat 
unexpectedly lifted B2s which can possibly carry out some kind of an 
intervention if the Russians do what they do not want them to do,  
because they are now defeated by the fact that the Russians are the first 
to enter. They have already entered Kosovo. But quite honestly, that is a 
peace force, but ... Who knows what these lunatics can do. Once they had 
started carrying out their assignment, they should have completed their 
assignment.  
 
President of FRY 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
 
I have planned to meet with you tomorrow somewhere between 10 and 11 
o’clock. Are you ready? Issue this order immediately. 
 
*** 
 ..... (?) 
 
General, hello once again. There, you see, Mihailo has returned from the 
Centre and he brought back a draft military-technical agreement between 
the defence ministry and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the 
import and stay of a special military contingent on the territory of 
Kosovo. It has four pages, the titles should not be changed. They are now 
waiting for us to give our opinion about it. I think that we should send it 
directly to you by fax. What do you say? This is, therefore, the agreement 
whose preamble says that it is in line with article 7 of the Resolution and 
that at issue is cooperation between the two sides on the import and stay 
of that special contingent, and then article 1 says that our government 
agrees, that it accepts and that state bodies agree to ensure the 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            148  
 148
deployment and the operative activities of these forces and that we will 
fulfil our obligations stemming from this agreement. Article 2 defines 
certain terms over which we all agree. There are three terms – sides, 
meaning the legal persons who had signed, then the special military 
contingent of the Russian Federation – they call it CVK. This means the 
military formation that is deployed on our territory, but it has its 
weaponry, military equipment and all the necessary reserves that cover a 
certain territory of a country, since the borders are defined. Then the 
third term is the forces of the sides in the conflict, all our military 
commanders, the military police, reserves and intelligence bodies, and 
equally all the formations of these Albanians, meaning the sides in the 
conflict. Article 3 says that the goal of that agreement is to establish a 
lasting cessation of hostile activities and control of the implementation of 
the Resolution. The control of the cease-fire, guaranteeing the realization 
and preventing the forces not envisaged by article 6, annex 2 of the 
Resolution, from returning to Kosovo. Then the disarming of all the 
illegal formations, including the KLA, the creation of security for 
refugees and displaced persons, then ensuring social security and order 
until responsibility for the performing of these tasks can be assumed by 
the international, civil… the supervision of the demining of the territory 
of the zone of responsibility. The realization, according to the needs, of 
the obligations regarding border control and the last securing of the 
protection and freedom of movement of their civil forces in the zone of 
responsibility. The zone is in the northern part.   
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
This is now good, there is no task of providing full security and safety for 
the citizens, belonging to all nations and religious communities. That 
must be the first task. The full security, personal and property safety, of 
citizens of all nationalities regardless of their religion and ethnicity. Do 
you agree? 
 
.... (?) 
 
Let me now read on. Article 5. The development of CVK will proceed in 
line with the local authorities of FR Yugoslavia. The start of the 
development of the middle CVK group will be synchronized with the start 
of the development of other contingents of the international military 
presence. The further development of CVK will take place according to 
the dynamics agreed on by the two sides, us and them. In order to ensure 
the landing of planes of the military-transport aviation, the Yugoslav side 
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is providing the airports in the areas of Belgrade and Slatina. For the 
purpose of the unloading and loading of weaponry, m/s, the Yugoslav 
side will provide railway stations in the places of deployment. Concrete 
stations will be defined in agreement with the local authorities. The 
Yugoslav side will provide assistance in supplying the contingents with 
electricity, food, drinking water, technical water at prices which the sides 
agree on. Article 6. In line with the obligations, the authorities of 
Yugoslavia understand and accept, they agree to have the contingent be 
deployed and to operate in the areas of the zone, having the authorization 
to take all the necessary measures to establish and support security for 
all the citizens of Kosovo. Article 7. The CVK and its members will bear 
no responsibility at the expense of state or private property that would be 
inflicted.... tasks in connection with the realization of the agreement, they 
will not fall under the responsibility of courts in FR Yugoslavia in any 
respect. Material damage that is inflicted on the Yugoslav side in the 
defeat of the CVK will be regulated. Article 8. Without bringing into 
doubt any of the stands, the sides have agreed to consider that the CVK 
commander that the authorization to request the transfer, withdrawal or - 
dislocation of certain forces of the sides in the conflict, materiel, 
weaponry, and also the termination of various measures which, 
according to the opinion of the CVK commander represent a potential 
danger and the realization of their tasks or the other side 
[incomprehensible!]. The sides in the conflict that do not fulfil the 
requests for transfer, i.e. the realization or dislocation or which have not 
suspended measures endangering or potentially endangering … after 
receiving an adequate request from the CVK can be faced with the 
implementation of all the adequate measures, including the use of those 
necessary measures with the goal of ensuring the presented stands. 
Article 9. For ensuring the fulfilment of obligations towards FR 
Yugoslavia and cooperation with international bodies and with the 
authorization of the UN Security Council, the CVK commander is 
authorized to provide assistance to these bodies. Article 10. For the sake 
of the realization of this agreement, a joint commission will be formed 
after the deployment of a special military contingent in Kosovo according 
to the decision of the sides in the conflict. Article 11. The agreement will 
come into force on the day of its signing.  
 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Let me consult General Kovacevic. I believe, the two of us are of the 
opinion that all this is very correct and harmonized with them and that 
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wretched American side of theirs. Only if they accept it. You just send 
that. It is in our interest for this operation to proceed as soon as possible, 
and we have already compared it, since Kovacevic was at these talks. 
There is no deviation. On the contrary, certain things are more 
favourable, all the more so since it creates the possibility for the Russians 
to have their commander and it does not go into the issue of whether and 
to whom he is subordinated. He is not subordinated to NATO, but quite 
certainly to that representative authorized by the UN secretary general. 
In our opinion, there is nothing disputable there. If there is any need, we 
can send a fax or a telegram or something like that. We are eager to have 
this signed and to start with its realization. The zone is exactly as we 
insisted, absolutely acceptable.  
 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
The marshal is now with the president. You have received it, i.e. 
translated it.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
The important thing is for them to get the zone they have marked. It’s 
good. It would like it to include the patriarchate, Pec, but since the 
patriarchate will be protected by our forces according to this agreement, 
then everything is acceptable. Because, all those cultural and historical 
monuments will be secured by our forces, either the police (MUP) or the 
army. It is necessary to determine the exact criteria for establishing what 
they consider cultural and historical monuments to be, those recognized 
according to certain international criteria. It is important to keep the 
people there, to prevent a total erosion, withdrawal, because that would 
complicate everything, while these monsters who took a lot of money a 
long time ago have ensured for themselves a safe haven here in Serbia’s 
interior and now, using the poor as a guise and under their protection 
they are practically moving at the head of the column with them. Those 
Serbs in Kosovo – I served 8 years in Kosovo, I know well what they are 
like. For 40 years we…, and now this generation of ours has to correct… 
we are losing Kosovo, and 50 years, that famous Constitution of 1974 
that buried us.  
 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
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I said on a TV channel: What do you know about that? Do you know that 
after the adoption of the Constitution the relations were such that the 
Serbian interior minister could not go to Kosovo without the written 
consent of the Interior Ministry (MUP). They kept silent.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
The responsibility for this lies with those Serbs and Montenegrins who 
held high positions and wanted to preserve them, so they toadied to the 
Albanians, and there was a possibility then, while Tito was still alive, for 
it to be resolved properly. We will be in touch. 
 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
There are no major problems, except the jammed roads. We are trying to 
do something about it. Here, it is only now that these MUP bodies are 
being engaged to regulate that traffic. The biggest problem is the delay in 
the arrival of these forces in Metohija. The Germans are late in arriving. 
It is only today that the Germans and the French might enter, and it is 
difficult to carry out the takeover later. This is the third day. 
  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Nesa, this should be forwarded in written form and it should be said that 
we were unable to carry out the signed plan, the withdrawal, due to the 
belatedness. So that they cannot find an excuse in saying that we were 
late, instead of 13 days, that we… 
 
lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
 
We keep writing to them and they know that. These Russians (came) down 
there, you know, through Kosovo Polje, to the airport. There are certain 
indications that the English are preparing a stronger unit that would 
come and overpower them somewhat. But let them do whatever they want 
to. Secondly, as far as our units are concerned, everything is proceeding 
according to plan. We will discipline all that, that route in all the 
directions in these centres where they are coming. Meetings have been 
held with the heads and municipal officials and other structures. We have 
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received this, this request of yours. I don’t know whether we can turn 
senior officials back and chase them there throughout Kosovo, but if we 
come across them, they will be sent back. The entire SPS executive board 
has come. They are coming to Baki and let them handle that. We are 
keeping our leading people in their positions so that no one would have 
any objections, and they, we will see what we can do. I believe that those 
who wanted to flee have already left, there is no dilemma about that. You 
know where they have houses. We will not allow any kind of withdrawal 
until they come.  
 
Ambassador MILOSEVIC  
 
General, we talked all night, and they will not allow it. They are 
demanding that the Russians leave, withdraw. This political move of 
ours… 
 
 
President of FRY  
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
  
Let’s stick to 10 o’clock. Someone will meet you to give you instructions. 
Here at Uzicka Street.  
 
*** 
.... (?) 
 
General, hello. An additional small piece of information. This Talbott, the 
deputy secretary of state is now flying to Macedonia with three generals 
and a certain Russian general will be there too. Also, in these talks he is 
referring to this agreement that we have concluded. We do not have that 
agreement, so order someone to send it to me. They say that Talbott has a 
political conclusion in that agreement, they have allegedly been 
authorized by Belgrade and so they can deny the Russians this or that. I 
have rejected this and said that there are no political conclusions in it, 
that it is just the military dynamics of the withdrawal, but I haven’t seen 
it. Send it to me by fax, 9379555.  
 
*** 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
You draw it up together and give me the exact concept of the organization 
of the protocol, the complete protocol. You cannot make it irrespective of 
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this that is at Sava Centre. Listen Nole, I …nothing until I see it in 
concrete form and on paper, the plan, and checked out in practice. I see 
that when something is released with confidence that there are 
corrections in the plan, which were made by President Milosevic. I will 
come to show you, to correct it in time and to make this report the way 
that the army does it, on two pages, and not 10 pages – that way you have 
the form guaranteed, but no essence. Yes, and the things you have 
incorporated are disgraceful. That last night, if you had been here, I 
don’t know, what I do not see… The one who did that plan for you must… 
At 1 p.m. and I will send this so that you can reach an agreement on the 
implementation of this plan, and I will write the speech. Unfortunately, I 
also have to do that message of congratulations. I have to rewrite the 
speech totally. So, I am sending you Vlajkovic and his protocol manager. 
If necessary call Sava Centre to see who is in charge of the protocol to 
come to give me the full concept – how many people will be engaged, the 
engagement of the Interior Ministry (MUP) and the military police. And 
how will you regulate the issue of the people entering there, so that a 
person would know that he has the right to enter there, to go to that 
cocktail party. This reception will be held at 6 pm. 15. at the Federal 
Executive Council (government). A choir that will sign the anthem, after 
that the president will make an address, I will have to say a few words, 
let’s see how you will ensure that Sava Centre is full. Apart from the 
official invitations, how will the rest be filled. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
I went to the president in regard to this Army Day and the regulation of 
all these issues. Here is how things stand, in short. There is no 
synchronization between that other side and the Russians. They held 
some kind of talks all night and all day and they reached absolutely no 
agreement. They will not give this sector that has been offered from the 
line of Istok, towards Istok to Pristina and towards Istok, southern 
Serbia. The Hungarians will not allow the flight over their territory. They 
are now awaiting the political decision of two American presidents. The 
English have announced that they are to come to Slatina, via Urosevac, 
during the day. How they will resolve this is their business. We really can 
have no influence on it, but as regards the time of our pullout, as much as 
they keep postponing their arrival and the takeover of the zone, we will 
have to keep postponing our plans as well. At 4 p.m. the Germans are to 
come to that Prizren part. At 7 o’clock this morning, these guys took over 
that part at the Dunavo watchtower and at the Glavocice gasoline 
station, while at 5 a.m. a small helicopter landing was carried out at the 
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Kacanik gorge, since they were not certain about the security of the 
communications, since the Albanian forces have already demonstrated 
activities. This is the current situation. All the Russians can do is move 
from there, they will make the arrangements for the sitting and they 
probably will not accept what we have proposed and what the Russians 
have accepted and for what they had fought.  
*** 
 
The state of emergency is still in force so that even the media in 
wretched Serbia were very cautious about giving assessments and 
conveying statements of both the opposition and the structures of 
power. Editors knew better than anyone in Serbia what had 
happened to their colleague Slavko Curuvija. There was no doubt 
that his murder had been ordered and carried out with the help of 
the secret services of Sloba’s and Mira’s regime. Thus, during those 
days, the Vreme magazine carried the statements of parties and their 
leaders showing that they were speaking differently about the whole 
thing, which was the first herald of the stormy year that lay ahead of 
us. 
Socialist Party of Serbia 
The document preserves the integrity and sovereignty of FRY 
The Socialist Party of Serbia has supported the plan for resolving the 
Kosovo crisis of the envoys of Russia and the European Union, Victor 
Chernomyrdin and Martti Ahtisaari, with the assessment that this 
document provided for “the establishment of peace and the halting of 
the criminal bombardment” and, that, at the same time, it preserved 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our state, while the 
resolution of problems in Kosovo and Metohija is being transferred to 
the UN, this confirming the role of this highest world organization, in 
line with its Charter”, stated the SPS Executive Board. “With the unity 
of the people, the citizens, political parties, the leadership, with the 
heroic fighting of the army and police, we have managed to defend the 
freedom, dignity and honour of our people from the several times 
militarily, politically and technologically superior enemy, NATO, 
which carried out an aggression against our country with the goal of 
annulling the sovereignty and territorial integrity, contrary to all the 
standards of international law”, says the statement.    
The SPS stated that, “taking as the point of departure the fact that the 
greatest value is the protection of the people and the state”, it 
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supported the document “that represented the basis for peace”, and 
that it was on the basis of such orientations in favour of peace that a 
UN Security Council resolution will be adopted. 
 
Miodrag Vukovic, advisor to Milo Djukanovic 
Everything should be explained to the people 
"It necessarily happened, it happened late, and someone must answer 
for that. It was necessary to establish peace, it was necessary to have 
the Kosovo problem resolved through negotiations, it was necessary to 
accept the international community as a partner and not to go to war 
with it, it was necessary to have a responsible attitude to the people and 
the state. Montenegro had asked for all these things. The policy in 
Belgrade first tore down the agreement on Yugoslavia, it created a 
patriotic Yugoslavia, it punished Montenegro and started charging 
towards the sky, but with the paupers in Serbia, while they moved 
themselves away from it all. 
Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia, Kosovo will not be ruled by the 
Serbs, Serbia has lost its state integrity and all that should be explained 
to the people. Serbia will no longer be a unitary state. By decision of 
the Serbian parliament, it is being federalized, in the worst way for 
Serbia. The FRY practically no longer exists. There is a request for 
this space to continue to be one state, but that does not imply the 
present manner. Montenegro will never again (be) with this type of a 
regime in Serbia, be we hardly managed to save ourselves from having 
the authorities from Dedinje turn us into Hiroshima. Montenegro does 
want to be with Serbia, but a new and democratic one. We are 
apprehensive about the days that are coming and how Serbia will be 
able to cope with itself. With these authorities, Serbia will not be at war 
against the whole world, but it will not be with the world either.  
 
 
REBELLION OF RESERVISTS IN SOUTH 
SERBIA 
 
"When a man wants to murder a tiger, he calls it sport; 
when the tiger wants to murder him, he calls it 
ferocity." 
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Bernard Shaw 
Lieutenant Colonel 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
Since I was determining this with the prosecutor’s office, since I have 
when I flew in here, the new information that they are now not going 
down there with 37 and with buses etc. to return that, they confirmed by 
24 [incomprehensible]. These prosecutors, the supreme judge, they say 
that, on the basis of this ultimatum, the signed document that was sent, 
we have the right to arrest them all.  
 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
I am in favour of having them arrested, regardless of whether they had 
postponed… Who do they think they are blackmailing?  
 
 
lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
Yes, I have. Here I have just come in, I was with the prosecutors and so 
on.  
    
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Is there anything especially interesting? I have read what you have sent.  
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
I have just had consultations. They say, the chief prosecutor says that 
those who have sent such a petition and signed it with such a tone of an 
ultimatum which expires now at 2 p.m., that they should go get them 
back, that we have all the elements for an arrest. This means, together 
with the mayor. 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Of course, this is how it should be done.  
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Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
We have seven plus eight signing it as an ultimatum … by 2 p.m.… they 
are going to get them and the mayor has signed.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Fine, and call me then. This evening we have with the president…, all the 
assistants here, it starts at 8 p.m. You come a few minutes earlier.  
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
They had a meeting with Pavkovic. I don’t know whether you have a 
report on this? 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
No, not yet, but I know that Pavkovic is down there. 
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
He has finished the meeting. The result of his meeting is that they have 
postponed it until the 24th if the issue of their return is not resolved, and 
then there is also an ultimatum. I had these consultations so as not to 
make a mistake there and not to have percentage-wise problems 
regarding certain issues and the fact is that we have firm arguments, we 
have their signatures and I… and the facsimile together with the mayor, 
and the mayor is SPS.   
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
That doesn’t matter. He shouldn’t have succumbed.  
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
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Therefore, I ask you now whether I should now issue the order for 
preparations to see and hear each other this evening and to do it in the 
morning.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
The president will be here this evening. I will tell him that, and have him 
confirm it, but I am absolutely for it. It has to be done sharply.  
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
They have as an ultimatum 48 hours, there are all sorts of things written 
there.  
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Send me by this guy of yours, send me these things.  
 
Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
I give my support to Aca down there, I have to support him from here, but 
since they are not going, if they were to set off now, we would do it now, 
and I think we have little time, little time to rest. We have to do that 
tomorrow, if you agree.   
 
 
 
lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
Yes, I do, but I think the sooner the better, just as much as you need to 
organize.   
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
I will organize for this to be done, at alert tomorrow.  
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lieutenant general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC,  
 
This means that it is 15, plus the mayor – 16. 
 
Lieutenant General 
GEZA FARKAS,  
 
No, there are 7 from Baljevac and 8 from Raska and the signature of the 
mayor of Raska.  
 
 
Appearing here for the first time is also the name of journalist 
Miroslav Filipovic whom the military court sentenced to several 
years of imprisonment for alleged espionage. Mr. Filipovic was a 
journalist of the Danas newspaper and a correspondent of several 
foreign news agencies. His example clearly shows that whatever the 
service conceives the military judiciary carried out, while the 
Administration for Morale does the marketing and presents it to the 
public. The mentioned journalist experienced a real Golgotha 
without having a clue about who stood behind it and why. After 
October 5, instead of learning the truth, he was brought into an even 
bigger delusion because general Pavkovic, in order to conceal what 
was really happening, established contact with the mentioned 
gentleman, invited him over in an attempt to make up for what he 
had done to him. I myself had intended to visit Filipovic, to warn him 
about what was being prepared for him, but the value of the 
information I was receiving was more valuable than the risk of giving 
myself away in that manner. I have no knowledge of the 
Montenegrins having tried to warn him about what was being 
prepared for him. I believe that until this day and until reading this 
book, he himself did not know what was really happening to him. 
At a session held on July 1, 1999, General Geza Farkas presented the 
following information regarding the mutiny in Yugoslav Army (VJ) 
units: 
Correspondent of foreign media, especially our citizens, are 
intensively following the events concerning the protests of military 
conscripts and the measures being taken by the VJ for the purpose of 
resolving this problem. Especially characteristic is the conduct of 
Miroslav Filipovic, a journalist from Kraljevo, and a correspondent 
of Agence France Press, who, in contact with a security office, posed 
the following questions: how true is it that there is discontent in the 
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VJ and that there is a group of people in the VJ ready to topple the 
present authorities by force. Is it true that the combat equipment of 
the 252nd armoured brigade had deliberately been left in Kursumlija 
so that it would not continue towards Belgrade in a combat 
formation. 
Is it true that there was enough fuel in the tanks only to come to 
Kraljevo. Is it true that VJ members are realizing that the army has 
been sent on a plundering campaign to Kosovo? 
Does he have correct information that there is discontent among 
higher officers, by which he means battalion commanders and 
higher, as well as an intention to topple the present authorities. At a 
rally in Cacak, this same journalist kept pushing the thesis that 
23,000 military conscripts from Kraljevo had been compelled to 
resolve their justified requests with the force of arms. 
Contrary to this, they are taking and planning further steps for the 
purpose of ensuring the broader support of the international 
community for acquiring a special status. From June 18 to 29 this 
year, an international conference for the democratic transformation 
of Yugoslavia was held in Vienna and organized by the Austrian 
Foreign Ministry. 
The invited participants also included Branko Perovic, the foreign 
minister of the Republic of Montenegro, Zoran Djindjic, president of 
the Democratic Party, Nenad Canak, president of the Vojvodina 
Social Democrats, Vuk Obradovic, president of ..... and Rasim Ljaic. 
The president of the Sandzak coalition ... was to make the keynote 
speech on the political, economic and humanitarian situation in 
Sandzak, in the light of the resolution of the Kosovo crisis. However, 
he did not travel to Vienna because he did not receive a permit for 
leaving the country, so he sent his speech by fax. 
Also, on June 28, a meeting was held in Ohrid of representatives of 
the Republic of Montenegro, Macedonia, the so-called Republic of 
Kosovo and the Republic of Albania for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement on the creation of a joint union. The participants in the 
meeting discussed issues concerning the establishment of mutual 
diplomatic relations. They agreed at this meeting to continue on July 
3 and 7 when they would thoroughly discuss and review the plans for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations.  
During the war, permits for leaving the country were issued by one of 
the VJ administrations dealing with mobilization affairs. They were 
issued selectively and it did not take much wisdom to understand 
why the present minister, Mr Ljajic, did not go to Vienna and who 
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prevented him from doing so. The military leadership was taking 
advantage of the state of emergency for a showdown with those who 
did not share Milosevic’s views. Something similar was also 
happening in Montenegro, where special lists were being made of 
people whom the army called into its ranks during the war. Those 
were people from Milo’s regime, and the lists could only have been 
made by Slobodan’s coalition partner: there Milosevic had his 
political… in the form of the Socialist People’s Party (SNP), a 
satellite which, on his behalf and on behalf of his policy, carried out 
the things Belgrade would conceive. The federal administration was 
under the strong influence of the SNP which was spending money of 
Serbian taxpayers for the purpose of destabilizing the situation in the 
mentioned Republic. Montenegro became an oasis of salvation for 
the Serbian opposition and the only opportunistic bloc in these areas 
that had the courage to oppose the tyranny from Dedinje. As such, it 
became the legitimate target of Milosevic’s followers. 
Slobodan had just rid himself of Kosovo, so that the only danger for 
him was small Montenegro. On the other hand, Montenegrin 
territory was a “political Normandy” in which ideas, money, agents 
and everything needed to start a war between services and interests 
was embarking. Milosevic knew that he could publicly act in 
Montenegro only through the VJ and its services. This was also 
sensed in time by the Montenegrin leadership so that a secret war 
started much before both sides were ready for it. The victory of one 
side automatically meant the defeat of the other. Montenegrin 
President Milo Djukanovic, President of FRY Slobodan Milosevic  
and the international community were all aware of this. The 
preparations for the elections in Montenegro were also attentively 
being followed by the VJ Security Administration even though this 
was not in its work description. 
The speech of General Aca Vasiljevic, later a witness against his 
“supreme commander” in The Hague, literally went as follows: 
 
General, among the activities of the foreign factors during the previous 
week I consider it interesting to mention that further examination is 
focusing on the situation among professional VJ members in regard to 
the current political situation in the country, as well as the events which 
are yet to ensue. In contacts with certain VJ members, presented are 
theses about the existence of different stands and views on this situation 
between the generals and senior officers on the one hand, and junior 
officers, on the other, who are said to be dissatisfied and tense because of 
their own status and the situation in the country, with the assessment that 
here lies a potential nucleus for public discontent and rebellion, which 
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opposition forces are also counting on. In this regard, the headquarters 
of the opposition forces in the country are making different assessments 
and calculations according to which allegedly only 20% of the VJ 
members support the present authorities, that another 20% have a 
neutral attitude, while as many as 60% are for a change of power at any 
cost. At issue here are obviously arbitrary assessments and a desired 
state of affairs, so that we at the VJ do not have any more reliable 
indicators in this regard either. However, in view of the announced 
activities by the opposition forces and their active efforts to include VJ 
members in their plans and activities, special attention should be devoted 
to familiarization with the situation in the commands and units. In this 
regard, I have in mind certain quite reliable operative findings of ours 
about the plans of the Alliance for Change to hold on Transfiguration, 
August 19, in front of the Yugoslav Parliament in Belgrade, a large 
promotional rally at which they plan to gather over 150,000 citizens from 
all over Serbia. In that sense they have planned to transport citizens from 
the interior by 125 buses and trains, and for securing the rally they will 
engage the so-called association of reservists, activists of the Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party, as well as activists of 
independent trade unions. Planned for this gathering is the participation 
and appearance of a total of 22 speakers, headed by Dragoslav 
Avramovic21, and who will also allegedly include generals Vuk 
Obradovic and Momcilo Perisic. This rally would practically mark the 
beginning of the campaign for the elections being prepared for September 
1, 2000. All this points to the need for us to take all measures, everyone 
within their competencies, so as not to experience any kind of surprise. In 
this sense, security officers have already been given the task of intensively 
monitoring and becoming familiar with the situation in their units and 
taking necessary preventive and counter-intelligence measures on the 
whole, and even individually. 
 
The territory of Montenegro is still in the focus of the attention of foreign 
intelligence services. With the formation of various movements and 
organizations, and especially now with this latest thing that they did -  it 
is a Montenegrin defence movement, with which, through propaganda, 
they want to emphasize the great danger of a possible intervention by the 
army for the purpose of toppling the current authorities in Montenegro.  
  
                                                 
21 Dragoslav Avramovic, also known as Deka (Old Man), Socialist dissident, who managed to achieve 
stability of the inflationary dinar in 1994 and restore confidence in the economy The then National 
Bank governor, Mr. Avramovic, became enormously popular, and as such, he was potential "target" for 
KOS (Counterintelligence Service) for fear that he could be Milosevic's rival in the elections.  
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Characteristic of Montenegro and the composition of officers in 
Montenegro is the fact that we have a total of around 100 officers who 
are already members of MUP units. Around 17 officers have announced 
their departure from the VJ and the joining of MUP units. Around 40 
officers are in a dilemma, and they will most probably leave the VJ. My 
proposal is for us informatively, i.e. to ensure our stronger presence 
down there on the territory of Montenegro, primarily because there is an 
absolute information blockade there, so that officers do not have 
information, only from that television there. We have made some tests 
and their television can be heard and seen all the way to Cacak.   
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TRACKING DOWN “INTERNAL ENEMY” 
 
One of the main tasks of the Counter Intelligence Service (KOS) after the 
air strikes in 1999 was to save the regime and, as part of this, their 
attention focused the “internal enemy”, i.e. the opposition in Serbia and 
the regime in Montenegro. 
It was characteristic that the army was very interested in Niš, as the centre 
of Southern Serbia, and the then mayor of Niš, and the present prime 
minister, Zoran  Živković. 
They did everything in their power to discover what he was doing, whom 
he was in contact with, who was giving him instructions as so on. I had 
agreed with Buda to warn the opposition leaders, through Montenegro, 
about the intentions of the military leadership if it is assessed that some 
kind of operation against them could be carried out, and to warn them 
about it. In continuation I will present concrete examples. 
 
Both the Collegiate Body of the Yugoslav Army’s (VJ) chief-of-staff and 
the “supreme commander” were regularly informed about the intentions 
of the Niš opposition. The situation was slowly becoming complicated and 
it required great skill to keep it under control. The fact that the unity of 
the opposition was feeble, while the vanity of its leaders was enormous, 
quite certainly played into the hands of the authorities. One such 
assessment of a future rally three days before the event itself was set out by 
General Gajić before the Collegiate Body of the chief-of-staff:  
 
Major General 
BRANKO GAJIĆ 
In regard to this rally announced for August 19, 1999. Its preparations are 
under way and they are under the direct influence and guidance of the foreign 
factor. There is no doubt that the rally will be held, but, according to the 
information we have, there will probably not be as many people as they 
estimate and as they present it to the public – 150-170,000. The number of 
people who will be present and the way in which it will all proceed largely 
depend on the conduct of the Serbian Renewal Movement’s (SPO) leadership. 
According to the current knowledge and to what is publicly being presented, 
the SPO and its leadership are for a more moderate manner, I would say - not 
to have any kind of escalation. However, we do not rule out the possibility of 
certain problems and even certain excess situations occurring, in view of the 
participants, the possible participants in that rally. 
 
What is positive in a way, is the fact that there are differences and certain 
conflicts among the parties forming the Alliance for Change. Conflicts of 
interest, conflicts related to a power struggle, and there are also material 
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interests, certain financial means in question, and this can quite certainly have 
an effect on the rally and its results etc. I believe that we too at the VJ should 
take certain measures so as not to be taken by surprise. The possibility of 
individuals from the VJ participating in the rally, and perhaps even of the 
individuals whom we have identified causing certain excesses, are not to be 
ruled out. 
As regards the situation in Montenegro, it is still registering a deteriorating 
trend. Two factors are very important.  On the one hand, it is the things that 
are being done on the political scene – the endeavours that are being made at 
any cost and in every possible way, through practical conduct, to undercut and, 
I would say, annul or not recognize the laws of FRY . 
 
I was at that rally. I had the estimate of the army and the estimate of the 
media that were inclined towards the opposition. That rally definitely 
showed that the SPO had exhausted its strength in the previous period and 
that it was not possible, unfortunately, at that moment to count on the 
SPO as someone who would be able to set the critical mass into motion and 
push it into a conflict with the regime. This was, at the same time, also the 
beginning of an open and final break between the rest of the opposition 
and the SPO. I must admit that General Gajić was right. There was no 
doubt that the VJ had its people in key positions in the parties who were 
providing it with information about the opposition’s activities. On August 
19, 1999, a meeting was held which was almost exclusively devoted to the 
opposition, its financing, surveillance… Today, three years after the 
toppling of the regime in Serbia, perhaps the answer to the question of 
why Milošević’s generals are here even though he is in The Hague, could 
be found precisely in the fact that certain key personalities from the 
opposition of that time worked for the service. 
The following speech clearly shows that the Security Administration 
infiltrated its people and that it possessed exact and verified information 
about the intentions of certain parties. This is being confirmed in practice 
three years after October 5. 
 
Lieutenant General  
GEZA FARKAŠ 
Extremists and other destructive forces are preparing to topple, outside 
parliament, the legitimate authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia after the rally 
in Belgrade on August 19. They need to show their strength, ability to organize 
and resoluteness to cause unrest in the country in the upcoming period with 
unarmed, but armed means as well. Their activities have been systematically 
complicating the already difficult situation in the country. Especially their 
calculations regarding the constitutional role of the Yugoslav army. Regardless 
of the evident differences between the leaders of the Alliance for Change, they 
agree in principle that a change of power in the country is inevitable. It is 
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precisely on the basis of this that the foreign factor is trying to unite them, and 
it has made certain steps.   Undoubtedly due to the estimate that a far smaller 
number of followers will attend the upcoming rally in Belgrade that announced 
– first a million, than half a million – the leaders of many parties will not 
appear at it, under various pretexts. Party leaders are declaratively in favour 
of the rally in Belgrade passing without incidents. It is being assessed that the 
authorities will take measures, primarily block the roads towards Belgrade, so 
that as few people as possible would attend the rally. In the SPO they do not 
expect the rally to achieve any major results as regards the requests for the 
dismissal of the current authorities. They believe that it is only in September 
that one can expect various forms of resistance and civil disobedience to kick 
into full swing.  In this regard, radical elements in the SPO are saying that this 
party is preparing to topple the regime with more aggressive methods than ever 
before, while its leadership is advocating the stand that elections are inevitable 
as soon as possible and that they would win them. However, it is important to 
note that advocates of the violent toppling of the regime in the country, 
members of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, publicly advocated such methods on 
August 13, at the rally in Vršac. They are presenting in an increasingly 
conspicuous manner false insinuations about the VJ and they deliberately keep 
mentioning certain former VJ officers. Speaking at a rally of the Alliance for 
Change in Kosjerić on August 13 this year, Velimir Ilić, the mayor of Čačak, 
said he was familiar with the fact that allegedly only a small number of 
generals supported the president of Yugoslavia, while a majority of the 
members of VJ and the Interior Ministry (MUP) were against the current 
regime. Former General Momčilo Perišić informed those present, around 200 
people in the town hall in Kragujevac, on August 10, that he had founded a 
new political party. As its members, he presented film director Predrag 
Bajčetić and composer Zoran Hristić, and as far as he himself was concerned, 
he said he had done everything to prevent such a crisis situation from arising, 
but that he did not succeed. After stepping down from his position in March 
this year, he maintained a reserved attitude during the NATO aggression 
against Yugoslavia, only to intimate in July, after having contacts with the 
leaders of certain parties, the leadership of Montenegro which he visited, and 
Patriarch Pavle, the formation of his own political party. The inaugural 
session of the Party for Democratic Change (PDS) was held on August 8 in 
Brusnica, near Čačak. It was attended by around 50 members. I have here that 
this gathering in Čačak was financed first by the Crown Council in London, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church of Gračanica of Windsor, the president of which is 
Jelena Jovanović, the daughter of Čeda Jovanović, an army general from the 
Kindom of Yugoslavia in Canada, the Serbian People’s Defence – a Chetnik 
organization in Toronto and Chicago, and the private banks of the Krstićs and  
Lazarevićs in Valjevo, they are members of the New Democracy. This 
inaugural gathering was presided over by Bishop Radović who proposed 
Perišić as the party president, which was accepted. Already on August 9, 
Perišić met with Patriarch Pavle and, on the occasion, the two of them decided 
not to participate in the rally in Belgrade. In a guest appearance on the local 
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TV network in Kragujevac on August 10, former colonel Ljubodrag 
Stojadinović set out a series of insinuations on account of the VJ, especially its 
security service, which he characterized as the darkest and the metastatic 
segment that was destroying the VJ. In the same show, Milivoje Glišić, the 
editor of the NIN weekly, said that Perišić could have resolved the issue of 
Kosovo and Metohija in a peaceful manner, but that he did not have the 
support of the state leadership for this. He claimed that there were few 
generals in the VJ who could match Perišić by his education, dignity and moral 
attitude. It is obvious that by predicting data on the number of the participants 
in the rally, with the demands that would be set to the current authorities in the 
form of an ultimatum, with announcements of excesses and so on, they were 
endeavouring to attract as large a number of participants as possible and, at 
the same time, to create a certain feeling of fear and insecurity among the 
ordinary population. The terror being carried out by the Albanian terrorists in 
Kosovo and Metohija… I now have here the scenario for today’s gathering, 
related to this and in short… We received this information last night - Radoje 
Lazarević, as a representative of New Democracy (ND) in the organizational 
committee of the rally for changes, submitted a report to his party’s 
representative council on the course of the preparations for the rally. In the 
report he intimated that the technical preparations for the placing of the stage 
would begin in the evening hours on the 18th this year, after the football match 
between Yugoslav and Croatia. They are already doing this in front of the 
Parliament building. The gathering of the participants in the rally with a 
musical program is envisaged to take place between 4 and 7 p.m. Predrag 
Đorđević is in charge of organizing the hosting of the program. The rally is to 
begin at 7 p.m. with the playing of the hymn “God Give us Justice”, the 
reading of the letter from the Crown of Aleksandar Karađorđević and the 
offering of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s blessing and support to the Alliance 
for Change by the Bishop of Vostanje Rakita. The plan is for the participants in 
the rally to be addressed by representatives of political parties who include: 
Mlađan Dinkić on behalf of the G-17 Group,  Spasoje Krunić on behalf of the 
SPO, Zoran Đinđić representing the Democratic Party, Nebojša Čović from the 
Democratic Alternative (DA), Velimir Ilić representing the municipality of 
Čačak, but with the SPO contesting that appearance of his, Nenad Čanak on 
behalf of the League of Social Democrats (SDL), Vesna Pešić of the Civic 
Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Jožef Kasa, representing Hungarian democratic 
parties -  Čanak was in favour of Žarko Korać speaking instead of him, Rebeka 
Srbinović as a representative of New Democracy (ND), Dragoljub Mićunović 
of the Democratic Centre (DC), Bakić gave up his intention to address the 
participants in the rally because speeches lasting 30 minutes, which he had 
insisted on, are not allowed. The end of the rally is to be announced by 
Predrag Marković, ideologist of the stability movement. It was agreed within 
the organization committee not to have any joint symbols on the stage, but only 
the Serbian flag, and below it the flags of the parties participating in the rally. 
While the participants can carry symbols of their choice. A place on the stage 
is planned only for those addressing the participants, while each party had 
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received 5 passes for the space between the stage and the journalists. It was 
decided to have 300 people securing the rally. It was originally agreed to have 
the SPO and DS each designate and prepare 150 people for security duty, but 
Vuk Drašković refused to allow people from the SPO to be part of this. It was 
then subsequently agreed to have the security consist of 200 persons from the 
DS and 100 persons who would be provided by Nenad Čanak. The rally with 
cost 16,00 German marks, which will be paid by each participating party under 
equal conditions. As regards the rally, the organizer assess that it will be 
peaceful with a relatively high level of participation and the unity of the 
parties, but with an insufficient number of those attending it. The estimates 
range between 50 and 80 thousand participants in the rally. Mild 
manifestations of disunity among the participants are expected in the rally 
through the inappropriate reactions of SPO members when DS representative 
address the participants and so on. After the report of Radivoje Lazarević, the 
ND presidential council predominantly reviewed the following issues. First of 
all, what should the contents of Rebeka Srbinović’s speech be. Secondly, what 
is the goal of the ND in this event, and thirdly, what is the request of the 
gathering on the whole. As the political goal of the ND, first emphasized was 
the formation of a transitional government, secondly, the holding of early 
elections -  Ratomir Tadić was against this saying that these two goals were 
mutually opposed and that one ruled out the other. Žarko Jokanović is not of 
that opinion, but believes that a transitional government should ensure the 
conditions and create the presuppositions for the holding of early elections. He 
believes that, first of all, this will not be an academic gathering, but rather a 
street rally for which short and strong messages will be suitable. Secondly, that 
the rally will be attended only by people who support the opposition and who 
will find acceptable only the things in connection with the change of the 
regime. Thirdly, that Rebeka must address the young since she is close to their 
age. Goran Mitić, chairman of the ND board in Niš insists on the replacement 
of President Milošević. Ratomir Tanić is against this and he is in favour of a 
request that can be achieved, while the request for the resignation of President 
Milošević cannot pass at this moment, according to his opinion. He is also in 
favour of Rebeka appearing with a cautious speech and a moderate political 
message. Rebeka, however, does not want to appear under such guidelines, 
stressing that, during her speech, she will follow her feelings and speak in a 
manner that is dictated at that moment by the situation and atmosphere at the 
rally. At the end of the discussion Dušan Mihajlović took the floor and 
reminded those present that the rally was not the idea of Zoran Đinđić, but of 
Mlađan Dinkić, and that it was afterwards accepted by Vuk Drašković. He also 
stressed that Vuk Drašković would not be participating in the rally and that he 
was doing everything behind the scenes for the rally and Zoran Đinđić to fail. 
He said that he had talked to Matija Bećković last night, who told him that the 
rally was like blowing a pierced balloon. At the end, Mihajlović drew a 
conclusion. First of all, there will not be as large a number of people at the 
rally as the organizers had hoped. Secondly, the idea about a transitional 
government could not pass. Thirdly, Vuk Drašković considerably compromised 
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himself towards the West during the war, while he was now compromising 
himself also among the opposition in the country. And his goal is not clear to 
anyone. Fourthly, the rally is very risky and possible are intentional 
provocations which would have unwanted consequences and which the 
authorities could take advantage of for a showdown with the opposition. 
Fifthly, he explained, he had refused to speak at the rally, even though he had 
surprised many with this, because he was aware of the fact that he was a poor 
speaker, and also because it was not clear what he should say. Sixthly, he set 
out the thesis that the ND must ensure for itself a specific and recognizable 
image. Seven, he believes it is good that Rebeka will be speaking so that they 
can show that they are not a leader’s party, but a democratic party, and eight, 
the participation of the ND in the rally is the price for its inclusion in the 
opposition. 
 
This information that was set out at the meeting of the collegiate body 
could not be found on the Internet or in the media. It is obvious that the 
counter-intelligence service of the VJ and of the Intelligence 
Administration were very much interested in how the opposition 
functioned, how it was financed and what its intentions were. The above 
mentioned shows that the information about the activities of the opposition 
had been gathered “from the inside”. The informers who forwarded such 
information to Slobodan’s service had to be inside the very leadership of 
the opposition parties. Today, three years after October 5, it will probably 
be very difficult to find out who had played a double game. It is here that 
one should also seek the explanation for how Milošević’s generals 
“survived” even after October 5. If the opening of these files were to be 
approached in a sincere manner, many people would recognize their 
“tags”, those who accompanied them, kept company with them, bought 
their children birthday presents… I leave it up to the reader to assess 
whether it is possible to acquire such information about parties, 
individuals, rallies unless you have someone in the leadership of these 
organizations. The files that were kept and are kept by the VJ security 
service are full of informers who did not spy to the benefit of the country, 
but to the benefit of an ideology and the regime. It has been like this since 
1945. Over the past sixty years, many innocent people were destroyed 
because the powerful people in these services wanted it. I hope the late 
prime minister Đinđić was the last victim behind which members of 
communist and neo-communist secret services directly or indirectly stood. 
During Tito’s time, the Counter-intelligence Service (KOS) of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army was the backbone of the ideological state so that 
those archives were full of interesting information which would not 
jeopardize the security of the state if they were to be opened now. We owe 
it to the innocent victims to open them. 
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Through these transcripts I am conveying only part of the atmosphere 
from the Collegiate Body of the Yugoslav Army’s chief-of-staff, paying 
attention not to publish information that could endanger the main purpose 
of the service, of course in accordance with the Constitution.  Therefore, a 
paradox was the fact that the citizens of this state spent billions of dinars,   
scrimping and saving, only for this money to be returned to them through 
the worst type of destruction. The Montenegrins at least did not pay a tax 
on their own ruin. 
 
 
 
 
MILOSEVIC'S "VICTORY" OVER NATO 
 
"We should weep for men at their birth, 
 not at their death." 
 
Charles De Montesquieu 
 
 
March 15, 2000 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC 
I do not want that the tasks, which you set out objectively and very 
professionally, on the basis of your professional work in the army, in all 
elements ranging from combat readiness to chain of command, mobilisation, 
security, rear, etc. .... However, I want to say that everything is absolutely clear 
and it is obvious – what is the result stemming from the Yugoslav Army conduct 
in the past year, and particularly during the aggression by NATO, which need 
not be emphasised because it is irrelevant for this gathering...  
The army managed to defend the country – that's number one – and, above all, 
to justify the reason for its existence, and to defend the country from 
incomparably stronger and indeed incredible adversary in the aggression on a 
small sovereign country like ours. Secondly, the army succeeded in defending 
the country suffering minimal losses, which in this respect is an excellent 
parameter. These are mostly those two important parameters – that it fulfilled 
its task well in terms of survival of both the state and the army itself. And these 
are those two important parameters because of which the whole world gave full 
credit to our army, including our foes, though reluctantly so and sometimes 
only implicitly, but it is clear the army has been given full marks. 
I would not like to go into professional evaluation and measurement of all 
these elements of combat readiness, but they are surely necessary to make 
some progress and further improve our defence. From the point of view held by 
our state, our people and state leadership, I think we may give full credit to our 
army for what it did last year under those conditions and under such 
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circumstances. It turned out those who often use that military abbreviation – 
with whom and with what... then those who were spreading defeatism 
explaining we have not enough troops, we have no strength and we have no 
resources, and in the end it turns out the defence is possible. It turned out that 
the army managed to find the answer to the question – with whom: with all 
those people who cared about the freedom of their homeland. With what – with 
whatever you have at your disposal, regardless of the fact that the resources 
were quite modest in comparison to the force which exerted pressure and 
attacked. They are defeated, we have defended ourselves.  
I will tell you what I think and what I deeply believe in although this may seem 
exaggerated to you, but I do believe NATO died in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was 
supposed to be a test model for a future attitude of the greatest military power 
in the world towards the new world order, and for NATO – this was a fiasco. It 
is true that this is a model for the future positioning of the greatest power with 
respect to the rearranging of the world order, but this is a negative example in 
the world which became imbalanced after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
when a new kind of balance of power started to emerge. The contribution of 
our state and, above all, its army is enormous for tipping the new balance of 
power in favour of freedom-loving countries resisting to the policy of 
hegemony and dictate. Our contribution far outweighs what could have been 
expected of a country of this size and weight. The example set by our country 
stepped up radical, significant changes of the geopolitical scene of the modern 
world, the geopolitical scene of our planet. China, as the biggest country, has 
entirely changed its military doctrine and explicitly condemned the US policy 
of hegemony, and radically changed its attitude towards the development of its 
defensive capabilities. For the first time in its history, China declared it could 
not rule out the use of military means to achieve its goals. At the same time, 
China, Russia and India began interconnecting, forging mutual bonds, and the 
awareness of the necessity to resist to the new hegemonist keen on subjugating 
the whole world has been raised. I have based my view on this and many other 
elements which may be used to analyse my claim that NATO died in 
Yugoslavia.  
Today, at an anti-NATO gathering in Great Britain, delegates.... several days 
ago of 201 delegates 199 voted – this was not anti-NATO rally but a peace 
convention – for the dissolution of NATO... not for condemnation of NATO but 
its dissolution. This is happening in the West. This is not happening in Iraq or 
in Libya, but in the West, in the heart of London, not to mention other elements. 
Therefore, I believe any other appraisal except for excellent marks for what the 
army achieved in the past year would not be objective. For your practical work 
all these evaluations apply and I accept them entirely, but I think we should all 
be aware of the genuine proportions of the results our defence achieved, not 
only in our country but abroad as well.  
I would not dwell for too long on the situation in the country, but I would like 
to say a couple of things. Current Montenegrin leadership, in our view, cannot 
bring about the secession of Montenegro as the people there do not share the 
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leadership's views. Politically we have to work a lot in order to expose all the 
aspects of their treacherous behaviour, but today it is clear they have on their 
side only Albanians, small numbers of Muslims who are in favour of 
secession... and they have that Catholic enclave hoping to take over Boka 
Kotorska Bay. The West is interested in Montenegro only in terms of 
destabilisation of Yugoslavia. The moment Montenegro secedes... if such a 
scenario were to unfold, the West would lose its interest. And the moment the 
Albanians in Montenegro – who do not call themselves KLA, but essentially 
there is no distinction between them, and they do not like Montenegrins in 
Montenegro more than the Albanians in Kosovo like them – take whatever they 
could seize – and that is Ulcinj and Bar and all the way up north to 
Podgorica...  
Secession of Montenegro would historically coincide with an end to the 
existence of Montenegro. Montenegro would be reduced to Katun District 
which existed in the Ottoman era – this would spell its collapse. We have it 
recorded from 1991... We were together at a conference in The Hague – 
presidents of former Yugoslav republics – when Kiro Gligorov told me they 
should affirm their statehood. Kiro, I told him, you will sooner lose your state 
than gain it. This has turned out to be true. Today, Macedonia practically 
exists no more. There is no a single Macedonian official – ranging from the 
president of the republic, minister of defence to prime minister – who actually 
knows how many foreign soldiers and troops are deployed on the Macedonian 
territory, and which army this is... and there is no one to whom that army is 
accountable – what numbers, which resources would be brought into the 
country; what will they bring; what will they take, what will they leave and 
where will they go... I think no one is actually informed about what this army 
will do in relation to all these things.  
It was clear to us that the main political task of the Albanian element in 
Macedonia was to bring about the constitutional changes in the republic. They 
have only one demand – that Macedonia be defined in the Constitution ...  not 
as the state of the Macedonian people and others who live in Macedonia, but 
as a state of two equal nations – the Macedonians and the Albanians. They are 
willing to cooperate inside Macedonia only to this effect. The moment the 
Constitution changes, the moment Macedonia is defined as the state of 
Macedonian and Albanian nations, the Albanians will say they have a right to 
self-determination because they are "constructive" people. They take the 
western part of Skoplje and further westward to the Albanian border and then 
declare they have seceded from Macedonia. The same will happen to 
Montenegro, but a much worse option is in store for their leadership because 
from that moment onwards a municipal prosecutor from Italy will issue an 
arrest warrant so that they will be arrested as smugglers, criminals, mafiosi, 
and no one will be protecting them anymore.  
This is a usual practice in those countries which even applies to both senior 
and junior officials. Noriega was arrested when they did not need him 
anymore, and they were the ones who had created him and raised him, but 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            173  
 173
forget about Noriega. Just look at these people arrested during the Spider 
operation ("Pauk"). All of them were wanted people at the international level, 
but they all had Schengen visas in their passports and travelled freely 
throughout Europe because secret services of NATO countries needed them to 
do dirty jobs.... whether to kidnap that unfortunate bloke on the Mount Tara, or 
to kill Drljaca while he was fishing, or to slaughter someone else in some other 
place and arrest people and take them to The Hague. They all had Schengen 
visas valid for the next several years, and no one was stopping them at border 
crossings while they were useful, but the moment no needs them anymore – 
everyone knows where and how they would end up. In principle, the same 
applies to these people I have mentioned above as well.  
Therefore I think we should insist on our principled position that the 
Montenegrin people has the right to decide its own destiny, that no one has the 
right to deny it, but also – no one has the right to impose something, 
disregarding people's views, something that the people did not decide for 
themselves, and we will stick to this.  
Secondly, I believe it is important regarding the situation in the country... that 
is the opposition which is not an opposition but a fifth-column type of creation 
which now... well, I want to tell you now so that you can come to this 
conclusion yourselves and think about it... not a comparison but it is identical 
bearing in mind who their sponsors are and the creators of the policy for 
destruction of Yugoslavia. What is this identical with? Our fifth-columnist 
opposition in Yugoslavia has the same role which the Kosovo Liberation Army, 
KLA, had in Kosovo – to feign some conflict and to create the situation in 
which someone could intervene taking their side allegedly in the interest of 
democracy. Their role is no different from the role assigned to KLA which had 
been set up in the first place to play that role, and KLA was supported because 
of that role and the attempt to allegedly provoke a civil war... and the way they 
called it – "liberators, rebels" and the rest... so that they would have someone 
to side with, and those, who abolished UN and all the norms established after 
World War II, had to go back to the Security Council and vote for the 
resolution which said the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia 
was guaranteed, and they had to recognise – through their actions – the 
leading role of the world organisation and its supremacy despite their efforts to 
revoke this... They had to do it. And who made them  go back to the UN? We 
did. And who restored the reputation of the UN? We did. And now they are 
trying to degrade it further by their actions – you all know this very well – but 
life does not follow a straight line.... there are oscillations, fluctuations of 
certain tendencies.  
However, one thing is clear – everything is moving towards multipolar 
structure and a new balance of power which was lost with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, we have contributed to 
accelerate this process, to shorten the time needed. That is an enormous 
contribution which our country has given for the world peace and the 
establishment of fair relations among free states of the whole world, and all 
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your individually and our army should be proud of that as well as our people 
which practically took upon itself,  to defend on its own from the aggression.                             
I just want to say a couple of things more. That is this material aspect, and it 
has its external and internal components. I ... for this gathering here... because 
we are talking about very important and confidential information on the 
defence of the country. I want to tell you we have today the financial backing of 
China amounting to 560 million dollars. So this is one billion and one hundred 
million deutschemarks. All these states – members of the Stability Pact, and our 
neighbours – Bulgaria, Hungary, Bosnia and Croatia have not received 
together this amount of money from their foreign sponsors, and they say we are 
isolated, and they are the ones cooperating with the world... plus 150-million 
credit from Russia, plus some very good arrangements with friendly countries 
related to oil shipments and the payments of some old debts. Talking of this 
external aspect, we believe it will further be advanced and strengthened.  
When it comes to this internal aspect, you can see we have opted for New-Deal 
type of approach to the recovery of economy by way of undertaking large 
investments employing large numbers of people, which in turn result in a 
proliferation of economic activities. Now we are launching this package of 
construction works, which should also have positive effects on the whole of 
economy because the construction of housing blocks is the most complex 
reflection of all other types of construction. At issue here is not only the 
production of the construction materials like glass, lumber, equipment, then 
sanitary engineering equipment, etc., but also the fact that no one would live in 
an empty apartment so you would have to buy everything – glasses, forks, 
plates, bad sheets, textiles, furniture, etc. The construction of housing blocks 
provides a complex impetus to the economic growth, and we will kill several 
birds with one stone in this way because we will drastically step up the process 
of solving the problem of housing for the army officers and soldiers. You need 
about 16,000 flats, and I reckon we can build these 16,000 flats in the next 
three years. I hope this year the army will have first 5,000 flats so that the 
people could move in. That is the current dynamics we are working on right 
now.  
Therefore, the fundamental issue at this moment for our country is neither this 
treacherous opposition – the people saw through it – and we are not much 
upset about it... we have to be cautious in terms of this security aspect so that 
they do not pull off some dirty trick because of their bosses, etc., but they are 
not a problem as a political factor. Our real problem is the social welfare 
situation and our primary task is to step up the economic development. Under 
the circumstances marked by constraints, blockades, restrictions and freezing 
our assets in bank accounts, this is happening more slowly than it otherwise 
would have, but still this is unfolding at a satisfactory pace and this will be a 
priority for us.  
And now, in all this – the position of the army. This we have to change in terms 
of relations... because it is only logical that for decades the people have been 
saying the army shares the fate of all other entities in the society. This seems to 
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be fair and it is fair, but this is not smart for a country which has been recently 
exposed to pressure and aggression. Therefore, we are now changing this 
relationship in favour of the army. The army must be given certain privileges 
with respect to the distribution of GDP. We started with this in this fiscal year 
since only the army's budget has been realistically increased, while other 
budgets for public expenditures have been decreased, but we will pursue this 
further because we have to ensure the full functionality of the new organisation 
of the army – the way we would like to modernise it... and we cannot effect 
changes overnight, but we must implement our economic policy and internal 
distribution in this direction.  
This is mostly everything I wanted to say in relation to these – how should I put 
it – external and internal political issues, but bearing in mind that you're all 
very well informed, and now let me say a couple of words about this analysis. I 
would like to appraise the analysis. I think analysis is very good. It has been 
done with due diligence. We also take into account the previous analysis of 
strategic groups; in the analysis of strategic groups, analyses of subordinated 
units, commands and institutions preceded this.... so my general impression is 
that it has been done rather well and what I have noticed in the presentations 
of the assistant to the chief of staff and the presentations of the commanders of 
strategic groups is that the problems are very well defined and ... very well 
defined proposals.  
Now the task would be... for those proposals... we have defined the problems in 
order to see what is to be done... to transform those proposals into immediate 
tasks ... to draft realistic and dynamic plan, to implement these proposals given 
in the presentations of the strategic groups commanders, to draft a plan and 
determine dynamics for the implementation of these proposals, which, of 
course, we have to apply... the possibilities about which general Ojdanic was 
speaking, but we should endeavour to have the dynamics strained to the 
maximum because... if we took theoretically a pure logic construction... if we 
were to realise those proposals, we would then have an ideal situation because 
the proposals you have given in the conclusions of your presentations have 
practically compensated all the shortcomings and set the course we should take 
to solve these problems, and there – you have to be indeed versatile. General 
Smiljanic said four components... if one component was broken, then the 
question is whether the remaining three use their full capacities and how they 
connected and linked.  
Of course, everything else I take as a metaphor, for example, not as some 
individual case or instruction. Therefore, to make an implementation 
programme for the proposals presented in this analysis and the proposals 
which are derived from it to translate into action which should further enhance 
the level of combat readiness of our army.  
Let me, finally, particularly thank the general staff for cooperation i.e. the 
supreme command headquarters, chief of staff general Ojdanic. We have 
collaborated perfectly while he was in this position. I believe we will be 
collaborating equally successfully when he assumes the responsibility for his 
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new position. General Ojdanic has proved his excellent capabilities, a very 
high level of patriotism and – I would say something which is very important 
for a good commander – a high level of optimism because those who cause you 
headaches, who keep asking with whom and with what to do – nothing of them; 
if we defended as they thought we should have, we would not have ever 
defended ourselves, we would not have ever carried out mobilisation, we would 
not have done anything and they would have thought we had an excuse – great 
power, and we were little. And we answered to this: everyone who cares about 
this homeland with whatever he/she has... we showed there are no 
circumstances which may serve as an excuse not to defend your homeland. This 
excuse is not an excuse but a surrender, regardless of capabilities and material 
resources.  
I would like to thank general Ojdanic for his cooperation while he was in this 
position, and bearing in mind everything he knows about the army and how 
close to his heart the army is, I would like to wish for him to give an even 
bigger contribution and help further development of the army and our state in 
general.  
At the same time, I wish a lot of success to general Pavkovic with whom I also 
had direct cooperation ever since the time he was the commander of the 
Pristina Corps... whose capabilities, patriotism and willingness to invest all his 
efforts into his job I very much appreciate and I wish him a lot of success in his 
new position as the chief of staff and wish you all a lot of success in your work. 
Thank you.  
 
lieutenant general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Mr. president, to mark your presence at this analysis – for remembrance, for a 
memory, for history, we decided to give you he book 'With Truth against 
Aggression'. This is a war edition of the magazine Vojska [Army] which was 
published and this book – the Yugoslav Army as a special publication for your 
family.  
We have presented this to minister general Ojdanic, to thank him because he 
contributed the most to such high marks for combat readiness of the army in 
1999... because he directly took part in its work. The analysis is finished and 
now we can have a short break.  
 
 
 
 
Milosevic has not always been allergic to The Hague. This depended on his 
daily political needs. At the time when he was "a peacemaker" for the 
West, he was cooperating with The Hague tribunal. Thus, Erdemovic was 
arrested, former member of the 10th sabotage detachment where some 
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members of the Spider group [Pauk] also were and another Yugoslav 
Army lieutenant – because they first spoke publicly about Srebrenica and 
the crimes committed there in the summer of 1995. They had been 
arrested the night before they intended to leave the country. Erdemovic 
told "an American female journalist" he had personally killed 120 people 
and that he could not go on like this anymore. I had an opportunity to 
have a look at the tape where Erdemovic was interviewed by the American 
journalist. Our state security service arrested them and seized this video 
tape, kept for some time in isolation, and then transferred to The Hague 
by a special plane. He was one of  the key witnesses to the Srebrenica 
crime. Slobodan easily decided to take this step because he had political 
benefit from this. Milosevic decided he did not like The Hague so much the 
moment it turned out he might become one of its "guests".  
In early 2000, a change took place in the Yugoslav Army, VJ, general staff. 
A little bit earlier, defence minister Pavle Bulatovic had been assassinated. 
Pavle Bulatovic had become too friendly and close to a non-commissioned 
officer who had been his bodyguard so that this had been more like a 
relationship between two close friends than between a minister and a 
sergeant first class. I knew this man was devastated by the violent death of 
Bulatovic. Besides, Pavle Bulatovic used to pop by to see the head of the 
Bled restaurant and word had it the personnel policy at the federal defence 
ministry was actually being created there. But let us go back to the 
Pavkovic's appointment. Pavkovic was an intelligent , hawkish man who 
could easily guess what his boss expected of him. This was a rather radical 
turning point and the first sign that Milosevic wanted to get rid of the 
opposition and to enthrone himself once and for all. It all started with a 
little bigger budget for the army and big promises. Slobodan seriously 
counted on the assistance of the military leadership, and undoubtedly, he 
could count on such assistance. The only thing he could not count on were 
the troops. He was not aware of this at the time. The more the military top 
brass were getting closer to the boss, the more the army itself was going in 
the opposite direction. One could assumed they would soon be generals 
without the army.  
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YUGOSLAV ARMY  ESTIMATES ON 
POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF A CIVIL WAR IN 
MONTENEGRO 
 
Major general  
GEZA FARKAS 
General Sir, I would like to immediately add something to the scenario 
that Branko has presented, because we found and obtained by means of 
our operational activities the draft operational plan for receiving 
refugees from FRY, which was made by regional office of UHCR for 
Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first half of September 
1999. The plan was made on the basis of UNHCR estimate that in case of 
a violent or agreed secession of Montenegro a civil war could break out 
between the Montenegrin separatists and Yugoslav Army, VJ.  
They estimate that conflicts may arise even under some inauspicious 
methodological conditions towards the end of 1999 and in the beginning 
of 2000 already. In the beginning of November 1999, the UHCR 
representatives asked the President of Municipality of Trebinje to 
perform all the necessary preparation activities for accommodation for 
some five to six thousands of refugees from Montenegro within two to 
three months. They expect the arrival of some 2,500 refugees from two 
main directions, Niksic, Trebinje and Niksic Bilece and two alternative 
directions, Herceg Novi Trebinje and Niksic Gacko. They estimate that 
out of that number some 15,000 Serbs would be able to find provisional 
accommodation in the eastern part of RS and some 10,000 should be 
received by the regional office of UHCR for Southern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, out of which some 1,000 to 2,000 of Muslims would need 
accommodation in the BiH Federation. They consider that the 
geographical characteristics of the border between Yugoslavia and 
Republic of Srpska and Montenegro do not allow establishing of wider 
migratory and accommodation capacities, but also that it is a very good 
thing that SFOR covers the border crossings in all the four routes.  
They estimate that the daily influx will depend on the development of 
situation in Montenegro and on the nature of the problem, that is, that 
several thousands of refugees can be expected daily, in case of larger 
conflicts between the forces supporting the Montenegrin government and 
Yugoslav Army, VJ. It was envisaged that the UHCR team are quickly 
placed on the main enter points and that the Red Cross, SFOR and 
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international police and other international humanitarian organizations, 
as well as the local governments in the Republic of Srpska and BiH 
Federation send their previously agreed aid from the border crossings 
and deeper in the territory. The local agencies of RS promised their full 
support in case of an influx of Serbian and Montenegrin population, and 
that the Muslim population would be enabled to go over their territory to 
the BiH Federation, which was planned to take place along the routes of 
Trebinje, Stolac, Mostar, Bilece, Berkovici, Stolac Mostar Gacko, 
Nevesinje Mostar. It was envisaged that with the support of the local 
agencies of RS Serbs and Montenegrins are accommodated in people's 
homes, in privately owned houses or in provisional collective centres, for 
which several sites were already designated, for some 10,000 refugees.  
The Muslims would be directed toward Mostar as quickly as possible, 
and their accommodation has already been prepared in Salakovac near 
Mostar. Anyway, the Regional Office for Southern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has general plans to set up four refugees' camps in RS, and 
those would be as follows: two in BiH Federation. They will endeavour to 
provide accommodation for 5,000 persons in every site in permanent 
objects like factories, schools, and other buildings that could easily be 
refurbished for living in them. However, that can be done only in Bradina 
for 700 persons, and in the tourists' camp near Trebinje for 400 persons 
and in the prefabricated houses' camp in Salakovac near Mostar for 800 
persons, due to which they also planned to accommodate refugees in tents 
in six sites. First of all, Salakovac for 800 persons and in 20 
prefabricated houses. Secondly, Bradina near Konjic for 1,000 persons, 
700 in buildings and 300 in tents. Thirdly, Old Persons' Home in Trebinje 
for 364 tents for 2.000 persons. Fourthly, in Tourists' Camp in Trebinje 
for 700 persons, 400 of them in the existing building and 300 in tents. 
Fifthly, in the northern camp Trebinje 1,000 persons in seven tents. The 
sixth site, in the deserted SFOR camp in Nevesinje 4,500 persons. Among 
the Serbs and Montenegrins that will in case of unrests and large scale 
riots in Montenegro take refuge in RS they expect people who had 
previously fled from the BiH Federation to Montenegro, like the Serbs 
that previously fled from Croatia, that is from the former RS Krajina. 
They think that the Muslims from the Raska area and area along the Lim 
River and Montenegro will go to KiM, where they will seek protection 
from KFOR, as well as to Albania, and one group of them to BiH, 
primarily to Gorazde via Srbinja. The area under the jurisdiction of the 
field office of UHCR for the Eastern BiH in Sarajevo.  
A smaller group of 1,000 to 2,000 refugees is expected to come in the 
area under the jurisdiction of the regional office of UHCR for Southern 
BiH. Mainly women, children and elderly persons are expected to go 
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there, because VJ or Montenegrin government will, according to their 
estimates, forbid the grown up men who are subjects to military 
conscription to leave Montenegro. It was planned to pay special attention 
to identify cases with special needs for "additional oath", like the victims 
of violence, prominent political cases, deserters and ethnically mixed 
families. Forms made according to the UHCR standards were given to all 
the participants in refugees' identification, and they were also given 
adequate instructions so that the final registration of refugees can be 
done once they have been accommodated in refugees' centres.  
They undertook responsibility for food distribution, which will in the 
beginning be done in transit centres and refugees' camps, until the 
necessary conditions for each family to prepare their own food are 
created. A joint kitchen will be set up in the Old People's Home in 
Trebinje, in which the cooking and serving of food will be organized by 
the Red Cross, and the dishes and cutlery will be acquired in UHCR. It 
was envisaged that food for some 10,000 refugees from Montenegro 
would be provided. The plan pertains to the southern part of RS only, but 
it is evident that there are similar plan for other parts of border areas of 
RS. And especially so for the route that goes from FRY to Srbinje and 
Gorazde, it was envisaged that most of the refugees take that route and 
that most of them would be Serbs, that is opponents to the separatist 
policy of Montenegrin leadership.  
I have read this,  General, because I think that it is important to stress the 
details that the plan envisages and all the estimates, because we had a 
similar situation immediately before the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis 
and since they organized things in a same manner in the territories of 
Albania and Macedonia, this all adds to the seriousness of this scheme 
and the situation that was presented by General Branko. 
Besides that, the Parliament is in session in Montenegro, and the 
discussion about the Property Act is in progress, in which the members of 
the Liberal Party of Montenegro explicitly ask that all the property, 
immovable property of VJ in the territory of Montenegro become subject 
to this Act, which means that the state of Montenegro becomes the owner. 
We obtained information that the staff there continues to leave the 
service. Last week five officers of VJ asked to leave the service because 
they were accepted by the MUP, and those were one first class captain, 
Bojicic Perica, captain Ivanovic Sasa, lieutenant Milasinovic Miodrag 
and captain Slavoljub Dragan, and a person that was not identified. 
During the interview in the MUP Vuk Boskovic, assistant to the Minister 
of Interior of Montenegro, and Ilic Radomir, senior inspector, former 
lieutenant colonel of VJ, were present.  
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During the conversation with Mister Maras and Buda a sincere 
concern for the abovementioned estimates was shown. The 
international community seriously considered the potential for the 
outbreak of civil war in FRY. Montenegrins got similar estimates 
from their colleagues in secret services of neighbouring countries, 
and from the Western countries, too. All that inspired additional 
anxiety. There were many reasons for concern. Objectively speaking, 
MUP in Montenegro was not capable to stand up to Milosevic's 
intention to subjugate this disobedient part of his emirate. That fact 
added to the responsibility of Mister Maras and Buda, as well as the 
need for skilfulness in commanding the MUP. Slobodan didn't need 
to deploy army from Serbia. We all agreed in that respect. He had 
enough forces on his side in the conservative part of Montenegrin 
public. He skilfully used the fact that links among Serbia and 
Montenegro were stronger than the links between certain parts of 
Serbia. He had an ace up his sleeve.  
The international community invested a lot of money and good will in 
efforts to change a regime that was a generator of all sorts of 
problems and wars from the first moment of their rule, and that used 
such a behaviour as their modus operandi and a reliable solution for 
short term extension of their entrenched rule and for long term 
suffering of their own people. This time, the herald of political 
changes was the fear felt among the members of the military 
leadership that the "domestic traitors and foreign hirelings" could 
definitely and forever replace the patriots.  
 
November 18, 1999 
 
Army general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
 
Based on the estimate that VJ and SMP22 are enemies to the ruling 
coalition in the Republic of Montenegro, the State Security Service and 
Montenegrin Ministry of Interior have introduced an operational 
campaign Coup d'etat to assess the situation in VJ and an operational 
campaign Thorn to assess the activities of SMPR. The focus of attention 
has been put on the units that, according to their estimates, could be used 
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for Coup d'etat. In order to obtain a complete insight into the state of 
affairs among the members of MUP, in case that situation becomes more 
complex, all the previously unassigned members will immediately be 
assigned to different centres, and thus will have complete control over 
those. The State Security Service plans to establish a detective agency 
with retired members of State Security that would continue to carry out 
the jobs of State Security.  
 
Major general   
ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC 
 
On the occasion of opposition meeting in Budapest that you followed, it 
was noted that they would appear united in the elections. To that end the 
message by Momcilo Perisic that the opposition forces should unite was 
sent. As a necessary precondition for free and fair elections he demands 
the change of the current government in Serbia, and "Glas" noted that 
another eleven parties had joined Coalition for Change and that 
government of Dragoslav Avramovic would soon be revealed.  
"Danas" published an interview with Aleksandar Karadjordjevic23 in 
which democratization of Serbia was advocated together with the change 
of present government. This underlines his opinion that we are at the 
moment on the road to even stronger isolation from the rest of the world. 
These are shared attitudes of the man who is unfortunately still a general, 
Perisic.  
General Momcilo Perisic gave an interview for "Dejpas"24 , in which he, 
among other things, spoke about the political mood among the Army 
members. So, he assessed the situation, and I quote here the words of 
General Perisic: "the majority of Army officers are against the 
Government in Belgrade". Simic, I will immediately correct what I said, 
yesterday I made an assignment, I refuse to do that, I do not want to 
speak with him. This General Staff, it would be an insult for us to talk 
with him, and we have some arguments, we have the survey carried out in 
the darkest of times in this country, what sort of results we got from 
survey and opinion poll and relationship between the Army, Army 
members and here I do not think of the officers only, but of the reserve 
officers and of 330,000 men at that, the arguments are there, but he 
knows something more than we all do. He explained his removal from the 
position of VJ chief of staff with President Milosevic's fear of potential 
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behaviour of the Army. President of FRY, quote, "have brought people 
who are loyal to him to the military leadership". Who will bring people 
who are not loyal to them, so what of that if they are loyal, even he was 
allegedly loyal to him, and you can see for yourselves how loyal he 
proved to be, why didn’t he --- and he said there of all the places, and 
after that he could have said --- gentlemen, it is not in the soldierly spirit 
do to that, but from this moment I am not ready any more to be VJ chief 
of staff since my opinions differ from yours, and he could leave in an 
honourable and fair manner. And in spite of that, they are all "entirely 
against Milosevic".  "The President of FRY brought people who are loyal 
to him in the military leadership, in spite of the fact that VJ is entirely 
against Milosevic". I still think that we have scientific indicators obtained 
by using scientific methods, and not some subjective beliefs, because he is 
to blame for the wrong role that the Army had in the old Yugoslavia and 
for its inappropriate deployment during the last war. That same general 
Perisic was present at the meeting of the Supreme Defence Council, I 
said that to Mister Vujanovic, too, in which a clear general attitude was 
reached together with the conclusion by the Supreme Defence Council 
according to which the future command over the Army was based on the 
directions from the President of FRY. That means that we had a general 
opinion based on individual attitudes, which in case of Albanian terrorist 
forces appeared in Kosovo and Metohia et cetera. Perisic also explained 
and added that financial situation of VJ contributes to the overall 
unfavourable conditions, general attitude of its members towards the 
government.  
Look here: "VJ officers are aware of the danger looming over them, and 
especially of the abuses by Milosevic, and it is not highly probable that 
the President of FRY would deploy Army in case of a civil war. VJ 
officers are serving the people, and not to the ruling parties, despite the 
fact that certain generals make their public appearances in the role of 
SPS and JUL spokesmen." 
When the journalist asked him whether it was the patriotic task of VJ to 
finally say to the President that he should step down from the position of 
president of the country, General Perisic answered: "Who would say that, 
and how?"  
The plot of this all, and this is only an excerpt from that interview of his, 
he said a lot more, and I will once again return to the task that we spoke 
about yesterday, Simic. It is really degrading for us to communicate in 
any way with such people, he is a man, and if he is not in the right that 
should be said, and that should be done in good time if he cannot agree, 
he does not agree and he should say that publicly and act with dignity 
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like a man. We were reprimanded for all sorts of things, and you can see 
for yourselves what happened after that.  
One of our next conclusions could be that continuous entangling of the 
hopeless political situation in FRY and lowering of military standards 
had negative effects on the security situation in it. That is what we 
ascertained jointly and what we publicly stated in our joint staff meeting, 
too, in the office of the President of FRY. The financial situation of a 
large number of professional members of staff, as we ascertained, is on 
such a low level that it jeopardizes, I would say, not only the very entity 
of VJ, but also calls into question the performance of specific purpose 
tasks of certain units, and as you know, this problem has been especially 
prominent with the VJ units in Montenegro, which calls for our concrete 
activities and concrete measures.  
In relation to this, measures that we have undertaken or that we shall 
undertake in the foreseeable future, have been accepted with complete 
approval, and you were informed about that in our last meeting of staff, 
and about the support by the President of FRY, and those will be further 
developed next week, in the next joint  meeting of competent 
representatives of the Federal Government and of the General Staff under 
the immediate guidance of President Milosevic. I am personally 
convinced that we have successfully started to untie the Gordian knot, 
and that we shall be determined and successful in that respect in line with 
the full potentials of this state, with a note saying that all of us in their 
individual specific area, and that has to be a unanimously performed task 
that I shall set in the end, has to do the part of the job of the General Staff 
while being extremely demanding and we achieved that towards SMO, 
and that means that the Federal Government should do everything in 
their legal authority.  
 
In the following conversation I had with Buda his sincere concern over 
the state of affairs in the state and in the VJ was evident, as well as over 
the possibility that Milosevic may incite a civil war in Montenegro. He 
was perfectly aware of the discord in the core of Montenegrin entity that 
was divided into a pro Serbian and a secessionists' block. Montenegro 
created the MUP units that could to a certain degree present a dissuasive 
factor. Other measures that were undertaken were intended for admission 
of officers to the VJ, which would in turn produce cadre and at the same 
time serve to produce psychological and human resources weakening of 
VJ in the territory of Montenegro. Only four men in the top leadership of 
Montenegro had information that I provided.  
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Major general   
ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC 
Sir, during the previous period foreign factor has carried out a focused 
assessment of situation in VJ units that are located in the territory of the 
Republic of Montenegro. The level and quality of relationship between 
the 2nd Army Command and the present republic government, VJ 
members reactions to the introduction of two currencies payment system 
and measures that VJ undertakes to protect the standard of living of its 
members in that republic, state and activities of the units.  
The leadership of Montenegro continues with their intensive separatist 
activities and completely avoids and obstructs the Constitution and 
federal laws in the key areas of social life. This has been indicated by a 
series of actions by the Montenegrin government, some of which are their 
complete opening of the land and sea routes for import and export of 
goods, possession and enabling of fuel transport of some 6,000 tons for 
KFOR's needs in Kosovo and Metohia, permissions for free stay and 
movements for Albanian terrorists among which there are some well 
known criminals with pending criminal procedures against them and with 
wanted circulars, along with many others.  
Montenegrin MUP activities have been registered, together with the 
increased intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the VJ units 
in that territory, psychological and propaganda campaign according to 
the assessment of the VJ members by means of recruitment attempts to 
join their units. Six members of the 2nd Army and of the Navy were invited 
to the informative interviews during the observed period, and the interest 
to take over 10 antiaircraft guns that up to now used to be the property of 
the Vunko company in Bjelo Polje, formerly owned by the former 
territorial defence of Montenegro, which serves as an indicator of the fact 
that the leadership of Montenegro endeavours to jeopardize defence too, 
as the last remaining federal function that is still operational, and to take 
it over at a given moment and assume control over it.  
 
In their efforts to win over the sympathies of the lower ranking 
officers, the «Patriotic Block» often used some unrealistic advertising 
moves that were related to finding solutions for the housing policy. 
Thus the apartments that nobody ever even started to build were 
allocated. That was especially evident in the period immediately 
before the elections in 2000. There were also orders pertaining to the 
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allocation of apartments that went flying between General Pavkovic 
and General Nikolic. The officers were given grassy uncultivated 
land in some fields, with the explanation that their apartments would 
be built in that place exactly. NGS VJ reached the conclusion in a 
staff meeting before the 2000 elections that the allocation of the non-
existent apartments would be a very good thing to do, and it was the 
first time in military history that people were given written decisions 
on apartments' allocation while the apartments were not even built. 
There were even some people from the military judiciary who were 
given such decisions, who until this very day never lodged any 
complaints against such a manipulation. There were even some cases 
when some of the unfortunate officers complained because they were 
not included in that list. General Staff Chief of Staff had the right to 
allocate an apartment on their own will, and he used that possibility 
to the fullest. NGS VJ used to have right to allocate 3 % of the 
available apartments without any explanation and it seems to me that 
later on the percentage amounted to 10 % of the total of available 
apartments. It is easy to calculate the reason why those non-existent 
apartment were allocated, because by doing that, the number of 
apartments that chief of staff could give away on his own will 
constantly increased. At the same time this method produced new 
voters for the "patriots". "Priority lists" for apartments' allocation, 
as they were called in the Army, grew bigger day after day. Serbian 
Government took the building in Nemanjina Street from VJ, and in 
return they offered an empty promise, when they should have given 
800 apartments. That building was bombed later on.  
 
General Staff VJ Chief of Staff, army general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC" 
 
 
The Government of the Republic of Serbia will fulfil their obligation in 
relation to the realization of the agreement on exchange of property right 
over the building in 9 Nemanjina Street in Belgrade for 800 apartments, 
that is for the provision of 200 apartments in the first instalment, which 
was planned to take place by September 1, 1999.  
- A decision to allocate a set group of apartments for VJ according to the 
programme of state reconstruction, and that VJ is included in the 
programme of the state development, and that each reform in the country 
in the future has to pertain to VJ, too, and not only the civil structures of 
the society has to be reaches as soon as possible. In the process of 
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building or acquisition of apartments in the future the experiences of the 
Directorate for reconstruction and development of the country should be 
used in relation to the usage of funds and faster realization, acquisition 
and building of apartments and other buildings.  
All the members of VJ have been informed about the conclusions and 
tasks set by the President of FRY, as well as about the measures for 
improving the overall financial position of professional members of VJ, 
which were adopted in the joint staff meeting of SMO and Head of GS 
and presented to all the members of VJ. In this way, we believe that the 
proposed measures reflect the minimal needs, and that the top military 
and state leadership make certain efforts to improve the overall financial 
position of the entire army.  
Bearing in mind the abovementioned facts, it is necessary to include 
conclusions and tasks set by the president of FRY in the Action Plan for 
realization of tasks aimed at improvement of financial position of VJ 
members that you adopted. Kindly, send a copy of the Plan to the GS VJ.  
Best regards, 
Head of General Staff, Army General   
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC". 
 
 
Preparations for a Conflict in Montenegro 
 
 
December 9, 1999 
 
 
 
Major general   
BRANKO KRGA 
As for the attitude of the foreign factor towards the internal situation in 
FRY, the pressures remain, and in that context we should expect further 
reactions on the situation in Montenegro in the first place. There are no 
official reactions to this activity of VJ in the airport, and the western 
media accused that as another measure of the Belgrade Government 
against the reformist Montenegrin leadership only. As for any potential 
future reactions by the foreign factor, it would be good to calm down this 
tense situation, because it is possible that it is all about a previously 
organized act of the Montenegrin MUP, which was performed in 
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agreement with the Western countries, with the aim to provoke reactions 
from the military and to air additional accusations against us, and thus 
we shouldn't let ourselves get dragged into that.  
 
Svetozar Marjanovic was lieutenant general, Deputy VJ General Staff, a 
typical demagogue, with all sorts of silly stories, always ready to bother 
the staff at their meeting with his panic comments about all our generals 
that will end up disgraced and humiliated if the regime is overthrown, 
while the army is doomed to get disbanded soon after that. He was aware 
of his potentials, and he knew what he wanted. While he was selling his 
cheap dogma to the lower ranking officers, he at the same time accepted 
to sign capitulation in Kumanovo, and he was awarded for that with the 
villa in the Uzicka Street with 33 ares of land, which was additionally 
invested in, after the approval from the finance minister Milacic, all in 
order not to jeopardize all sorts of conveniences available to the 
distressed patriot. It was all worthwhile, undoubtedly. It is interesting 
what sorts of things the lower ranking officers and non-commissioned 
officers are ready to do to their own detriment. They arrested me 
although I believe that they were not satisfied with their own positions 
and with the state of affairs in the Army. The Army really survived all 
sorts of things. It went through Golgotha when it survived the impossible, 
and it survived its disgrace because it lived to see the impossible. It was 
probably not aware of the fact that it is better if an army of donkeys is 
headed by a lion, then if an army of lions is headed by a donkey. 
  
Lieutenant general  
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
On Wednesday, the first day of this month, a group of people from some 
company came to the airport, in the civil part of the airport, to prepare, 
to level the ground, and they did the same thing on Thursday, and they 
measured the land to find the place to build a hangar, a place to build a 
landing area for helicopter, for helicopter landing, and the part of the 
runway connected to the --- runway.  
Commander Kasatovic, a colonel in the air force base, warned them that 
they couldn't do that because they didn't have the necessary permission 
from the relevant institution, that is from SMO, and that on day they 
promised that they wouldn't build anything until they were able to bring 
all the necessary documents to show them. However, without any 
explanation they continued to do the same job on the 6th, and they were 
warned against that again, and they continued to work when they brought 
some ten to fifteen police officers to protect the workers on their job. With 
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all persuasion and warnings that they should not be doing that, they 
continued with their job, and they continued with their job on the 7th, too, 
when the RV and PVO Commander reached the decision to introduce a 
higher level of combat alert in the air base first, where he introduced the 
red alert for all the people there, he gave them the weapons, both to the 
officers and to the soldiers, and he allotted the ammunition.  
Somewhere about one or two o'clock in the afternoon, according to the 
statement by colonel Kasatovic and one sergeant major who went out to 
see what was happening, they brought the additional 65 police officers, 
and he supposed that there were more police officers in the hangar, that 
means that there were some 100 police officers. We learnt all that on the 
7th only, it was the day before yesterday. When I learnt that at 14:40, I 
phoned to General Obradovic to ask what he knew about that, and it 
turned out that he also had the same piece of information on the 7th, too. 
He phoned to the Montenegrin Government, to the MUP, and nobody 
there wanted to answer the phone. Only the head of State Security, 
Markovic Dusko answered his call. He spoke with him, and it was then 
that Markovic agreed to discontinue all the work there, to withdraw the 
MUP officers, and to recall the combat alert in the units. He also agreed 
to bring all the documents on the 8th, the permission for construction 
work.  
Since the MUP officers did not go away, the combat alert was not 
revoked until the 8th in the morning. In the meantime, on the 7th, after the 
conversation they had, the commander of the 2nd Army increased the 
combat alert in the units that, according to the plan, were deployed in 
and around the airport, but in those in the barracks, too, in the barracks 
of Maslina and Moraca. The talks they had were long. Kasatovic talked 
with them, two or three times went there, inside, and the situation 
remained the same, except for the discontinuation of their work. 
Yesterday in the morning, I asked again from the 2nd Army Commander to 
talk to the Prime Minister, and since he couldn't reach him, I ordered him 
to write an official document, a letter to the Prime Minister. He 
addressed the letter to the Prime Minister. Based on that letter, Markovic 
and another man there asked to see the 2nd Army Commander. They met 
at 18:00. They accepted that they had not discontinued the work there 
after two warnings, that they entered there thinking that they would be 
able to do it without the necessary documents, and practically they 
thought they would get off lightly. They were surprised by the reaction of 
the military, and by the way they reacted, they were surprised by the 
military presence in the airport, they were surprised by increase of 
combat alert in the Military Police … in the barracks, and it was very 
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unpleasant for them that the RV and PVO Commander closed the airport 
at 16:00 on the previous day.  
In the meantime, on the other side of the airport, they monitored the 
situation there, based on the agreement they had reached on the 7th, that 
a group of people would come to bring the permissions to the airport on 
the following day in the morning. A group of people consisting of six 
representatives, and they did not bring any documents, no permissions at 
all, and they quoted the legal acts of the Republic of Montenegro, which 
said that the land was their property. It was a presumptuous demand, and 
they claimed that they would continue to work there. Based on such a 
report that was sent in to Commander Kasatovic, he increased the level 
of combat alert for the whole airport area, for all the units in the airport 
and for the air brigade, and he also reached a decision to close the 
airport then. That is what went on on both the sides, based on the reports 
by RV and PVO, and on the reports from the 2nd Army. After the 
conversation between the 2nd Army Commander and with colonel 
Kasatovic and a representative, head of State Security of the Republic of 
Montenegro of the precious day, the overall situation is better to a 
certain degree, or at least nothing happened last night to worsen it, if we 
assume that it will get better. They agreed that they should submit a 
regular demand for the construction of that building there. We shall see 
what happens next. NGS accepted the measures that the Commander 
introduced, and I am not informed whether you ordered any changes or 
not.  
 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
Yes, I did, I ordered that these planes should not take off, he should only 
transport the airplane that goes there with that group, and the airport 
will be opened again.  
Lieutenant general  
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
All the other measures shall remain until they completely withdraw all 
the MUP officers. According to some information, and it has not been 
confirmed, in my opinion that is not confirmed, because there is nothing 
in that report, except for what the RV and PVO Commander wrote, to 
indicate that they occupied the north bank of the Cevna River, but that 
has not been confirmed by the 2nd Army Commander. The group that went 
yesterday night to make a round there said nothing of the sort to 
Obradovic. When they returned there they did not see the MUP officers 
there.  
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That means that the bottom-line is that they admitted that it was their 
intention to do that without any permission, without agreement issued by 
the Defence Ministry. Is this what Krga insisted on a question, was that a 
previously contrived provocation? It is my opinion that it certainly was.  
 
Major general  
GEZA FARKAŠ 
General, Sir, I would only like to add that their tendency to provoke us 
was apparent, because the group of MUP officers that came to the 
airport was lead by Miskovic Borislav, formerly a colonel of ours.  
Montenegrin leadership continues to carry out various separatist 
activities, by which they destroy the strength of our state defence in many 
different aspects and undermine the very essence of VJ. This has been 
indicated by a series of actions by the Montenegrin government, some of 
which are their complete opening of the land and sea routes for import 
and export of goods, possession and enabling of fuel transport of some 
6,000 tons for KFOR's needs in Kosovo and Metohia, permissions for 
free stay and movements for Albanian terrorists among which there are 
some well known criminals with pending criminal procedures against 
them and with wanted circulars in the territory of Montenegro, and thus 
now they can move freely around. At the same time they are trying to find 
excuses for introduction of the two currency payment system, and to 
indicate that it does not represent a danger for VJ and its officers, in the 
territory of Montenegro.  
In relation to that, Montenegrin President, Milo Djukanovic pointed out 
on the occasion of a round table discussion in Danilovgrad on December 
1 this year that VJ was not jeopardized by anyone in Montenegro. They 
can receive their salaries, but only if Serbia fulfils its obligation to 
provide the equivalent amount of goods to be sold in Montenegro for the 
equivalent amount of dinars. VJ has to do its best to fend off all the 
attempts by the regime to make it a party governed army. If it is ready to 
accept proposals in the Montenegrin government platform, it will be 
welcomed in this republic, but if it continues with its tendencies to 
jeopardize civil government, I am convinced that the army will soon 
begin to feel uncomfortably in this republic. This has been a quote from 
his speech. They keep accusing the army of jeopardizing the civil 
government, and those tendencies, that is the publication of those things 
continues.  
Montenegrin Prime Minister, Filip Vujanovic, said the following in a 
press conference held on December 2 this year: "There are no regular 
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paramilitary formations in Montenegro; there is only one section of the 
Army that do not perform its function, and that has been labelled as 
Military Police. Their officers have been recruited from the followers of 
one political party, there are more of those officers than it is necessary, 
and that is done intentionally, and they have gradually become like some 
military formation that controls the state and the army. Montenegrin 
government has been prepared and cautious with Military Police." More 
and more often those conflicts are incited with the members of Seventh 
police battalion. Two days ago, and even on the day before yesterday, we 
have had the similar situation, when they tried to arrest certain members 
of the Seventh battalion. That was prevented only through the activities of 
those units' command.  
. 
Major general 
GEZA FARKAS  
 
 
Meetings organized by the Alliance for Change in Uzice, Prokuplje, 
Valjevo and Nis, in Kikinda and Novi Sad, in which they demanded that 
besides the legally elected government in Serbia and in Yugoslavia, the 
President of Yugoslavia be changed and dissolved, were of the violent 
nature in some places, like in Prokuplje and in Valjevo. The openly stated 
intention of certain political party leaders to try to change the 
government in Serbia and in Yugoslavia in a violent way. Increasing 
protests have been announced to take place from this day, July 16, when 
a rally has been scheduled at 12:00 in front of the VJ Club in Nis. It was 
called by the Alliance for Change. They scheduled that rally, and they 
organized it, and they called there the soldiers in the wars waged from 
'91 till '99, and Nis has been designated as the centre from which they are 
to be directed in the future. Talks between the chairpersons of the 
deputies' groups from political parties in Serbia and Montenegro and the 
Yugoslav Parliament about the existing relations in the Federation, in 
case that they fail to reach an agreement, will only additionally 
aggravate the situation in the country. In case that the agreement is not 
reached, we should expect even more radical demands in the future from 
the Montenegrin leadership, for further change of relationships in the 
Federation, and in case that their demands are not accepted, the bottom-
line is that FRY becomes a loose confederation and activities to achieve 
Montenegrin secession will continue.  
 
If president Milosevic does not resign, they have plans to organize a 
referendum vote on the Montenegrin secession in the autumn, and they 
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are supported in it by the foreign factor, and especially by the NATO and 
USA, which has also been indicated by their threats addressed to 
Yugoslavia and caused by accumulation of troops in Montenegro and 
possible Serbian and federal government aggression against Montenegro.  
In relation to this situation and party influence, we have, I don't know 
whether you, General, have been informed about this incident, the public 
statement made by the lieutenant colonel Mijovic Rajko from the 250th 
rocket missile brigade, when he on July 10, over a dinner party with his 
colleagues, and he is from the second rocket battalion, he publicly said in 
one moment the following: "the political system in Yugoslavia should 
change, because Slobodan Milosevic is the biggest enemy of the people".  
 
After the speech that he made, one group of the officers and reserve 
officers  present there left the party, but there were a lot of them that 
expressed their support for what he said and who applauded to him. I do 
not know whether the Commander has sent a report on that, but we 
suggested there, in the meantime, that is, before he made his speech, he 
had submitted a retirement demand. We here propose that the demand is 
not granted, and to invite him for an interview, and do all the rest and 
expel his from the VJ, instead of granting him a pension.  
 
There is a problem with such incidents or unconsciousness hints by other 
officers, too, and that can gradually become ---, by means of their public 
statements, that then become a very dangerous thing, and an indication, 
the fact that the others did nothing about it is indicative. The commanders 
did not react to such a statement.   
 
January 2000 
Army general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
They are testing us, whether we shall ... they will go even further than 
that, and then they will find something else, and again something else, 
and so on. This issue has to be explored further, from the aspect of 
command and from the aspect of jurisdiction of the RV Commander and 
2nd Army Commander also, in the territory of the airport, but it is obvious 
that the issue of delayed reporting has appeared  too, about this incident, 
reporting  with a considerable delay. Secondly, the decision making 
process, when the state and military and political decisions are made, I 
am not saying anything, if something is urgent, the commander has the 
right, he is accountable, but they must send the draft decision for the 
higher level to verify it, including the cases when we are not sure whether 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            194  
 194
an action is right or wrong, we should consult the President of 
Yugoslavia.  
 
Lieutenant general  
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIC 
The things I know is that people in GS got some information on the 7th at 
14:40, and the first report, such as it was, came at 16:40. The next report 
came only after 20:00, and that was the regular evening report. He knows 
that I am here and sends the report to me, he didn't send it to the 
operational officer on duty. The report has to be sent to the operational 
officers on duty, and then he is to find whoever he needs to find.  
Major general  
GEZA FARKAS 
General, Sir, I would like to say two things. Being aware of the complete 
situation in Montenegro, the attention has to be drawn to the existence of 
---- Here we have a problem, the airport is practically on that territory, 
and all the other effectives that can come in handy in situations like these 
are under the 2nd Army command. Actually, it was the RV and PVO 
Command that slowed down the information flow in this case. I reacted to 
that and reprimanded the security organs, too, they simply must not 
report without a decision, which is to some extent all right, but in such a 
situation the security organs, too ----  
Army general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
Geza, let's not hold up this meeting. This issue calls for details analysis, 
and also need to tell everybody in their face who was wrong and in doing 
what. It is obvious that mistakes were made. First of all, it is unnatural 
that if the order on introduction of a constant higher level of combat alert 
envisaged that some forces were assigned to defend the airport, and those 
are the 2nd Army units, then the 2nd Army General has to be informed 
about that immediately. Secondly, at that moment the RV Commander has 
to be informed about it, it was not the commander's fault if that 
happened, but it was his fault that it happened at that particular moment, 
and he sent his report on some other particular moment. That was 
precisely five or six days later. If somebody thus tries to hide things and 
present his work as excellent, then it is somebody's serious delusion, and 
the consequences of all that could have been disastrous. We have to --- 
from the aspect of timely information, the accuracy of reporting. I also 
saw that scheme, I simply couldn't make head or tail of that airport 
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scheme, and I was not able to decipher a single thing there, I also gave it 
to Vasiljevic to have a look at it, to discern the things presented, and the 
disputed territory. That circle was drawn, there are two things presented 
in the legend, and I cannot understand what's what in it. 
  
The things Ojdanic said seem tragicomic. He doesn't even know what 
that was all about. He can't even recognize the exact place in the 
scheme he was given, but is ready to wage war about it, although he 
cannot really make out the exact piece of Montenegrin stony land on 
which the MUP had decided to build something, which is by the way 
very, very small. We have lost the entire territory of Kosovo, there is 
the flight ban for our aircrafts that cannot fly nearer than 25 
kilometres to the Kosovo border, but we shall incite a civil war 
against our own people over a couple of dozens of square metres of 
Montenegrin stony land that a general with four start on his epaulet 
couldn't even find on a map. It is odd what sort of hatred can be born 
in our own mind. When somebody hates another nation, that 
phenomenon has its name, and there is even historical understanding 
for such an act, although such a thing is inexcusable. When 
somebody hates some groups of their own people due to their own 
blind obedience to a regime there is neither a name, nor an excuse for 
that. What did those people believe in? What kinds of ideas were 
born in their minds at that moment? Did they really think that their 
nasty games could remain a secret forever? The airport commander 
was colonel Kastratovic at that time, and that same man has been, if I 
can remember correctly, promoted to the rank of general by 
Kostunica. And for which merits? 
 
Major general  
GEZA FARKAS 
General, Sir, I would like to say just one thing more. Their tendency to 
provoke us was obvious, because those MUP forces that were sent to the 
airport are under command of Miskovic Borislav, who was once our 
colonel.  
Army general 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
He knows every detail, and they thought that we were  ---  well, we are, 
for letting them burry a single stone there. We shall see about that. We 
have the federal law, we have the Constitution, and it is well known who 
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owns the military property, who is in charge of granting approvals and 
permissions, and we are not interested in their willingness or 
unwillingness to cooperate with the Federal Government and its relevant 
Ministry. Kasatovic was right, I am doing my job in accordance with the 
Constitution, with the law, according to the orders of my superiors. By 
then, until I have those things, you gentlemen cannot do that. This has 
probably been a test of how ready we are to act adequately. Our 
weaknesses, which I presume causes this incident, have to be dealt with. 
A commander cannot --- if I do not verify his decision, he waged a war, 
he says --- and I remain adamant in my decision, and he cites the 
Constitution, the law, the Rules of Service. I --- Now what? There is 
nothing more to say. Nobody can imitate Misic. Smiljanic goes down 
there today, and when he's back, we shall sit down and calmly analyse 
every detail, and tell everybody the things they should be told.  
Major general  
GEZA FARKAS 
The argument that the legitimate government in FRY presents danger for 
the region and institutes in that territory has been advocated persistently, 
and that calls for the urgent dismissal of this institution, and that means 
in FRY the president above all, and the legally elected government.  
In the previous period, the foreign factor focused their investigations of 
the VJ units in the territory of the Republic of Montenegro and to whether 
they had been supplemented with the contingents from Serbia. The level 
and quality of relations between the 2nd Army Command and the present 
republic government, the circumstances under which the spying terrorist 
group Spider was arrested, and the measures that will be taken in 
relation to that. Situation and units of the Pristina Corps, and especially 
whether we are preparing to return to Kosovo and Metohia, and whether 
there are some hidden VJ and MUP forces in that territory, and any 
elements of Serbian military organizing, the standard of living of the VJ 
members and the effects of their financial difficulties to their morale, 
their attitude towards the governments in Yugoslavia.  
The registered Montenegrin MUP activities: increased intelligence and 
reconnaissance of VJ in that territory, psychological and propaganda 
campaigns directed towards the active VJ officers and MUP for potential 
conflicts with the army, which they are trying to provoke, and later on  to 
accuse VJ for inciting them.  
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            197  
 197
Yugoslav Army's Seventh Battalion and 
Montenegrin Interior Ministry  
 
They did not learn a single lesson from the breakdown of SFRY, and 
they didn't need those lessons, either. It was none of their business. 
That had nothing to do with the generals' privileges. There were 
certainly some honourable exceptions. One of them was General 
Grahovac, whom I unfortunately did not have the honour to meet. 
Down there, in Montenegro, I met Nedjo Boskovic, former head of 
VJ Security Directorate, who was then advisor to the Prime Minister. 
While we were sitting in Buda's office he addressed me:  
- We have met, haven't we? What do you do, son? – he asked me.  
- I'm a civil engineer – I said, trying to cut the conversation short.  
- It seems to me that we met somewhere, was it in Gemaks? 
- Yes, it was in Gemaks, in Belgrade – I answered. 
- You see, I knew we met somewhere, by god, did you see, Buda, 
what a memory I have – Nedjo said proudly. 
He was a sworn enemy of General Aca Vasiljevic, for whom he 
provided imprisonment in relation to those scandals in RV and PVO 
in the beginning of the 90s. When Aca came back to life, Nedjo found 
a place in the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, as one of the three 
retired VJ generals.  
Most of the tensions in the Montenegrin public were caused by the 
military police  Seventh Battalion, which was professional in the 
sense that there were no conscripts there. Its units were sent to ten 
garrisons in Montenegro. In each of those garrisons there was one 
company or a platoon. The battalion was in Podgorica, where its 
command was located, in Niksic, Bjelo Polje, Berane, Adrijevica, 
Pljevlje, Kolasin, Kumbor, Bar and Ulcinj.  
During one of the meeting, Ojdanic himself admitted that the 
Seventh Battalion had practically been a foreign body that could be 
the cause of conflicts, even in situations when such conflicts would 
not be considered as favourable for the state leadership. At that time 
Momir Bulatovc was the Federal Prime Minister, and the late Pavle 
Bulatovic was the Defence Minister. Many people in the Montenegrin 
State Security Service, SDB, went to SNP after the split in DPS, and 
so they left the Montenegrin SDB, and found new posts in the 
Seventh Battalion. Some of them were formerly in the Budva branch 
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of SDB, and they thus ended up in the North as heads of security 
service in some of the companies of the Seventh Battalion. After that, 
as they continued to move along the SNP lines, they moved to the 
Defence Ministry, from where they planned to go to our diplomatic 
missions. One of those people, who will certainly be able to recognize 
that I am speaking of him here in this text, made a lot of troubles for 
the people in the opposing camp. The problem lied in the fact that 
some of the orders from Belgrade did not follow the regular lines of 
command, but went directly from SMO to Kolasin. Thus, it 
happened that that same man got the orders directly, and he carried 
those orders himself, without any consultations with his superior 
officers. It seems to me that colonel Rajko Baltic was at that time the 
commander of the Seventh Battalion. Major Mianovic was his 
deputy, but soon afterwards he left the Army and found a job in 
MUP. I think that he is now the commander of the border units of 
MUP in Montenegro. He is a good officer and an honourable man. I 
have to admit that it was very hard for him to leave the Yugoslav 
Army, because he had taken the oath, and on the other he saw what 
was in store.  
I helped him to find shelter in the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, 
where he remained to this very day. He knew nothing about me, 
except that I had some good friends in MUP. He was even receiving 
his salary for several months, without coming to work. We couldn't 
take him in the Ministry of Interior immediately, because he would 
then stand in our way and prevent us from carrying out some plans, 
and he could have thus caused some suspicions in KOS. We couldn't 
tell him those things then. It bothered him that he received salary 
without going to work, since he was an honourable man. On one 
occasion he even said that he would return all the money he had 
received if he was not allowed to go to work immediately, so we had 
to assign him in PJP in the Montenegrin MUP. He has learned the 
truth by now. 
 
 
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC 
I would like to present only one piece of information in relation to this to 
Mister Prime Minister of the Federal Government and to the Federal 
Defence Minister, about the situation, the quality, about the behaviour so 
far, about their activities so far, the ways in which they acted, and about 
our expectation for the future, since they have also been among those 
people who have been involved in all those things. So, let them help the 
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military organization in whatever way they wish to do so. So, there is 
nothing to reach agreements about, we can handle them in no time, I 
don't give a damn who they are, because that Seventh Battalion can cause 
something that nobody wants to happen.  
 
According to the estimates by both the military and the civil 
intelligence services, the only danger was the one that came from the 
SPO quarters – and that created a lot of space for the rest of the 
opposition parties to fight for relatively normal conditions for 
aligning themselves and fight against the regime. At the same time, 
that created a host of problems for SPO, and especially for its leader, 
Vuk Draskovic, who suddenly and completely unaware became a 
bulwark protecting DOS and its leaders. There is no doubt that had 
the intelligence services established that mister Kostunica or Djindjic 
presented any serious threats to the regime they protected, they 
would have organize their assassinations, too. Owing to such an 
estimate, and to the conflict between SPO and DOS, and also to the 
relatively low turnout in the opposition meetings, and based on the 
official estimates and under the influence of the people around him, 
Milosevic started to consider the possibility to hold elections. After a 
series of attempted assassinations of Vuk Draskovic, the "patriots" 
managed to make him retreat from the Serbian territory. His 
assaults against the regime seemed more like a justifiable anger and 
his own personal anger caused by everything that had happened to 
him, then a serious oppositional fight. That was no wonder, because 
Vuk paid too high a price in fighting against regime. Besides attacks 
on Vuk, there were numerous attacks on General Perisic, who got 
involved in politics very late. The answer for that can be found in the 
revolt of his former colleagues, who at that time had not been allowed 
to openly show their own politically orientated ambitions, as well as 
in his excellent insight into the military organization in general. 
Perisic also had a considerable psychological influence, because he 
had been one of the most important aides, who openly opposed 
Milosevic. The General Staff could not pardon those sins.  
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
There is one danger, and it stems mainly from the state organs and 
official institutions. The opposition is mentioned, opposition, opposition, 
opposition, while the only opposition in this territory is SPO, and this 
group, informal group. They have not been verified as a political party, 
they don't have their representatives in the Parliament, they have not 
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been verified on the local level, and we should call that by its right name, 
since otherwise, with all those statements we only make them seem 
legitimate, and we also speak in public and call them "opposition". So, 
the only true opposition is SPO. And the Democratic Party, since it is 
mentioned in the local media.  
This Alliance for change25 leadership gather information, they have set 
up a commission and they gather data on all the promoted and awarded, 
commended newly appointed officers. They have a task and an aim to 
prove that were are members, that is, the hirelings of the ruling party, 
and that is exactly what they are trying to achieve.  
We gathered intelligence indicating that the Montenegrin State Security 
had been performing thorough checks of all the officers, with the aim to 
gather certain compromising materials that would later on be used to 
compromise or blackmail those officers.  
As for this group of generals, it is my opinion that they too have started 
their offensive in the beginning of this year. We know that Vuksic is the 
chief of Perisic's cabinet, and Perisic said the following thing: "The 
ruling power in our country cannot be handed over in a peaceful manner 
as long as the current political structure is in power." He also said that 
the methods Vuk Draskovic had been using were the same as those of the 
FRY President, Milosevic. And he disagrees with him. He assessed that a 
civil war was imminent, and that the only thing that was still unknown 
was how long and bloody that war would be. He said that he was trying 
to prevent it or to stop it in the very beginning. He needed weapons for 
that, and for the time being he didn't have any weapons, but he was trying 
to acquire them. That would be all about him, and I have to say here that 
we do not have a very good relationship with State Security, and thus we 
have to do that job on our own. As for the security state in the Yugoslav 
Army, we concluded that --- the morale has become significantly higher.  
In a sense, this strand of our activities has caused that. As for the public 
appearances and criminal activities, we have found out a rapid decrease 
there. And finally, about this incident during the awards giving, I would 
like to suggest that we should provide small cameras for such events from 
now on, and we should organize them ourselves. And in case somebody 
has demands like these, we only issue public statements, like after a 
meeting, to prevent those incidents, since we cannot know who will react 
and in which moment.  
 
Brigadier general 
JOVO MILANOVIC 
                                                 
25  
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During the entire months of November and December the potential 
situation in Montenegro in relation to January 13 was toyed with, and 
they of course use that to launch certain arguments, so that later on the 
situation would escalate to a conflict in the Montenegrin territory, to a 
conflict between the army and the citizens, that is the police loyal to the 
regime, and to make that a day D for a potential intervention in the 
territory of Montenegro. At the same time there have been no changes in 
the definitions of forces in the surrounding territories of Montenegro, and 
there has been no increase of combat alert in that respect.  
Thus, to conclude with, it is all about a psychological and propaganda 
operation that has been going on according to its plan, its planned 
dimensions et cetera, and it actually serves to create the necessary 
preconditions for justification of any potential reactions in the form of 
accusations against VJ and the existent plans for military intervention in 
Montenegro, that is, a return to Kosovo and Metohia by use of force.  
 
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
As for the extremists on the territory, it is typical that certain political 
parties have begun their illegal military preparations. The characteristic 
thing there is that SPO organizes their youth units that in the formal and 
legal sense of interpretation have certain sound basis, but they also have 
their military wing, so that so far such activities have been registered in 
Novi Sad, Sombor, Stara Pazova and Nova Pazova. As for their numbers, 
they each have several hundreds of young men.  
 
We also discovered the same sort of organizations in Leskovac, where 
they established tan organization called "Serbian Knight", made up of 
purebred Serbs, which they train in martial arts, fencing, archery, 
firearms and tactical training, and prepare them for combat and for 
Serbs' return to Kosovo and Metohia. They intend to branch this 
organization out to Belgrade and Krusevac, too.  
 
In spite of the fact that Coordination Body for controversial issues 
between Montenegrin MUP and VJ units in the territory of that republic 
has been established, the situation and attitude of Montenegrin 
government have not changed significantly, and we still identify cases of 
attempts to recruit VJ officers for the Montenegrin MUP, monitoring and 
attempted wiretapping of all the VJ activities and of all its activities in 
Montenegrin territory. This coordination body now has some recidivisms, 
since they invite only the commander of the 2nd Army for those meetings 
of theirs on the republic level, and they don't invite admiral Zec. Thus 
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they are trying to use their influence to effectuate an almost political 
indoctrination of these people that take part in their work, they exert 
pressure on them, and are trying to bring discord between those two 
army groupings, that is, between the Navy and the 2nd Army, by launching 
the allegations about one commander's willingness to cooperate and 
another's complete refusal to cooperate. Parallel to this body, 
coordination bodies have been set up in all the seven centres, and they 
insist on having weekly meetings. That, however, is not a good thing, 
because in the very beginning, when we started doing this, we agreed that 
they should meet only in some special occasions, that is, only when a 
need arose, when there was a need for that. In this way they are in a 
constant contact with our people, and some unwise and rash things can 
happen, they have been preparing themselves in an organized and 
centralized manner, while our people have been preparing only partially. 
Thus, in relation to these meetings, we suggest that the preparations are 
made here for the level of army commander, that is, the level of 
Montenegrin Government, because there has always been an activity to 
follow after each of those meetings. Mihajlovic, Djurisic, a war ship 
captain, commander of Navy SC in the Garrison of Tivat, accused the 
FRY President and Yugoslav government as the main party to blame for 
the present situation in VJ. He said some nasty things about the 
professionals in VJ who are of Serbian nationality, and gave preferential 
treatment for those of Croatian and Muslim nationalities. He advocated 
establishment of Montenegrin Army, and handed over the command of 
the units to the Interior Ministry of Montenegro in case that he was 
forced into an armed conflict with the Yugoslav Army. He also stated that 
in such a case he would not be ready to carry out the orders issued by the 
Yugoslav Army General Staff, because he would not shot at the members 
of his own people. He made the same public speech in the formal 
occasion of the Meeting in Tivat, which was registered. A team of the 
General Staff security service has been sent to deal with this case and to 
end it.  
 
Milan Milekic, a colonel, commander of the Podgorica Military County, 
said in some conversations he had that Slobodan Milosevic and Momir 
Bulatovic should be burned at stake, because they were doing everything 
to alienate the members of the same people, there in Serbia and in 
Montenegro, and that the military leadership was teaming of thieves who, 
together with Milosevic and Bulatovic stole the money that had been 
designated for the salaries of military personnel in Montenegro. He said 
that Milo Djukanovic was not a traitor, but only a criminal who would 
sell several leading Montenegrin companies, but that at that future time 
everybody would live even better in Montenegro. He accused the 
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Yugoslav Army generals for the present state in the Army, he said that 
they were appointed generals in a rash manner, and that he had been 
colonel for ten years already, and noted that he would soon become an 
academician.  
Measures and activities that are being undertaken. Firstly, an interview 
of the FRY President has been published in "Politika" daily. In a clear 
and comprehensible way the standpoints on all the important issues of the 
present military and political position in FRY were expressed there. For 
the purpose of informing our staff about it, the whole interview will be 
published in the next issue of "Vojska" internal paper. A document issued 
by the administration was sent to all the units, which ordered that the 
interview be studied carefully with all the soldiers, and defined it as the 
basis for interpretation of the present situation. As for everybody else, 
and especially for the generals that are most prominent in the public and 
in media, there must not be any discord or disagreements in their 
interpretations of the present situation in their presentation of the army 
positions in public, and that is why I ask you all to study carefully this 
interview, and to always bear in mind the standpoints of the FRY 
President.  
 
Towards the end of January the fissure that started to appear among 
the military became more and more apparent. There were more and 
more people who were ready to assist in prevention of a civil war. 
The atmosphere of a bloody outcome had been prepared for a long 
time. We have separated ourselves into different groups of those on 
our side and those on their side, of those who were traitors and those 
who were patriots, of those who were chetniks and those who were 
partisans for too long now. Everything was ready for the apocalypse 
to begin. When such a polarity among people is created in the media, 
military, politics and economy, even an innocuous situation can 
produce unforeseeable consequences. The war in Bosnia officially 
started after the murder of an honoured wedding guest, and the 
whole year before that everything was prepared for that war, and 
only an immediate cause was awaited. We had too many immediate 
causes at our disposal. Propaganda had already performed its job. 
Those who did not accept the media darkness as their reality were 
sent out from schools, universities, dismissed from job… In such a 
dangerous and over burdened situation in which the military 
leadership thought that they didn't anything else to lose, Serbia and 
Montenegro could easily have turned into Lebanon. I have to admit 
that all the people that I came in contact with were ready for any 
form of co-operation to avoid the conflict. I think, in fact I am sure 
that they had an incomparably better insight of the existing situation 
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than their superior officers did, regardless of the fact that they were 
in the lower positions and of lower ranks. I can only suppose the 
shock they experienced when only a year after October 5, they saw 
their new Supreme Commander surrounded with the old team of 
generals. They were embittered and disappointed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            205  
 205
SURVEILLANCE OF GENERAL MOMČILO 
PERIŠIĆ  
 
 
February 2000  
 
All the time, the Montenegrin leadership was acquiring, in every way 
it could, equipment that would offer it an advantage over the 
Yugoslav Army (VJ) in the sense of wiretapping and surveillance. 
They tried to compensate for their physical inferiority by being 
better organized. A major advantage for them was the fact that the 
West had understanding, at least as regards these defensive means. 
They also received enormous financial assistance. The army was 
located on its territory, which largely facilitated work. A 
considerable part of the military communication links went through 
civilian radio relay nodes that had been saved from destruction. 
These were the weak points used for wiretapping. It is true that the 
Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP) had updated information 
about all the members of the 7th battalion, which was, actually, not 
very difficult for them. A big thing was the fact that there was 
excellent coordination between the Montenegrin authorities and the 
Serbian opposition, which received from them or through them 
information and funds for their opposition struggle.    
 
Colonel General   
GEZA FARKAŠ   
 
As regards Montenegro, the Montenegrin State Security Service had 
obtained photographs practically of all the members of the 7th battalion, 
updated criminal data, i.e. records on them and members of their 
families, it released among members of the 7th battalion the information 
that they were about to be disbanded, which additionally disturbed the 
entire formation and induced them to ask what would happen to them if 
they were to be disbanded and to leave the 7th battalion, they would be 
faced with harassment and would have problems with the present 
authorities.  
 
On the territory of Montenegro, in Ulcinj, we arrested two deserters, 
brought them to the MUP which did not react even after the adoption of 
the Law on Amnesty. However, the Montenegrin Vjesnik daily published 
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this and criticized both us and the MUP for not having reacted in 
accordance with the law, i.e. according to the adopted law.  
 
What is also characteristic and extremely important is the fact that all 
our communication links going to Montenegro, and even a considerable 
part of the military communications, are listened to in Montenegro. In 
this sense, I suggest that, together with the Liaison Administration, we 
review the communications, i.e. the pattern of the communications being 
realized, i.e. which exist in Montenegro, to look into the possibilities of 
protecting these communications. That’s all I wanted to say, general. 
 
Lieutenant General   
BRANKO KRGA  
General, I would only like to confirm what General Geza said about that 
wiretapping. Namely, we have already received, a number of times, 
confirmation from foreign sources that they are listening to us. Thus, for 
instance, they openly said that they had been familiar with all our 
telephone communications between Belgrade and Niš, Priština etc., 
during the war. This means that it is absolutely necessary to pay attention 
to the things that are said over these telephones, nothing that could be 
indicative for those foreigners listening to us. There is the code exercise, 
and everything that is important should go through code exercises, 
telephones should be used minimally. We have pointed to this a number 
of times, but due to some kind of, so to say, habit or lack of discipline or I 
don’t know what, is still present.  
 
Major General   
 
Thirdly, this psychological-propaganda activity is continuing as part the 
informative operation, specifically directed towards the president and 
towards the VJ, as well as part of the social problems that are being 
reflected in the negative occurrences mentioned by General Geza . 
In view of the intensification of the psychological-propaganda activities 
by the enemy, I would like to emphasize certain characteristics. Everyone 
is included in this activity – the secretary general, representatives of the 
government and international organizations, many the media in the West, 
specialized bodies of NATO units. Unlike other information relating to 
the method, forms and activities, this activity resembles and is similar to 
the activity that took place just before the armed aggression.  
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Included in the informative operation, as I have mentioned, were the 
leaderships of opposition parties in Serbia, the current authorities in 
Montenegro and so-called independent media. Characteristic of the 
current authorities in Montenegro is their cyclical inclusion. This means 
that it is peaceful for two days, then they get involved for two days, and 
on and on like this. 
 
General  
MILEN SIMIĆ 
For the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, it is the Serbs, Slobodan 
Milošević and the VJ that are to blame. Slobodan Milošević is a war 
criminal … there is this warrant and the financial blackmail which are in 
the function of this, and the VJ is in the service of Milošević and is 
making preparations for an attack on southern Serbia and Montenegro. 
These are the message for the world public, and they have the greatest 
problems in this regard – to convince the world public that these 
messages are trustworthy.  
The main messages for the public in Serbia are that “the regime of 
Slobodan Milošević is non-democratic and it is responsible for both the 
aggression and the sanctions”. Montenegro and its current authorities 
are democratic, but they are endangered by Slobodan Milošević and the 
Yugoslav Army. The West is not against the Serbian people, but against 
the non-democratic regime. Quite indicative is the statement of Albright 
who is once again claiming that she likes the Serbian people etc. She 
reiterated this even during the aggression and the message is that the 
army has been abused, but that this is not the opinion all the members of 
the army and this thesis is now topical again. 
The message for the public in Montenegro is the regime of Slobodan 
Milošević is to blame for the economic, social and other problems in 
Montenegro. The regime in Montenegro is democratic and the 
democratic West supports it. The army is the main threat to Montenegro 
and not everyone in the army shares the views of the military leadership.   
 
General Nikolić, whom I knew personally, looked funny to me, to say the 
least. At every meeting of the Collegiate Body, like some grieving tattle-
tale, he kept reporting Perišić without whom he probably would not be 
what he is. As soon as he would open his mouth, he would tongue-lash 
Perišić. He either had some kind of a pathological hatred towards him or 
he had such an assignment. Perišić knew all that because he was warned, 
and he could also read it later on. I can only imagine what these meetings 
between those generals and him looked like when he became the deputy 
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prime minister. It is quite logical that they could hardly wait to ‘throw 
him out of the saddle’. Pavković was probably also fed up with this - 
Perišić did this, Perišić did that. Pavković put an end to that painful 
situation with Perišić by ordering the arrest of the former chief-of-staff. 
Therefore, the decision on the arrest of General Perišić was issued 
approximately two years before it was carried out. In the army this is 
called a strategy, I suppose, and in civilian life it is described as a 
visionary quality. I informed Mr. Maraš and Buda about this, and as far 
as I know, Perišić knew well that his arrest was being prepared. Buda 
confirmed to me that he had informed Perišić about what his former 
colleagues were preparing for him. Even more ironically, I warned him 
again for the second time in 2002, seven days before our joint arrest, but 
this time the military strategy scored a victory over my visionary quality. 
Temporarily! 
Perišić was accused of having been involved in the OSA (Wasp) terrorist 
group because he had given a book as a present to some wretched 
lieutenant who was allegedly the OSA leader. I believe the lieutenant’s 
last name was Gajić. It was only in Hitler’s Germany and in Sloba’s 
Serbia that a book was considered to be a terrorist weapon. In Germany 
they burnt books, while here they arrested those who gave them away and 
possessed them. 
The OSA group was conceived in the minds of generals as the direct 
counterpoise to the group “Pauk” (Spider), because it was necessary to 
find a potential “assassin” of Pavković, just as Milošević’s potential 
assassin was found in group Pauk. 
Therefore, the boss decided to have Perišić arrested because he gave a 
book to hardened “terrorist” Gajić. Very characteristic is the fact that 
the generals regularly went to the boss to get their opinion. It is, thus, 
quite logical that the continuity of lending opinions persisted even after 
October 5. Their identity was exclusively linked to the present political 
situation. That is how they were taught and they did not know of any 
other way. In order to have generals who will be accepted by the citizens 
as their generals, we need to take non-affirmed, young and prosperous 
officers who know that they must not tie themselves to politics. If they are 
dismissed for having a neutral attitude to politics, that is quite certainly 
less tragic than if they are dismissed for having been politicized. For the 
people and especially for the state. Politicians must renounce their habit 
of winning over officers for their goals.  
 
Lieutenant General  
STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ  
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General, as regards morale, while I served in the south, the former chief-
of-staff, General Perišić went from house to house and simply kept saying 
that soldiers must not respond to the mobilization.   
 
Colonel General   
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
Let’s arrest him. If we have proof of this, he should be arrested. I don’t 
know how far this thing with Osa has gone and whether the Osa group 
has been transferred to the Niš prison? 
 
Colonel General    
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
We need to see with a lawyer to intensify that trial of theirs and to see 
whether Perišić is involved in that in any way. If Perišić is involved in it, 
the necessary procedure should be initiated. These are the orders I have 
received from the boss. If he is involved in Osa, just like any other 
citizens, I will sign it all. The fact that he was the chief-of-staff makes no 
difference. He is involved in a terrorist action.  
 
Colonel General   
GEZA FARKAŠ 
He is involved in the sense that he was in contact with Gajić, he gave him 
a book as a present.   
 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
This means that this is now going through court proceedings and the 
statements of that Gajić – if there are any elements for raising the issue of 
his responsibility, let this be done, and this about him going from house 
to house and advocating... – if there is proof of this, arrest him. There is 
no dilemma about it.  
 
PERSECUTION OF ZORAN ZIVKOVIC  
 
General Stamenko Nikolić dealt with criminal charges against 
opposition leaders. Not an easy task at all. He was alone, while the 
leaders were numerous. Thus, it was the turn of the famous “pole 
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guy”, whom I would like to get to know in person, Nenad Čanak. The 
generals’ favourite topic. Especially since his threatening with the 
hanging on Terazije. That “executioner” had to be stopped. And who 
would be better for this than Nidža. Sloba and Šešelj, non-destined 
room-mates in The Hague, had pushed into the army’s hands yet 
another weapon – “the public information law”, which was actually 
directed against the opposition, while the media were only collateral 
damage. In fear of the sky-high penalties for conveying the stands 
and views of the opposition, newspapers and televisions avoided open 
conflicts with the authorities. The biggest loser in this was the 
Serbian opposition, because very few were those who dared and 
desired to present what the opposition wanted to say. That law was a 
real weapon in the hands of monsters. This weapon was used to shoot 
at everything and everyone who thought differently. 
This time, it was the turn of today’s Prime Minister Živković. 
Otherwise, my colleague “spy and traitor”. By profession, of course. I 
am sorry I did not have an opportunity to get to know him 
personally. I do not know whether the Montenegrins had warned him 
about what was in store for him, but I believe they did. For 
Milošević’s generals everyone was a spy, the question was only what 
to try to prove for whom. His direct approach bothered them. It 
suited them more when someone attacked the regime in a wrapped 
up form. This is as if he had been deluded. But when someone, like 
the then mayor of Niš, keeps developing opposition activities in his 
city, and also has contacts with his colleagues in Europe, then that is 
a finished matter. Every military prosecutor could raise charges 
against him without being given a new rank and apartment.  
                            
Colonel General   
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
Who else had assignments to carry out?  
 
Lieutenant General  
STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ 
I had two criminal charges against Nenad Čanak. Proceedings have been 
instituted through the military prosecutor and that is undergoing 
procedure, as are the misdemeanour charges against the Glas daily. 
As regards the situation in Montenegro, the West continues to offer 
support to the Montenegrin leadership, but quite characteristic is the 
thing that the president also emphasized yesterday – that there is no 
resolute support for independence, but only as a platform, through which 
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they continue to exert pressure against the Yugoslav leadership. 
Characteristic in this sense is also what the Montenegrin foreign minister 
said in a conversation with us – that it is obvious from their contacts with 
the West that the world is in panic regarding Kosovo and Metohija, and 
even Montenegro, that they do not know what to do, that KFOR is not 
managing to cope etc.  
The stronger presence of the foreign media was registered in Montenegro 
over the previous days. CNN teams came from Macedonia and they are 
interested in the further course of developments. One should not rule out 
the intention of certain factors in the West to use media manipulation to 
redirect attention from Kosovo to Montenegro so as to divert attention 
from the failure on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Quite indicative 
is the statement Clark made yesterday in which he once again attacked 
President Milošević of wanting to destabilize Montenegro and said that 
NATO forces were following this very carefully. The SFOR command in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) has been ordered to prepare to receive 
refugees from Montenegro.   
As regards the situation in Montenegro, the West continues to offer 
support to the Montenegrin leadership, but quite characteristic is the 
thing that the president also emphasized yesterday – that there is no 
resolute support for independence, but only as a platform, through which 
they continue to exert pressure against the Yugoslav leadership. 
Characteristic in this sense is also what the Montenegrin foreign minister 
said in a conversation with us – that it is obvious from their contacts with 
the West that the world is in panic regarding Kosovo and Metohija, and 
even Montenegro, that they do not know what to do, that KFOR is not 
managing to cope etc.  
 
Lieutenant General   
ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIĆ  
During the previous week, those carrying out intelligence-subversive 
activities towards our country focused their attention on the activities of 
VJ units on the territory of Montenegro, in the immediate vicinity of 
Kosovo and Metohija. As regards the security situation in the territory, it 
is complex, there are activities by separatist, extremist and terrorist 
forces and they have a negative effect on the VJ’s security. The main 
danger is the possible escalation of terrorism by Albanian separatists in 
southern Serbia. However, due to incessant separatist activities by the 
leadership and MUP of Montenegro, the security of the VJ in this 
republic is largely endangered. Last weekend, in a number of towns in 
Montenegro over 2,500 members of MUP’s reserve forces… weapons 
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and uniforms were distributed to them, the functioning of the military 
calling-up service was checked out, and shooting from infantry weaponry 
was carried out. Those who received call-ups were told that the activity 
had been carried out for the purpose of checking out the mobilization 
alert of the units since, Montenegro, as stated by MUP officials, is 
endangered by the army’s intention to attack MUP and occupy this 
republic. 
It is characteristic that the statement of Mr. Djukanović concerning the 
army and the situation on the territory of Montenegro is constantly being 
repeated on the domestic scene. As regards psychological-propaganda 
activities against the FRY and the army, they continue with unabated 
force and everything it proceeding exactly according to their plan. For 
now, we have shattered the thesis about an alleged mobilization of the 
army, preparations for forcible return, but we have not eliminated the 
thesis about the army entering Montenegro and this should be, and I 
suggest that this be the main task for next week, we have started with that.   
The conclusion is that, despite the activities by the factors who have been 
demonstrating this negative influence over a longer period of time, the 
morale is stable for now and no major problems concerning the morale 
are expected in the upcoming period.  
As regards proposals for measures, I suggest that we forward to the units 
part of the president’s speech, of course with approval and authorization, 
in the original form, especially the assessments and especially certain 
measures, with the exclusion of what should not be presented, because 
that has a positive effect on the morale, and already the very presence is 
provoking positive comments.  
I would like to ask, if it is technically possible, for this protected channel 
also to be used in communication with the assistant for morale, because 
the situation in the units and adequate measures are reported on every 
morning.   
As regards measures on the territory of Montenegro, the statements of 
two commanders will be presented today.    
 
Colonel General   
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
We should see what is happening with this lawsuit against Perišić for the 
statement that a paramilitary (unit) is being formed within the army. We 
said that this should be done, and I called the lawyer. As regards 
television, information 3.A will go. Primarily that Čorbić woman, that is 
of course…, I don’t know whether anyone had an opportunity to watch 
that television, but they have lately been so poisonous that it is 
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unbelievable. There were also unsettled relations regarding the lease, 
and we decided to turn that space into housing space, like other business 
spaces as well, and to give it to someone to use, and this will also help us 
get her out of there, because her conduct is inappropriate, everything she 
writes and says is in that function.  
And this Živković, the mayor, whom they are mentioning, we have sued 
him for that statement, because he is constantly giving statements, making 
assessments about the army, putting requests to the army etc. Today, 
Deutsche Welle carried his statement. Here is what he said: there is a 
dangerous game being played by certain people in the army who still 
believe that political commissioners should exist in the army.  
I game my man an order once again thoroughly to examine and to 
present a response – no political commissioners in the army, but he 
probably believes that he as a politician can deal with political issues. He 
is one of those… whom we should have arrested during the war, but I 
made the biggest mistake there, because he did not even serve the army, 
he put on a uniform and started interfering in the work of the army and 
then I held a meeting and told him that we will introduce military rule 
there if everything does not function as it should. However, during the 
aggression, he most directly cooperated in a manner which I am not 
familiar with, but he is in constant contact with the mayors of certain 
cities in the NATO member countries. He gave a statement saying that he 
did not know why, that he was surprised that NATO was targeting 
barracks and tearing down barracks when the army is hiding there and 
there and there, and he said where it was hiding. However, we have no 
proof of this but at issue is a man who should be fully unmasked. This is 
just a game… if you followed that entire correspondence, he requested to 
be relieved of responsibility as the mayor, because in the city council 
there are also councillors who are members of the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS), of the Radicals, so that he would lose in the vote, and he, 
therefore, asked his party to strip him of that immunity.  
However, we will see. He gave a statement, a very bad one, several times, 
saying that the army was raising the level of its combat alert, that it was 
sending troops to the territory of 3.A, that the 63rd parachute brigade was 
sent at the time when those things were happening at the airport, which 
caused disturbance among the citizens of Niš, and we sued him for it and 
will continue to sue him.   
The subconscious desire to have former colleagues convicted was 
probably the result of the fact that the boss could suspect that they 
too would probably be against him as soon as they take off their 
uniforms. There were various pressures and threats towards them 
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and those close to them. The army is considering possibilities for 
taking away their apartments. How to take away the apartment of 
Colonel Stojadinović and to get rid his wife who was working for the 
army. Pavković’s radicalism can best be seen in his speech. One 
should bear in mind the fact that these speeches were made before 
about a dozen people and that the conversations were recorded. I can 
only imagine what it looks like when they meet with operatives who 
need to carry out these decisions. However, this clearly shows the 
direction in which the military leadership was heading.  
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
The latest information… the thing the air force commander is writing 
about the conduct of Grahovac down there and everything he is doing. 
We have to be sharp in our actions towards such persons. The fact that 
we have data and information about what is happening means nothing to 
us if there is no action. It means nothing to us, reading all that 
information just gives you a headache. If we know that this Grahovac is 
doing that... I wrote it down there, and a Court of Honour and to initiate 
the procedure of taking away his apartment and everything else, and [to 
present him] in the media... constantly to publish articles about what he 
is doing, so that the people would know what that general is doing. It is 
only in this way that we can unmask him, and not just keep presenting 
conclusions, as we are doing. We will even live to see him come here and 
kill us all, right here in the office. And not just about him, but about all 
persons in this regard. If we know that someone is carrying out hostile 
activities towards us, we have no business to provide him with 
documented proof, you have to arrest him, to bring him in for questioning 
for two or three days, as long as we can hold him, and then we will 
apologize to him later. And not as it is being done now - having them 
create chaos, kill, liquidate and we let them come and go. They have to be 
arrested, he is not to exist, if we want to protect the personality and the 
military organization and everything else.   
I believe we are over-sensitive when it comes to carrying out an adequate 
activity on the basis of information we have. We either do not find the 
information absolutely reliable, or we do not have this, or are still 
checking out that and then one gains the impression that we are being 
drawn into some kind of spiral where we want to - we don’t want to, there 
is – there isn’t, there will be – there won’t be etc. What is that Kalalić, 
who is he? If we know that he is messing around, that he wants to 
liquidate someone, we should liquidate him first. Therefore, the situation 
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needs to be followed well. Smiljanić is doing that, we need to do it, let the 
service do it. You know how it is, someone could make some kind of ... 
etc. and then we will be surprised by what had happened. So, it is 
necessary to know well the pilots, to know well the commanders, to 
establish well the organization... the possibility of taking aircrafts... one 
thing, another thing, the third thing etc, and not to have someone create 
some kind of an excess, after which we will all be surprised.  
Does anyone else have anything to say about the tasks that were carried 
out, does anything need to be explained? And if it’s finished, there is no 
need. No. Yes, Krga, please. 
 
Lieutenant General  
STAMENKO NIKOLIĆ 
General, we have three proposals regarding your orders for a 
disciplinary investigation against the former chief-of-staff and there are 
three proposals of the sectors. Vlade Nonković, Branislav Petrović and 
Ljubomir Draganjac are to state before the Collegiate Body that a 
procedure can be launched, a disciplinary investigation, and your 
decision to initiate a procedure before the Court of Honour is to be 
passed afterwards. The generals have to be active. We looked to see who 
is free. This is also the proposal of the head of the Legal Administration 
who is involved the most in conducting the procedure.  
 
DETERIORATION OF THE CONFLICT WITH 
MONTENEGRO 
 
ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIĆ 
Separatist activities in Montenegro are intensifying, numerous 
characteristic activities which endanger the security of the Yugoslav 
Army (VJ) have been registered and they include the following: 
1. Non-corroborated attacks on the VJ about it endangering the security 
and sovereignty of Montenegro, and the further arming and training of 
police units, with the training being carried out by former army officers 
2.  In every larger building in Podgorica and in other larger buildings in 
Montenegro two observers are placed to monitor the movements of the 
army and officers-tenants, and even some kind of records on this are 
being kept 
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3. The Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP) has formed groups for the 
intimidation of citizens and for the overnight stays of certain military 
conscripts who responded to the military call-ups to defend their country  
 
5. Incessant observation of army units and facilities, except certain 
military facilities such as the Golubovci airport at command 2.A, the 
command of the fleet has prepared forces for an attack on these facilities.  
Certain retired generals, Grahovac and Martinović, are spreading anti-
army propaganda, stating that the army had carried out an aggression 
against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), that the 
Slovenians were right to have seized the border crossings, that half of the 
professional VJ members in Montenegro are for Milo Djukanović, while 
the other half has been deceived, that Montenegro should seize the 
airports and border crossings because this i sits country and that the wise 
and capable have been expelled from the VJ, while only obedient 
generals have stayed. 
Extremists from the Serbian opposition are preparing to provoke unrest 
in the country and the forcible takeover of power, which certain parties 
are intending to use for the realization of their secessionist goals. 
Representatives of certain political parties in Vojvodina demand the 
status of a republic for this province. As the reason for organizing the 
protest rally planned for April 14, this year, they mention the 
endangering of the media in Serbia. Their preparations for violence 
during the protest rally is also indicated by the forming of crisis 
headquarters and strike groups for conflicts with bodies of the Serbian 
MUP. One such group in Čajetina is being led by a former VJ non-
commissioned officer, and their nucleuses consist of members of… from 
the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Otpor organization. For 
this occasion, they are even carrying out special training in martial arts, 
the use of inflammable means, baseball bats and so on, part of which has 
also been shown on television in the show “The Radicals’ Waves” on 
March 28, 2000. 
The security situation in the army as a whole is favourable. There are 
individual cases of party and other forms of negative expressions by army 
members, but they have had no impact on the state of security. However, 
they have contributed to the partial compromising (of the damage) and its 
reputation. An analysis of the conduct and contacts of VJ members who 
have left the army and have gone to work for the Montenegrin MUP 
undoubtedly confirm that this category of professional members is being 
used for the realization of intensive intelligence activities towards the 
army, both at the beginning of the testing of their suitability for being 
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accepted into the Montenegrin MUP and later on. They are establishing 
planned contacts with their former colleagues from the army units and 
commands and are bearing influence on them to leave the VJ. 
The importance the Montenegrin MUP is attaching to the contacts of its 
members with VJ members is best attested to by the fact that all members 
of that MUP are obliged to report to their superiors all the contacts they 
had achieved with VJ members for any purpose. Operative findings 
indicate that three students of the navy Military Academy - Jovan Vračar, 
Ljubiša Krgović and Darko Vasiljević – will leave the army immediately 
after the completion of their schooling. Among the proposed measures, 
we believe that it is necessary to issue an order that would oblige all VJ 
members to report to their senior officers all the contacts they and their 
family members made with members of the Montenegrin MUP, and also 
to take measures to relieve of their duties all those for whom we learn 
that they have submitted requests for a transfer to MUP bodies, because 
they submit such requests, have interviews, but stay on and work for 
months in the commands, during which time they are practically 
considered to be their people in our ranks. Secondly, we should re-
initiate the drive for all army members in their basic units to return the 
automatic weapons which they have illegal possession of, without any 
consequences for them. That is all I had to say. 
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
Throw them out immediately, if the information about their conduct is 
correct, and he can go to whichever television he wants to and talk.  
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
That should be prepared and we should present something through the 
media about this, and secondly, acquaint those in the lower commands 
with this. This order which the First Administration will write, is to 
regulate the realization of special measures at border crossings on the 
territory of Montenegro. They can prepare the same scenario – since this 
Grahovac constantly keeps referring to it – like in Slovenia, taking over 
the border crossings. So, they can go after these crossings, they do not 
want the watchtowers, but they would be going for the crossings that can 
be used. Let those watchtowers that are covering the crossings be well 
organized and reinforced. 
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There is a great similarity between the events in Slovenia, where I 
once worked, and in Montenegro. This is quite logical, in view of the 
protagonists on both sides. On the one had, we had the desire of the 
democratic forces not to secede, but to redefine the relations within 
the federation, and on the side there was Milošević’s regime which 
behaved as it did in 1991. In such a constellation of things, it was 
quite logical that a conflict would break out. Actually, the only 
obstacle to Milošević provoking an open conflict with the help of 
loyal people from his surroundings, was the West’s unequivocal 
intention to go all the way in that case. The manner in which he ruled 
did not allow the citizens to live without tensions and wars. As much 
as he needed a reconstruction of the country, on the one hand, even if 
only in the marketing sense, he just as badly needed a situation in 
which he would be able to use petty intrigues and conflicts to 
maintain the tension and keep the people’s attention away from the 
real social problems. 
The Montenegrin MUP did everything to compensate for its physical 
inferiority with a better organization and technical advantage. 
Wrong is the belief that the West was arming the Montenegro. Quite 
the contrary, the West was of the opinion there was an excess of 
history in these regions, as one of their publicists said, and of 
weapons as well. The Montenegrins could obtain defensive police 
equipment, as well as surveillance equipment. A great advantage for 
them was quite certainly also the fact that they could rely on an 
exchange of information with Western services, which was normal in 
conditions of coinciding interests.  
 
Colonel General  
SVETOZAR MARJANOVIĆ 
I believe we need to start taking measures towards those for whom we are 
not sure that they will carry out our orders, we must no longer keep 
delaying this and these measures could include dismissals, secondments, 
transfers from positions and the filing of criminal disciplinary charges. I 
believe we must no longer keep postponing this, because it can easily 
happen that we have... etc., and then we constantly keep wondering 
whether something will be blown up, whether someone will do this or 
that, and we constantly keep concluding that we have this kind and that 
kind of officers.  
 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            219  
 219
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
We have to have a list of such persons. We need to look into this, to call 
the army commanders and to see with then and to resolve this 
immediately, on the spot. It is better that we order them to leave than for 
them to leave by themselves. 
 
Colonel General  
GEZA FARKAŠ                           
They are investing maximal efforts into psychological-propaganda 
activities and are presenting information that a conflict will soon break 
out between the army and the Montenegrin police on the territory of 
Montenegro, they are creating a kind of psychosis in that region and are 
preparing for NATO, in such a situation, to be in the position, i.e. to have 
to intervene. 
 
Colonel General   
GEZA FARKAŠ   
It is characteristic that, on the territory of Montenegro - and we 
discovered that on March 21, we received this information and we have 
finally established that it is true - a truck full of weapons came from BiH. 
We do not know what was in it, and that truck went to Nikšić. There are 
currently around 250 members of special units in Nikšić, at Motel 
Vidovdan, and these specials are gathering in other garrisons as well and 
they have received the task of preparing to block the barracks and 
possibly prevent the army from leaving.  
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
This information should be prepared for 2.A for the army commander to 
prepare a blockade of that motel and other measures, and then we will 
see who will be faster. 
 
Colonel General  
GEZA FARKAŠ 
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Last week, an officer crossed over, he transferred from the army to the 
MUP, and a non-commissioned office is preparing to cross over as well. 
In commanding positions in the MUP there are currently 65 of our 
officers, our former officers who are commanding police units of various 
levels, among whom there are 16 senior officers. The Montenegrin 
government is organizing and preparing to adopt a Law, i.e. a decision 
on the formation of the Montenegrin armed forces. The government is 
preparing a proposal to forward it to Parliament. A wiretapping centre of 
the MUP has been established in Podgorica. It has a task and it is 
listening to all our communications, both radio and telephone 
communications. 
Secondly, I said here that I believed it was really necessary to toughen 
the transport and the supplying of Montenegro, so that they would not 
come into conflict with our Serbian police because of these channels 
through which they are passing. This is a large quantity, they transferred 
here 98,000 litres of milk out of which only 15,000 went to the army. 
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
Let this be looked into. Who transferred this? 
 
Colonel General  
GEZA FARKAŠ 
That is from Ribnica. They concluded those contracts and it left from 
Sjenica. 
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
That is our zone of responsibility. See to it that this is looked into, who 
did what, and immediately arrest all those who are doing so. They are 
violating the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and 
that’s that.  
You and Milen Simić should see to what extent was there an outpour of 
military information in that feuilleton in the Vecernje Novosti about the 
air force and anti-aircraft defence, because, in my opinion, it is unheard-
of to publish things in such a manner and to make a promotion of one 
unit and certain personalities, and to give the complete information on 
the organizational and personnel formation of such a unit. And 
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everything that we kept [as a secret] until now in regard to certain 
activities during the aggression, it was all said and told there. So, the 
Security Administration [should see about this], and the Information 
Administration... I ordered that an order be issued saying that such 
projects, as are these, cannot be presented to the public. I can tolerate 
statements by commanders, I can tolerate interviews, I can tolerate 
everything, but such a project... Even the president asked me yesterday 
what that was.   
 
 Major General  
MILEN SIMIĆ 
General, on the basis of facts which had a negative effect on the morale, 
there are no major changes compared to last week. I would like to 
emphasize here only a higher intensity of inspections and visits to units, 
which is already said to have had a positive effect and I point out that the 
signal of the Yugoslav television has now finally covered the zone of 
responsibility of the navy. 
Among the negative factors, the reports still emphasize the problem of 
army members on the territory of Montenegro and the proposal of 
General Nikolić for the upcoming period will partly resolve that part of 
the problem and it refers, later on, to the payment of allowances to 
persons without an apartment, persons living away from their families. 
This is pointed out by the commands of the strategic groups and I believe 
it is good that they are exerting pressure on the general staff.  
In regard to the attitude of the media to the army, as far as the domestic 
public is concerned still prevailing are features with positive messages, 
and as regards the foreign public, attempts are mostly being made to use 
new propaganda messages to cover the aggression and the failure of the 
aggression. However, this is not reaching the world public. Negative 
messages about acts by the army during the war and afterwards are 
immediately revealed as such. As regards the attitude of the media, it is 
characteristic already today that they are starting especially to attack 
organizational units of the general staff. Until now, it was the military 
leadership, while attacks are now directed towards the Security 
Administration as the body with influence on the president, while the 
Administration for Morale is being described as ideological and of an 
agitprop nature. 
 
Colonel General 
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NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
Who is describing it like that? 
 
Major General  
MILEN SIMIĆ 
This was published by all the media in Montenegro and by Stojadinović26 
in Glas. 
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
You should call in that Stojadinović for a conversation and we should 
give him a lecture.  
 
Major General  
MILEN SIMIĆ 
He will publish that too, general, he will immediately publish it. 
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
Let him publish it. 
 
Colonel General 
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
We will discuss a bit the new organization of the administration. You 
should give me, as soon as possible, proposals for the person who would 
be the VJ spokesman and we have to agree on his presentation of things 
and he must be the one to present all this. As regards the information 
about the newspaper that wrote about alleged crimes, a serious denial 
should be prepared in regard to it. Everything they have been accusing us 
of so far, in such a manner, all that is based only on allegations, there is 
nowhere any proof. So, this should be seriously denied and that 
spokesman should be prepared. I don’t know whether you already have 
someone in mind? 
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FIRST OPEN CONFLICTS IN 
MONTENEGRO 
 
May 2000 
Colonel 
ACA TOMIC  
General, Sir, general Farkas ordered me to make a report on this 
group from the Seventh Police Battalion in Bijelo Polje. They came 
into a conflict with four members of the Montenegrin MUP Special 
Unites. That was one of those characteristic safety incidents that 
happened last night. There were no other safety incidents. That 
would be all from me.  
General  
SIMIC 
The first anniversary of the battle of Murin and the beginning of 
reconstruction of buildings in Murin were celebrated in the North of 
Montenegro, and a large number of Montenegrin citizens from the 
North gathered there. The activity bore political significance, and I'd 
rather not talk about that. However, I would like to stress that the 
Army did everything to organize, prepare and carry out the festive 
occasion properly.  
These increased levels of control and units' inspection with the aim 
to gain an insight into the situation and to offer assistance have 
made positive influence. Among the elements that have had negative 
influence on the morale, and we expect that the negative influence 
continues to be present in the following period, is the reaction that 
came as the result of late payments, and salaries above all.  
As for these fights, since mister Tomic noted them as being 
important, as I have made a joke about it, the important thing is that 
our guys won, that is that they were not beaten. Later on that night 
they tried to arrest a sergeant, from the same unit in Bijelo Polje,, 
you know, and he had to use a hand grenade as his argument 
against that, and the special unit guys withdrew after that and gave 
up arresting him. We reached a mutual agreement that they would 
not speak about the incident in public, and to solve that problem 
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with the MUP leadership, since we have the preparations for the 
competition in Podgorica underway, and it has been jointly 
organized by MUP and 2nd Army Command.  
 
 
 
Lieutenant general  
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
But it is very important that we are all fully aware of the level of 
importance of the things that we are speaking about here, and it is 
especially important that the general public if fully informed about 
it, and especially the general public in Montenegro. Secondly, every 
piece of information we gathered, that is the public statements that 
we issue have to be made available to the television. Everything you 
give to Tanjug, everything that you give to RTS, has to be given to 
Info27, too. Don't let me keep reminding you about that! I begin to 
get the impression that those heads of departments, heads of groups 
and those administration officers have begun to behave casually and 
negligently, and that when they are given a task, they determine the 
deadline for it themselves. Well, we are going to determine the 
deadlines ourselves, and in a great precision, and we are going to 
ask for reports about all those things. We asked for that official 
report to be made to inform our soldiers, to inform the 2nd Army and 
the Navy in that territory, and also for us to be able to take the 
necessary measures with the Federal Government in case they stall 
us off. So, we should send that in there, and ask that it is published 
in the media as soon as possible. Have we found a way to calculate 
salaries and payment for Army members separately from other 
things?  
 
Lieutenant general  
GEZA FARKAS 
 
In the territory of Montenegro, there have been some reactions to 
these articles, to these activities, reactions that have been published 
in the papers. They reacted by means of some headlines, and we 
shall probably hear more details about that. Here are some of the 
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characteristic headlines: "Generals Dislike that Montenegrin 
Leadership Don't Give Money", that's one of the headlines. When in 
a democratic country Army turn against a member of the Supreme 
Command, and then a headline saying that Ponte has asked Kremlin 
to explain why they didn't arrest General Ojdanic in Moscow, and so 
on. The same propaganda campaign has been continued. We had 
one serious conflict near Mojkovac, where the members of the 
Seventh Battalion in their civilian clothes, when they were not on 
duty, in a restaurant, came into a conflict with a group of civilians 
and a Montenegrin MUP officer who was with them. He pulled his 
gun out, and then they all jumped on him and took his gun away, and 
then everybody started to fight. The outcome of that all was that he 
went out of the restaurant when the fight was over, and the Seventh 
Battalion officers got out of the restaurant, too, there were seven of 
them, and then the owner of the restaurant fired his automatic gun at 
them, and wounded one of our men and his brother who is not from 
the Yugoslav Army. This was a serious conflict that could have 
resulted in some serious problems. We did something about it, both 
along the command lines, and along our line, we went out to the site 
of the incident first of all, and then did everything we always do in 
cases like that. These people that took part in, that is, the one that 
shot at them is at large. We can hardly ---, he is Asanin Zoran, the 
restaurant owner.  
 
Incidents like this one presented serious danger for the safety of 
Montenegro, and I know for sure that, as a rule, they always 
drew the attention of the Montenegrin leadership. The most 
serious problems were made by the units of the Seventh 
Battalion that were deployed in the north of Montenegro. Head 
of security service in one of these units, Anicic, was a very 
interesting character in those incidents. As far as I know, he was 
an operational officer in the State Security Service in Budva. 
After the crack in the ruling party, he became the SNP follower, 
and became the security service in one of those detachments. He 
was rewarded for his loyalty and transferred to the Defence 
Ministry, where, according to my sources, he waited to be sent 
further on to the military diplomatic missions. As far as I know 
now, he is still in the same position, and to top it all, he is sitting 
very near the Cabinet of Maras. The Army has always had 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            226  
 226
problems with the Seventh Battalion cadre. Most of them were 
sent there with some politician's letter of recommendation, and 
most of them never attended the relevant military schools. They 
did not allow that to stand in their way to get high ranks and 
non-commissioned officers' ranks, and with those the status of 
active members of the armed forces, with all their rights and 
privileges.  
 
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Can we issue an arrest warrant for him? 
 
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
An arrest warrant. We can, he is at large somewhere in Montenegro, 
so whom shall we sent the arrest warrant to? He chose carefully 
where to hide. He is hiding there. They simply said, there in those 
meetings, that he had escaped. We turned to the Interior Ministry for 
help. The commission we set up had a meeting, and a criminal 
charge was brought against him. We'll get organized and do 
something, now that we know who he is. They started fighting over 
the music in the restaurant, because the musicians refused to play 
Serbian songs, and so on. They refused to play the song about the St. 
Vitus Day. They also reacted, Glumac28 called a meeting, and the 
State Security Chief was there. They expressed their reactions to that 
meeting of ours, when you were down there, and so on. They said 
that they had made an assessment of that, that they had not expected 
such a thing to happen, that it had been inappropriately silly, and 
even that we had had a chat over drinks and food, and that there had 
not been an official meeting at all.  
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
Further on, yesterday during the riots, and so on, there was --- you 
know what happened there starting from the afternoon, the delay, 
                                                 
28  
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and so on, and finally how it all ended. It was characteristic of them 
that a message and a telegram with Solana's support were read in 
the rally. And there ---, some leaflets were handed out, a 
proclamation to the citizens of Serbia. Last night in that 
proclamation, they called on a renewed occupation and in all the 
free, that is, oppositional towns, in which they ordered that tonight 
and in the afternoon people start gathering and continue doing that. 
The problem lied in that that went out, because they were not able to 
reach a consensus. They were all in the City Parliament building, all 
the opposition leaders were in there, and they couldn't agree upon 
who would make a speech, what would be said there, and they didn't 
have enough people there, either.  
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
You shall continue to monitor their activities, and see whether they 
are coming out tonight, too. It is simple; we should publicly 
proclaim that everybody who called for a rebellion and destruction 
of the state shall be arrested. I'm telling you, half of them will run 
away. And then a wanted circular should be sent for them, so that 
they never return to this country. It’s that simple.  
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
Sir, Canak sent us a letter, a letter to our generals, and so on. That 
letter should be read, his reactions are there, in it. He said that we 
were protecting Milosevic's family, and everything else along these 
lines, that we were not protecting the workers, that he possessed 
reliable information, that he knew for sure that the lower ranking 
officers were not supporting us, and so on.  
This helicopter, the one that entered that air space, went out of the 
corridor. A wounded criminal was in that helicopter, a mafioso from 
Banja Luka, which got wounded several times during a mobsters' 
clash. He is now referred to as a casualty, in the communication 
between the Military Medical Academy, and the Banja Luka 
Hospital…  
 
Lieutenant general 
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NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
And who sent a helicopter for him to come here? The state, of 
course. Dodik sent a helicopter for him. And everything is clear now, 
the Army of the Republic of Srpska has nothing to do with that, that's 
clear. And so, I’ll tell this so that you all know it, we have forbidden 
that, there would be no more aircrafts flying in from the Republic of 
Srpska. Please, I want to see that document. I personally signed it 
yesterday. It says here that it is forbidden that the aircrafts from the 
Republic of Srpska enter our territory, except for the cases with 
special permission. You, don’t play games with this one! If you didn't 
put it all down in this one, correct it all! So, not a single aircraft can 
go in here. When it is permitted, then they will need some special 
criteria to be met so that it can come in this country. NATO troops 
are in the Republic of Srpska. The Army of the Republic of Srpska is 
now not what it used to be, and we do not know who is there working 
in that Army nor who has been involved in that. And now we have 
just discovered that that one was a criminal. Maybe a NATO officer 
was also in that helicopter, and maybe he came there to take 
pictures, to drop those locators there, and so on, who knows what 
sort of things he could have done there. So, from now on, no one can 
come in here any more. And that one that has sent those complaints 
to you, let that general complain to his heart's content. First of all, 
he has to send, as we have said ---, for all the pilots, but that would 
mean nothing to us now. They cannot come in here. He can go 
somewhere to get medical treatment, like he came to Belgrade; he 
could have gone to Sarajevo to get medical treatment. He has to 
meet the same criteria there. He can get medical treatment in 
Zagreb; he meets the same criteria there, too. He goes in a foreign 
country. That's it, done and over. We got an order for that there. 
Don't try to play with that. They got ---, they units received an order 
to shot down all the aircrafts. So, we have, and our units have to 
inform our soldiers and our pilots about that. So, each aircraft will 
be shot down, every one that is found above the zone of forbidden 
flights. And this here, this above us is also a no flights zone. We have 
units that should be ready, ready to do all those things.  
 
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            229  
 229
I suggest, sir, since two days ago there was another flight, and I 
suppose that it undergone the same procedure like that one with that 
helicopter, and it didn't go out of the ---. But in cases when they land 
here, we have no control over those cases, and we cannot know who 
is in the helicopter…  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Everything has been taken care of, and so the control procedures 
are the same as those in the airport, the customs, and all the rest. 
When they get the permission, it is not sure that one will get the 
permission. That means that they cannot come here just like that. A 
helicopter from the Republic of Srpska comes in here, and nobody of 
us can do anything about it. This means that they cannot come in 
just like that, if the permission is granted they land in the Batajnica 
airport, it is thoroughly examined down there, and only then can 
they do everything else. That's the decision. They can send all sorts 
of things in, with that helicopter, they took everything from them, the 
weapons, they search through and control everything there, they can 
even take away their helicopter, they can even take away their pilot, 
they can send in five terrorists here in such a helicopter, they can 
send in those special unit soldiers here, and land them in the 
helicopter on VMA building, as if they were patients. They can then 
go wherever they like from the VMA, and do whatever they like. Let's 
not play with those things any more. They kidnap people, of course 
they do. They may even kidnap somebody who has come to the VMA 
for a treatment, and take them away.  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
He have people who are getting medical treatment in the VMA, too, 
and there are some other people there who are also getting their 
medical treatment there, with approval by the responsible people in 
VMA. I know that, too. And they get better treatment than our 
general when he is sent there. And as for this head of security in the 
VMA, you shall suggest somebody to me immediately, and he is to 
get retired immediately, now, he gets retired in June, and you shall 
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suggest to me a man to replace him there. You can prepare the 
order; just wait for Geza to suggest somebody to me. We have to 
handle that. He has to inform the security directorate there what is 
happening and in what manner. Geza should not be chasing 
anybody to do that; Geza should not run there in VMA to ask his 
whether this one has been admitted or not. Everybody should do 
their job, there's no doubt about that. They transferred the one that 
took part in the assassination of Arkan to VMA, too. And the Interior 
Ministry transferred him there, we know nothing about that. MUP 
what? You have to be informed about everything, too. VMA is 
subordinate to you. It is all right when they carry a casualty there, 
but we have to be informed in advance that the wounded man is 
being brought there. And after all, why bring him there in the first 
place? Why did they leave us with this hot potato, with security on 
our shoulders, with all the work for us, everything to organize, to be 
involved in all that? There are at least a hundred hospitals here. 
Who is that Gagi guy that shot the other one, and why did he have to 
come there of all the places? That's not acceptable for us. People 
who work in VMA should handle those things. They should not tempt 
me to start asking why they accept such cases. They should handle 
these things. And you should have a meeting with them to discuss it 
in a serious manner, and if necessary, you should bring the VMA 
people there, all those chief people should come here in my office, 
and I'll tell them the things that I have just told you, I'll tell them. 
What do they think they are doing? We are a medical institution, we 
are this, we are that. There are hundreds of medical institutions, and 
not a single one of them have even considered the option to bring 
them there. And once they bring them, they don't even inform us 
about that. Whose interest is it in to hide those things? We have a 
team that render services; they provide medical treatment to patients 
out of the health institution. He doesn't want to come to VMA 
because he hasn't got an adequate suite, and then he receives his 
treatment at home, the team with doctors, nurses and everything get 
ready, go to his home and provides treatment for the patient there. 
Which ones of those generals demanded such a treatment at their 
homes? And afterwards nobody knows anything about what 
happened. Nobody knows anything, the doctor himself decided to do 
so.  
Lieutenant general 
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GEZA FARKAS 
There is another proposal, since police officers here have also 
started to get sick and take longish sick leaves, and then they call us 
to say that they have patients from the Ministry of Interior, and 
groups of mobsters. We have now a Military Police lieutenant in 
Novi Sad, who has been on sick leave for two months now. So, my 
suggestion would be that we should examine the sick leaves of our 
officers, to see who suffers from what, and so on.  
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
You know yourselves what's that all about. It is all about the fact 
that those are people who have official documents, permissions to 
carry arms, and they are suitable. They pay them well, he sits 
besides him, when the police stops them they have documents to 
show them, and suddenly he becomes somebody's body guard. That's 
what's been happening.  
 
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
And they do those things, and get the amount equal to their annual 
salary for one such operation only, they get the annual salary.  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
That is only the issue of somebody's safety, or are there some other 
crafty schemes that can be achieved by means of obtaining and 
abusing of official papers? So, this order should be issued and 
immediately send.  
Is there anything else? 
So, in relation to this situation that has arisen now, we should 
establish a team tasked with monitoring and following of this 
situation and incident that is going on now in Belgrade and in the 
country. Let the deputy chief of General Staff lead this team, one 
officer from the staff sector should be in the team, one from the 
morale department, that is the Information Directorate, one from 
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Yugoslav Army land forces and from the Security Directorate. So, 
that would be a team that would constantly hold their meetings, 
follow things, etc.  
And secondly, a team is to be set up to monitor all these measures, 
the measures that should be undertaken these days, today, 
tomorrow, in relation to our buildings for a potential invasion. I am 
almost sure that those from Otpor, the mercenaries, not the students, 
of course, that they would try to attack some of the buildings, as an 
attempt to get hold of weapons, or only to provoke us in some way. 
I'm almost sure of that. So, that should be examined on the army 
level, on the general staff level, our buildings that should be 
protected and units that should be tasked with securing them. Those 
units should be designated precisely, together with who should be 
their commanders, the liaison that we shall have with him, and who 
can issue orders to them. So, this team should practically coordinate 
all those activities with the commands of one and the other Army, 
both in the units made up in Belgrade and of course, deeper in the 
territory. Well we cannot allow that somebody attacks that building 
of our General Staff in the centre, and that we do not have a unit 
that has been tasked with protecting it and intervening in such 
situations. And to gather our forces only after such incidents, only 
after something happens that makes us gather our units. That unit 
has to be set up, formed into ranks, ready to act. Only a signal, the 
men come, the unit is on their way. We know who can sound the 
alarm for them, and who is here. Look here, we must, I am for that, 
we have to protect the interest of the Army.  
The thing that  that one there in Montenegro did, we have to know 
everything about it, he can escape now, but he has a restaurant 
there, and he is bound to return sooner of later. Montenegrin 
Ministry of Interior will do nothing to catch him, or if they catch 
him, they will release him. But we shall catch him, like when Aca 
Vasiljevic caught that one in Split. We shall catch him and put him 
on trial. There's no other way. Everybody who is doing things 
contrary to the Army interests have to be punished. And we shall we 
whether it would be the civilian judiciary or the military one that 
will catch him first.  
And the thing that happened in Nis, I have already said what I had 
to say in relation to that. With the judiciary that we have here, and 
with everything else, we have to deal with it ourselves. Why, 
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Suvakovic29 phoned me last night, he was looking for Ojdanic, and 
couldn't find him; Suvakovic was trying to find him, the man from 
the Operational Information Centre.  
Well, in the city. That would be the Ministry. They give information 
to these bullies that we running in the streets last night trying to find 
the suitable ones to use them. From the Operational Information 
Centre. That was probably done by a man from the Ministry, he 
might be a soldier or a civilian, maybe from that Defence 
Directorate, or something, and that man informs those --- by means 
of a radio link they tell them which street to go, which street is 
empty, and so on. And these here called me, they didn't know what to 
do. I found Ojdanic by mere chance later on, and they are dealing 
with this issue now. So, it means that it is all connected.  
And there's another thing for us to do. That letter that Canak sent --- 
Those are their surmises only. The tales they tell. We have to explore 
that attitude issue of our people deeper in the territory. Is there 
somebody who works with them, have them been informed properly 
or not, and so on. The Morale Directorate should send them an 
official letter, too. We should maybe carry out a routine control in 
relation to that, and so to see in a special way, by using a special 
method of talking with those people, to find that out. It might be that 
they managed to win some platoon commander over, or some 
lieutenant, or a tank commander, and gave him 10,000 German 
Marks to do who knows what thing in a certain moment. He could 
take a tank, or go in it to the streets. That is a problem. That's it, a 
complex situation, and we have to have that team that should 
practically be on duty 24 hours a day, but we also have to provide 
for this opportunity to work on that.  
Let’s go on. The Morale Directorate.  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Well, there's nothing much to say. We don't have to waste our time 
with those figures. The important thing for us is to say to the general 
public that they have not funded us at all, and that in return they ask 
everything. That is the only issue.  
                                                 
29  
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The other issue is that we didn't exclude anybody from the Supreme 
Defence Council; he excluded himself from the Supreme Defence 
Council. His support of NATO, his siding with NATO during the 
aggression, his refusal to accept all the military honours that were 
offered to him there, and not only once, but several times, his refusal 
to respond to our invitations to come. We invited him on the 
celebration and promotion of the second lieutenant, didn't we? –
That means that he excluded himself. Well, what does he want now, 
somebody to beg him to come? Everybody knows that. Those things 
should be told to them openly, let the people be informed about those 
things, and they will always make their versions of the same story. 
But it should be concluded that they should always fulfil their duties 
towards the Army, and that it is only then that they can ask a 
question. This way we do not attack them, we are only defending 
ourselves. We offer explanations to their accusations.  
The people that are afraid to give the exact data think that Milo and 
he, if only he could, would protect them, leave them. The first thing 
he will do is to send them away. We all know that.  
 
MILEN SIMIC 
As for these negative things, that is, negative phenomena, it is the 
standard of living, which is still characteristic for Montenegro, in 
spite of the fact that better quality measures have been undertaken 
now, and also General Pantelic, and the renewed propaganda 
activities in Montenegro. That means that they managed to get 
consolidated in two to three days, and that they now started a 
propaganda campaign against the Yugoslav Army.  
We have not mentioned anyone there, which is a good thing, and 
however, everybody recognized themselves in it, and the things that 
General Geza had said were noted here, in the "Vijesti" papers, that 
he was controlled by the Ministry of Interior and that the Ministry of 
Interior was the main propaganda source, the main propaganda 
source against the Yugoslav Army. That much is clear.  
As for the media attitude towards the Yugoslav Army, during this 
week there have been a considerable number of positive messages, 
positive comments and information, and what is important at that, 
those were published in the most important media. The negative 
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comments were mostly published in those media that are not all that 
influential.  
There is only one thing that I would like to say. The "Danas" 
newspaper has the circulation of 8,000 copies, as well as the 
"Vreme" magazine. So that the only paper that caused problems was 
the "Blic", with its large circulation.   
May 13th, the Security Day, was given great publicity in domestic 
media, and from those characteristic incidents, there was the appeal 
by Vuk Draskovic, in that - I wouldn't know how to call it – address 
to the Army and Police.  
It has also been characteristic for these last weeks that the "JU-
INFO" signal has been disrupted in the Republic of Montenegro, 
and that means that they have learnt its scheme and waves' 
directions, and they are disrupting them.  
As for the foreign media, they are mostly dealing with, or beginning 
to deal with Montenegro and relationship between the Interior 
Ministry and the Yugoslav Army, but it has also been characteristic 
that a large number of them have been dealing with the NATO 
aggression and NATO failure in the FRY territory. All in all, the 
morale has been stable, there are no important problems, but as for 
the territory, the characteristic thing is that the situation in the 
Republic of Montenegro has begun to get complicated, and thus we 
shall dedicate one strand of our propaganda activities towards 
Montenegro.  
These concrete tasks that you have ... 
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Yes, I know, but that should be done in the afternoon, or in the 
morning. Maybe we could do that tomorrow, or the day after 
tomorrow --- Why can't we? We could gather these ---, you could 
prepare for an appearance in the media concerning this new 
situation. I am not sure what kind of official statement we could 
offer. So, it's us. But we should have a statement ready in relation to 
that. So, it's what we were always advocating. That the Army should 
be the stability factor that would prevent any attempt to initiate a 
fratricide and a civil war. This is exactly what I was saying earlier. 
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            236  
 236
They attacked me for saying that then, saying that I was invoking 
that war, and I was only saying that the Army should prevent it, that 
it should be a buffer zone between one and the other side, and that it 
could serve to prevented it. Well, now they have realized that they 
haven't a single chance to win the elections. Or at least that is what I 
think. And I also think that they are aware of that. They are 
frightened now, for they know that the elections are bound to take 
place by the end of the year, and they are not sure that they would 
win, and in order to achieve their aims they have decided to 
instigate conflicts and so on.  
 
Brigadier general 
MILEN SIMIC 
But, it is characteristically, Sir, and General Geza knows it, and you 
know that, too, the large numbers of people are important to them. 
So, to instigate a conflict, they would need a mass of people that 
cannot be controlled, and that mass for Belgrade is some 300,000 of 
people and more, while they haven't been able to gather 30,000 
people. Thus, that gathering of people is definitely a failure even 
before it starts. They are…  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
No, the only thing that can be done in that respect, since they are not 
in a position to gather that number of people, the only thing they can 
do is to instigate an even bloodier conflict. So, those mercenaries, 
and I expect that they will use the Romanians, or those people from 
the Republic of Srpska, or who knows who else can be used to kill 
police officers, to kill citizens, and to say later on that soldiers did it, 
that the Police did it. You know what happens when somebody kills 
someone in a large group of people. Police have weapons, and so 
on. We have to be prepared for that. We mustn't let that happen, and 
everything is going in that direction, and legally, at that. So, we 
should prepare one official statement and keep it ready in case we 
need it, and we shall see – if it continues to get complicated, we shall 
publish the statement. It could happen that the state of emergency is 
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proclaimed, although I doubt that it will happen. There is no reason 
to do that now. Not under these conditions, no.  
 
The current Chief of Yugoslav Army General Staff, Branko Krga, 
has been clear and open in dividing the people to "us" and "them". 
He was advocating a more radical action under the present 
circumstances, which that was to arrest everybody who protested 
against the taking over of Studio B. I have recently seen footage of 
protests that were organized at the time when Studio B was taken 
over, and there I saw the late Prime Minister Djindjic, who was 
trying to enter the Beogradjanka building. Since there were only a 
small number of people who gathered for that rally against the 
taking over of Studio B, the operation was easily carried out.  
By a mere coincidence, I was near the Serbian Government 
Building at the time when they assassinated Prime Minister 
Djindjic. I came there, in front of the Government building at 
the time when the government officials started to gather there. 
At one moment General Krga appeared there, accompanied by a 
jeep. He stepped out of his BMW, but they immediately put him 
back in the car and drove him in the underground garage of the 
Serbian Government building. I presume that it was done for his 
safety. For a long time after that incident I though of the irony of 
life. I'm sick and tired of people like these.  
 
Major general 
BRANKO KRGA 
... however, the general impression is that there is some kind of 
scheme, and that we have not been able to get hold of it, of that 
material, of the proof, the proof that these events are only parts of 
that inclusive scheme. I will be free here to say that even this 
decision that was reached yesterday, about the seizure of Studio B, 
is something to their advantage. Not to our advantage, but to their 
advantage, to the advantage of the same people that plotted that 
scheme. They foresaw such a development, they were warning that 
this would happen, that the regime would --- I don't know --- 
according to the media, do this, and according to some other media 
do that. It would be far better if you had done what you just said, if 
you had arrested them, those individuals that advocated…  
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Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
Well, fine, they will start; they will use every conflict with them for 
their own purposes. If those, those leaders got arrested, they would 
gather around the prison, and we would have the same thing.  
 
Major general 
BRANKO KRGA 
Yes, but you see, they had during their last rally--- Simic was right 
in saying that this was very close to their end. There were only a 
small number of people there. And now, with this next move, they 
will again have a larger number of people gathered in the streets.  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
This move can prove to be a good one, and it can prove to be the end 
of it all.  
 
 
Major general 
BRANKO KRGA 
Well, I would like to say that, perhaps you should, in those proposals 
there --- I don't know whether it would be in our best interest to 
introduce the state of emergency. And they are doing everything to 
get the support from abroad, to do this, to do that. All the impostors 
in this world made their statements only five minutes after that, and 
expressed their reactions. This kind of tensions is certainly not good 
for us. It is particularly not good for us, the Army.  
 
Lieutenant general 
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC 
How is it going? Not good at all. We have to be cautious. We have to 
be ---, to act like we did immediately before the bombing campaign 
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started. Thus, we shall have to have teams in our organizational 
units and structures, somebody who shall be present there, 
somebody who shall be coordinating that body, and it has to be set 
up as soon as possible. We should have a meeting, and particularly 
carry on with those documents for monitoring; this is exactly what 
we need. There's nothing else for us to do.  
As for the things that should be done in relation to our next task, we 
shall go through that quickly now. I don't want to spend too much 
time on that now.  
We cannot reach any new decision now, we can only look at it in a 
general way, to see what has been going on.  
 
Lieutenant general 
GEZA FARKAS 
General, Sir, I would only like to briefly point out to the current 
safety situation, in the whole territory of FRY, that is currently in the 
focus of attention of the security services and the overall safety of 
the country.  
What was not achieved by the war, by the psychological and 
propaganda operation is aimed at achieving now, by the following 
phase, and that is terrorism. Terrorism, as a form of activity is very 
dangerous, and its aim is to destabilize Yugoslavia and to remove 
the present government by force. To instigate disorder, riots and 
insecurity in the country. What we are facing here is a mass 
organization called "Otpor", which is extremely dangerous, because 
it gathered a large number of young people above all, young people 
from the school children to students, and that also has its militant 
wing, which has been commanded from abroad, by the international 
intelligence services, that is by the CIA. It is from there that they 
recruit the perpetrators of the most horrid of all acts, like 
kidnapping and murders. This is where they are doing things that 
were forbidden by the Geneva Convention and by the documents 
reached at all the international conventions and meetings, and those 
are manipulations of the young people and of children. Besides that, 
as the perpetrators of these crimes there are also delinquents, drug 
addicts, psychologically disturbed people, convicts, homosexuals, 
and above all, a large number of people belonging to religious cults. 
So, their activities are comprehensive, and it has been directed to 
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the bosom of this nation, to the young people. This is very important 
for us, to record and to be aware of that, since those same young 
people, from both the sides, will come to serve their military service. 
And here I would like to immediately draw your attention to all the 
measures that should be undertaken jointly by the safety organs and 
state and public security services, and that is to register those 
persons, that is to check the recruits. However, some of them might 
pull through our filters, and thus we shall have to take certain 
measures against that.  
As a part of their activates on creating insecurity, these extremist 
parties, that is, the destructive parties, or organizations like SPO, 
have undertaken in the whole territory, and above all in Belgrade, 
upon themselves to make a list of all the officers according to their 
places of living. This part of their activity has already been carried 
out in Montenegro, so that it was already done by the Montenegrin 
MUP, they registered and make a list of all our officers, and they 
even check everybody in their files, to see if there's anything else to 
find out, so that they can use that for their propaganda purposes.  
And thus, a comprehensive campaign has begun to destabilize this 
country, create the sense of insecurity, and to act, to act zealously 
against VJ.  
I will tell you here several things, which are ---, that is, there are 
only several organizations that practically have their military wings, 
and that can be characterized as paramilitary. Those are the Falcon 
Detachments, set up by SPO, in the form of sports organization, 
which, however, have their military programmes. Serbian knights, 
this one has ---, was set up in the territory of Leskovac, and they are 
spreading there. They also have their military programme. Serbian 
Guards, Serbian Volunteer Guards, Serbian Volunteer Detachment, 
Association of Serbian Volunteers, Serbian Liberation Army, OSA --
- we have in fact arrested their key men, we put them on trial, and 
you know the outcome of that. We have concluded that bearing in 
mind the things that they prepared, that they wanted to do, the 
Military Court was lenient, and the President of FRY also 
complained about that. It is probably on the Military Judiciary to 
examine their criteria. Then the Serbian Liberation Army, SOVA, 
and now this Otpor organization.  
These perceived problems have to be constantly present in our 
operational activities and the command system. I would like to ask 
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you, in relation to this, since this is about murders and kidnapping, 
capturing of people to be sent to the Hague, that the prominent, that 
is the commanders all the way to the battalion commanders, and 
especially those who took part in wars since 1991, they are all their 
targets, in their public and in their secret lists. Thus, we should all 
improve our personal safety.  
We have made a plan, a programme, an instruction; I don't know 
whether it has been sent to you, which has envisaged the general 
measures and the special measures of personal safety. You in the 
first place should, every individual should take care of that, to avoid 
situations in which they can become targets, although it is difficult to 
do, since their plan envisaged that a liquidation takes place, or a 
kidnapping of some of the military leadership figures.  
These problems have to be present in your activities, too, and on a 
daily basis. 
The intelligence services have set in motion their sensors, their 
members, in the whole territory. They have become active in their 
military diplomatic missions, in the legal way and by means of their 
secret organizations and people that were sent to all sorts of 
informal groups, that is in the non-governmental groups and various 
humanitarian organizations.  
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
MOCK TRIAL OF ZORAN ZIVKOVIC 
 
 
The assessment of the second army commander was quite realistic 
because I had an opportunity also to talk to people from the 
Montenegrin Interior Ministry (MUP). This information clearly 
indicated that the army would interfere in the conflicts in 
Montenegro the moment these conflicts start suiting Slobodan’s 
company. They were working on the strengthening of those units that 
could be operative in some kind of future conflict in Montenegro. 
This primarily refers to the 7th battalion and other units of the 
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military police. Also correct is the presumption that, in a possible 
conflict, the MUP would probably be far more inferior, because it 
could not count on the support of the entire Montenegrin nation. 
It was at such meetings that the fates of individuals, groups and, 
ultimately, the state itself, were decided. The speech of General 
Lazarević, who was the commander of the third army, clearly shows 
that his attention focused on the conflict with the then mayor of Niš, 
Zoran Živković, who was under the constant surveillance of the 
security services of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army. His attacks on the 
military leadership could no longer be tolerated and General Nebojša 
Pavković gave the green light for his arrest. During those days, the 
newspapers wrote the following: 
The mayor of Niš, Zoran Živković, said today that the police had 
stopped him and asked for his documents on his way out of Niš, when 
heading for Požarevac to attend a rally of the opposition. Živković told 
the Beta news agency that the police let him pass after having taken 
down his personal data. According to him, one of the policemen told 
him that the police would not allow him to enter Požarevac, but he 
could not explain why. Today, a bus with members of the United 
Branch Trade Unions "Nezavisnost" and the Otpor movement also set 
out from Niš to Požarevac.  
• BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT in Niš, the mayor of Niš and 
the vice-president of the Democratic Party, Zoran Živković, was 
heard on the basis of the criminal charges filed against him by 
Military Post 3755 in Niš for the spreading of false information. 
Živković did not invoke his immunity as an MP: “I have no right 
to refer to my immunity when this could not be done by (founder 
of the Civil Resistance in Valjevo) Bogoljub Arsenijević Maki, 
(the initiator of the protest of citizens in Leskovac) Ivan 
Novković, (editor of Television Soko) Nebojša Ristić and many 
others who are under similar pressure from the regime in 
Serbia”, said Živković. (Beta) 
 
 
Lieutenant General  
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ 
 
The situation in the zone of the army from the aspect of activities by 
extreme forces... we assess that the activities of the external factor in 
conjunction with extreme forces, and especially the militant Sokol 
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detachment and so on are increasing their intensity, with the possibility of 
their escalation into broader civil unrest. The activation of so-called 
crisis headquarters for the defence of free media, which started yesterday 
in Niš, and today they are announcing Kruševac and other centres, the 
organizing of protest gatherings and calling on the citizens to 
demonstrate all forms of civil disobedience, and yesterday they started 
calling on VJ members to deny obedience to military leaderships.  
 
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
 
Arrest them, Laza. If we do not arrest them now, and if he is openly 
calling on the army to deny obedience, you look up in the law what that 
means. You take out an armoured battalion and arrest Živković, if he said 
that. Don't think that they will not attack us, they quite certainly will. The 
moment they sense that we are afraid, that we are hesitant, they will do it. 
If he really did say that, you should come out with an announcement 
saying that all those issuing such calls will be caught by the military 
authorities and arrested. They will, thus, shatter your army. 
 
Lieutenant General  
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ 
 
Practically, the centre of destruction is Niš.  Constantly coming one after 
another to Niš and Pirot are Stambolić, Perišić and who knows who else.  
 
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
They should be captured and beaten up, and then you’ll see whether 
they’ll do it again. 
 
Colonel General   
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
We should see to it, Simić - so that we don’t forget later - to prepare for 
tomorrow a statement, but we will all take a look at it. If this is so, 
Lazarević should provide the information about him calling on the army 
to deny obedience, under whose competency does this fall and so on.  
 
Lieutenant General  
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIĆ 
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General, he literally said: we call on our fellow citizens, our brothers 
simply to deny obedience to the leadership, to their generals who are 
leading this nation towards ruin etc. 
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
 
Tomorrow a statement is to be issued and tomorrow we are to refer to the 
statement of this Živković and some other leaders of opposition party and 
to announce: that the military authorities will take adequate measures 
against all those calling for the undermining of the army. 
So, the situation there is also quite unstable for us. As we have seen, all 
the assessments in the country are that the foreign factor has also 
realized that the opposition cannot do the job as envisaged. They too are 
now starting to panic pending the elections which will quite certainly be 
held by the end of the year - whether they will win or not - and since they 
know that they will lose these elections, they have to do something before 
the elections, and that is precisely what they are doing now. Otpor is a 
very perfidiously infiltrated organization who, as was well assessed by 
Ivan 30 (31)... it is the most massive organization, it has entered all the 
pores of society, it is not known who is in it, who runs it, from where etc. 
Worst of all is the conclusion that it has entered all the pores of society, 
that is the most dangerous for us. This means that it has entered 
kindergartens, primary schools, high schools, colleges, factories etc. 
 
With the adoption of the anti-terrorism law and a planned action, this 
organization is to be unmasked. We presume that the largest, the most 
conscientious part of the society which has entered this, will distance 
itself. Those who do not do so, who stay - it will be known that they are, 
actually, the Otpor members who are to cause chaos, to attack and to stir 
up a rebellion in the country. You have seen those who were arrested, 
who were waiting for the rally to take place in Požarevac, all six of them 
are the most hardened criminals. A large number of those present from 
their ranks are from Romania, and let me remind you that people live 
there with 20 marks per month, while here they get a hundred or two 
hundred. Therefore, someone like that will not only put on a black T-shirt 
and jump on a policemen and throw things at him, but will do whatever 
you want him to. If we add to this the Montenegrin mafia, our mafia, etc., 
the power struggle and the gradual drawing of certain criminals into 
political games, then we truly have a complex situation. 
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Attacks have stated will the calls for the denial of obedience, the story 
that there is a rift between the military leadership and the troops etc, it is, 
of course, being advocated by those who are not familiar with the 
situation in the army. You are probably familiar with the situation in your 
units. If this is so, then we should be hanged here as soon as we come out. 
This means constant presence in the units, constant conversations, 
constant informing and monitoring. Surprises are not to be ruled out. We 
should not rule out the possibility of certain people at all levels of 
command surprising us. Perhaps younger soldiers who have relatives in 
Otpor etc, or are under (certain) influence or who are being financed, 
junior officers who also have relatives etc, or have been deluded for 
various reasons, and that is why this network of associates in the units 
should be even more developed, so that we know what is going on in the 
platoon.     
 
So, we have to know, we must fully control the situation, see that these 
people have been deluded, perhaps they do not understand the situation 
and we must not go against children, against young people against 
students etc. Not all of these are students, you have militant students. Of 
course, you cannot stand still and watch while he is throwing a stone at 
you, but the one throwing the stone is not a student and he is doing it for 
big money, and the one believing he is a student is standing by him and 
watching, and is now demonstrating solidarity with him. Therefore, the 
two should be separated.   
 
We have to do everything to prevent this from spreading into the units. If 
it does get spread, we must act energetically towards both officers and 
soldiers.  
 
So, we must be ready for any kind of surprises, we should not delude 
ourselves by thinking that they will not attack us, that they will not touch 
us, the way we were taken by surprise in the previous Yugoslavia when 
we were hesitant – let's do it , let's not do it, while they were carrying out 
their part of the job. So, if you want to be victims or targets, you be 
passive and you will see what will happen to you. As long as you show 
resoluteness, courage, resolve not to allow attacks on the army, you will 
be respected both as individuals and as soldiers. The moment you 
abandon this, you will be faced with the danger of even part of a unit 
turning against you and siding with them. Therefore, we have to deal with 
that. This means that we have to be ready for such surprises. We have 
sent information to Otpor and I ask you, please, to have all this done 
nicely. The army, i.e. the uniform can also be abused by those who kept 
VJ uniforms, all those who did not – and you know you did not – 
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withdraw uniforms, withdraw weapons. We have part of the weaponry for 
which we know that it was stolen. These weapons are being sought, these 
are the weapons that shot on Ravna Gora and these are the weapons that 
are hidden in haystacks. Attention should now be paid to those weapons. 
Therefore, security bodies at all levels must intensify their work, and if 
you know where there are individuals or groups who have weapons, who 
have equipment that they did not return, go there with the police and 
disarm them in cooperation with the civilian police, in cooperation with 
the military police, this village, that house, straight there tomorrow 
morning at 4 o'clock, and please carry out a search and the confiscation 
of weaponry. Of course, there must be a legend, either that he is a 
fugitive, or that we know that he did not return it, etc. This has to be done 
or else we will have problems with that weaponry.   
 
Units should go out into the field according to your assessment and units 
towards the commands that are to intervene… For everything else you 
yourself should make an assessment so as not to be taken by surprise 
somewhere. I personally doubt that there will be attacks on military 
facilities, but if the situation deteriorates, we cannot intervene in street 
fights and so on, but if the mob is entering the Parliament, if it is entering 
barracks, if it is terrorising the people etc., then we will see, a decision 
will be taken. We have to put a stop to that, not to side with anyone, to 
stop it, so that this does not happen. Well, (this is what they want now) 
and they see in Otpor now the only organization that should carry out 
their goals and they will now press to finance it, to put it to use and to let 
them do their job. That is why we should now act quickly. They are now 
once again announcing attacks on the television, then a return etc. So, 
please, deal with this.  
 
As regards the combat readiness of our units, it is in your interest 
constantly to control it and to know. If you do not have 150 men, you 
have a hundred, but those one hundred are 100% full (?). They know, 
they are prepared, they are linked to the commanding, and do not let 
something happen, and only then say I will doing something. No, I will do 
everything, so if anything happens, I will use etc. We have to see those 
prepared forces, equip them with the necessary means, if we have them, 
and we should not keep them in some kind of stocks – these grenades, 
shock grenades etc. for surprise actions which will injure no one, but will 
repel the attack. Earlier on we had this obligation - we had combat 
groups, we had the forces, but we also had units for preventing such 
unrest, demonstrations, and we trained them for this. Along with a 
combat group, I always had one such company, two companies that were 
familiar with these activities etc.   
Military Secret Part I                                                                            
                                                                                                                            247  
 247
 
It is necessary to work on the development of a climate in Montenegro in 
which the people will condemn that Montenegrin police, instead of us 
attacking it now. We have said that they are more numerous than 
necessary, while they say that it is not the army’s business to assess how 
many policemen there should be. Well fine, that is true, but it is our 
business to assess what they are arming themselves with and what kind of 
activities they are carrying out etc. I have information that special 
weapons, Stingers 31 (32) etc, were brought to Montenegro through 
Debelo Brdo to Herceg Novi, and I do not know were they went from 
there. Perhaps it is just a story, maybe it is not, but we should see to 
develop a climate in which the people of Montenegro who are for 
Yugoslavia, who see what is being done there, let them speak about MUP, 
and then let that MUP feel unsafe among those people there. We will 
easily deal with the Montenegrin MUP. You must not allow yourselves to 
be taken by surprise. You must be a step ahead of them – if you think that 
they will attack you, you attack them and their leaders. We said that the 
decision is yours. If someone decides to attack the army, you go ahead 
with the attack and first go for that man and then everything else. You 
have the advantage, you have the unit, the force, you have units that can 
shoot from a distance, you can direct your fire in any way you want to. 
So, you should be a step ahead and allow no surprises. If you allow 
surprises, you’re finished.  
Regarding this case, we said that Vasiljević had been given the task, and 
Geza, to look into this case with the member of the 7th battalion. He 
should not have gone there and behaved as he did and it is his fault. And 
this man then went out, got into the car, they drew them apart and then 
this one fired. So, do not expect the Montenegrin MUP to resolve this for 
you. He should be followed and caught. In ten days, ten days’ time, after 
ten days it should be known that the army had caught him.  
And now we should see about this case in Niš. We should issue a 
statement and deal with it. If Živković was calling on the army to deny 
obedience, we should see under whose competency this falls. Aca, pack 
your things and go to Niš. You, Gaja, everything you need, when the 
opportunity arises, get him and let us put him on trial. He had deserved 
long ago to be caught, long ago, and we now have to do it. Look into that, 
Simić, we have to prepare that for tomorrow, we have to quote him 
exactly, to say that, at a session of the municipal council, the mayor of  
Niš, Živković, publicly said, called on members of the army to deny 
obedience to their commands and units. In this regard, the Information 
                                                 
31 (32) 
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Service, the military authorities are announcing that adequate measures 
will be taken against him and all those working on the undermining etc.   
 
Lieutenant General  
BRANKO KRGA 
General, should we add what it means to deny obedience? 
 
 
Colonel General  
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ 
We have people who fought honourably for this country and who are 
against this, and we can hardly bring influence to bear on them and 
restrain them so that they would not react to their conduct. And what 
would it mean if they were to make a move? We know what these soldiers 
of ours were like, volunteers, reservists, that mass fleeing from Belgrade. 
He has no immunity, he was stripped of his immunity.   
 
 
Admiral   
MILAN ZEC  
General, as part of these measures, we would be very happy if the 
judicial bodies were to review a bit the work of their bodies on the 
territory of the Republic of Montenegro. We in the navy would be very 
satisfied if the military prosecutor in Podgorica were to be replaced.   
 
 
Colonel General   
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ  
 
We have launched the initiative. The president has supported it. The 
minister knows. We have scheduled for Friday a meeting with everyone 
from the military prosecutor’s office and the military court, and I am 
even thinking that you should come too. At it, we will clarify all that, both 
as regards the personnel and this. I am now ready to sign the order to 
pension off the one in Niš32 (33). I will now tell him that when I see him 
on Friday, because they are behaving the same as... they have escaped 
control. They think they are outside the army and instead of representing 
the interests of the army, most important for them is the law and the way 
they interpret it. That Radisavljević... it is with great difficulty that we 
managed to persuade the MUP to intervene in the case of Filipović who 
sent an interview by e-mail, I don’t know where. In it he said all sorts of 
                                                 
32 (33) 
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things, he revealed military information, secrets etc, and then he said that 
the army, a certain lieutenant-colonel from the army, he did not give his 
name, had practically carried out a genocide against the Albanians, that 
he had seen 800, 900 people killed etc, that they shot with a 10 cm anti-
aircraft cannot at... at those people and that he had seen no Albanians in 
Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) and terrorists, but that they were all 
civilians and our tanks were running over civilians. That was his story. 
And then those guys arrested him and filed charges on 150 typed pages. 
He was supposed to take a decision on the launching of an investigation 
within 24 hours, but he sat for 24 hours somewhere in some field. He did 
not care and then he passed a decision to release him and said that when 
I found it suitable... That was the answer. Alright, we will finish with this.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION  
 
After the victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) on 
October 5, 1999, there was not a revolution of the kind that was 
necessary for this nation, but there were revolutionary changes in the 
sense of the place and role of the mentioned coalition. DOS was created 
to change Milošević's regime and for this it received the support of the 
people, the intelligentsia and the West, but it was not prepared to take 
over power in the sense of building a new state and a new system of 
values in the radical sense in which this was necessary to accelerate 
certain democratic processes. They were simply taken aback by the speed 
with which Milošević's empire was crumbling. Numerous holes were 
being opened in the state apparatus for which DOS did not have quality 
people. Rotten compromises started being made and they produced new 
shortcomings so that, in the end, a chain of lobbies was created and it 
used democracy as a guise for greed and scandals. Composed of 
numerous small parties, DOS was the right response to Milošević's 
tyranny, but not to the post-Milošević renewal of Serbia. The slowness in 
the adoption of the key laws and the non-defining of the main issues on 
which a national consensus would be reached (borders, Kosovo, 
transition, the Constitution, the Hague Tribunal…) became the main 
reason for conflicts instead of being a magnet around which the wisest 
Serbia could offer would rally. Vanity, greed and the terrible slowness is 
doing away with the people who were burdened by scandals, only 
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aggravated the already chaotic situation. The lack of new ideas that 
would be presented and realized by new people rendered barren the 
political solutions that were offered. Until the moment when progress was 
measured by the annulment of the grotesqueness of Milošević's laws (the 
smuggling of fuel, cigarettes, murders, inflation...) the semblance of the 
successfulness of reforms was maintained. Once it became necessary to 
produce and support certain new ideas that would essentially mark 
transformation and a discontinuity with Milošević's dictatorship, 
quarrelling started and everything began losing momentum. When it was 
necessary to offer Serbia something more than ordinary donations, to 
define cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, establish the rule of law, we 
stopped. It is with greater speed that the people were forgetting the 
poverty they were emerging from than the government could provide the 
promised prosperity. We once use to be overwhelmed with joy when 
inflation was not measured by millions of percentage points per day and 
when bombs were not falling on our heads, while today we are 
dissatisfied with the length of time needed for us to enter Europe. 
Since I am not a politician and have no obligation, nor the habit, to toady 
to anyone, especially not to my own people, I believe that the greatest 
responsibility lies with the people themselves. The people kept electing 
Milošević, the people put up with inflation, the people went to wars and, 
ultimately, I myself was also bombed. These are the facts, no matter what 
this may sound like to someone. What we put up with is something no 
other nation in Europe would. What we are doing today, supporting and 
reviving those same people who had pushed us where we are, best attests 
to this. If the German nation had the greatest merit for the fact that it 
resurrected from the ashes of Fascism and built a modern state, then the 
Serbian nation is, quite certainly, the most responsible for the things that 
happened to it and for being where it is now. We have to agree with this, 
but we must not reconcile to it.    
One of the main presuppositions of any reform is a reform of the 
personnel. That is, probably, where we fell short the most. In the places 
were Milošević's people were replaced, the successes were the greatest. 
The reforms were delayed the most in the security services and the 
judiciary. The situation there is, actually, the most critical. At the moment 
when it was not possible to go any further without starting with 
dismissals in the army, the judiciary, police, Prime Minister Đinđić was 
murdered. When we were unable to resolve the murders that accumulated 
in the last decade, when the Hague Tribunal sat on our back, pulling 
bodies out of the Danube, we remembered Milošević's rallies of support 
and we devalued practically everything we thought would represent the 
foundation of some new Serbia. We became hostages of Milošević's 
generals and once again we resurrected the anti-Tribunal lobby dressed 
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in some new uniforms and lined up in front of the monument at which the 
first demonstrations on March 9, 1991 started. When dictators become 
democrats, it is just as puzzling for the people as when Democrats, 
toadying to the people, organize such rallies. DOS was exhausting itself 
the most from within, through rash and hasty moves, and the West was 
helping by believing that everything that says “democratic” truly is that. 
Everything that was written on the previous pages has been conveyed by 
myself and my friends to the Montenegrin government as of August 1999, 
and to the Serbian government since October 5, 2000. 
Minister Vladan Batić received this book just before it came out, and 
thanks to him a meeting was organized with the special prosecutor, Mr. 
Jovan Prijić. I have to admit that Mr. Batić was never in a dilemma for a 
single moment as regards its authenticity or the responsibility of the main 
protagonists of our drama. A high-ranking official of the Security 
Administration was also acquainted with the material, and I returned to 
him, in his cabinet, all the documents I had on abuse in the VJ. According 
to my information, Mr. Prijić requested from the Counter-intelligence 
Service (KOS) an explanation and confirmation of the authenticity of the 
book and documents. Real panic spread within the Security 
Administration of the VJ when they read the book. I believe Mr. Prijić 
took the book to the wrong place to inquire about the authenticity of the 
mentioned documents. This is as if we would ask Legija to arrest 
Milošević or to testify in the case of the Ibar Highway and the 
assassination attempt against Vuk Drašković. I do not know whether 
anything was done in this regard, As far as I know, noting was done. The 
only thing left for me to do now is to address the public, but not for the 
purpose of punishing criminals, this is something the courts should do, 
but in order for such things to be called by their real names in the future.  
At the end of this book, I gave a long thought to what its conclusion 
should look like. Maybe I did not know how to write what I wanted to, 
but I did know whom I would write about and what kind of a message I 
would send to the normal part of Serbia and Montenegro. I will write 
about an honourable officer who requested service in return for the 
great deed he did and who experienced a veritable Golgotha for not 
being indifferent to the abuse and criminal acts perpetrated by those 
who were supposed to represent the most glorious part of our nation 
and state. His sufferings continue even while I am writing this book. Of 
course, at issue is Lieutenant-colonel Miodrag Sekulić, head of 
informatics in the Cabinet of the VJ chief-of-staff. If he is to blame for 
anything, than it is for not being immoral and hypocritical, for 
differentiating between black and white, a catastrophe and success, an 
opportunity and a debacle. He was not inspired by evildoing, but by 
deeds, he did not ask for a rank in exchange for his honour. He shared 
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the fate of other officers, unprepared to sacrifice the very foundations 
of humanity and morality for a handful of seeming glory and lies. He 
could not watch court fools playing kings. His mother did not teach him 
to bring misery upon others and to call these tragedies coincidences, by 
which he would spit on the root he had originated from. Good grades in 
his work made him a witness who bothered everyone. He found himself 
in the position to be tried by the one whom he had helped the most and 
whose guilty sentence would be a guilty sentence to the generation 
which, faced with a choice between submission and a just sacrifice, 
would choose the later. That is his guilt! The conviction of this 
honourable and honest officer would represent a conviction of the 
normal people in this Serbia and Montenegro. I wish to use this 
opportunity to call on both Prime Minister Đukanović and Prime 
Minister  Živković, as well as President Marović, as avowed democrats, 
to lift the anathema from this honourable man. Your struggle would 
have had no sense or effect if it had not been for thousands of 
individuals like Lieutenant-colonel Sekulić who, by risking his life and 
the lives of his family members, was ready to make an enormous 
sacrifice in order for Serbia and Montenegro to become what it is today. 
I expect responsible and moral people to say what that man, who was 
ready to risk everything to save what was lost and to help unknown 
people to place this country among the ranks of democratic states, 
meant for this nation. He attended meetings of the Collegiate Body of 
the VJ chief-of-staff, listened and saw with his own eyes where all that 
was leading. What was he supposed to do in those difficult days? To 
push the cart that was heading down towards an abyss or to act like a 
hero who had the courage which others did not and to do everything in 
his power to prevent Milošević's tyranny and the wailing of some new 
mothers for their children. We cannot, gentlemen, for the sake of daily 
political events, trample on the bodies of living people, because, sooner 
or later, we will trample on ourselves. 
For this reason I thank him immensely in my own name and on behalf 
of all the people who differentiate between a military secret and a crime 
hidden under the mystery of a military secret. 
“Patriots” did everything to explain that October 5 was the product of 
semi-literal criminals who brought DOS to power, and no one opposed 
them by saying that intelligent and educated officers, of whom there 
were thousands in Serbian history, saw where Milošević's junta was 
leading us and clearly demonstrated their patriotism and love for their 
fatherland. These were veritable “Apis-es” who, after the change of 
power asked for neither promotions nor popularity. They stayed where 
they were, while Milošević's general and colonels rose up skyward with 
only one desire – to take revenge upon those who were different from 
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them, in order to present they shame as a glorious battle for their 
nation and state. This revenge was inspired primarily by fear of the 
proof of what they were doing in the past decade. Lieutenant-colonel 
Sekulić deserves to have a prominent place in the history of the recent 
period, and Montenegro should have the honour of pinning a 
decoration on the chest of a great man. On this occasion, I also wish to 
thank other officers who helped me, directly or indirectly, and who are 
also persecuted only because it is suspected that they too, like Sekulić, 
could say what they know. 
Sekulić's sacrifice is even more valuable if one bears in mind the fact 
that, although he knew what he had done, even after he was arrested he 
pointed a finger neither at the Montenegrin nor at the Serbian 
government, because he realised that this is what Aca Tomić and those 
like him, would hardly wait. He did not do this even when, two years 
ago, they suspended him and halved his already miserable salary, or 
when his quasi friends turned their heads away, or when they denied 
him the rank of colonel which he has deserved by his years of service 
and his best grades. A future Ph.D. in informatics, he withstood all the 
harassment in a stoical and dignified manner, as befits such a great 
man. I never expected anything less from him. 
Finally, I would like to thank all those politicians who offered me 
support to persevere in the writing of this book, and they will recognize 
themselves in this sentence. With this book, I have reduced an internal 
pressure provoked by those resurrected ideologists of Milošević's 
patriotism, who are constantly appearing on front pages and on pre-
election billboards. 
The only other thing I would like to know is how Branko Krga feels 
when he reports to “domestic traitors and foreign mercenaries” and 
also the reasons why reports are accepted from such a man?  
 
I thank everyone for their support and patience. 
 
 
 
A N N E X E S  
 
 
Letter of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) to the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP) 
dated May 19, 1998 (Annex no.1) 
 
Interior Ministry of the Republic of Serbia – for comrade Danilo 
Pantović 
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A few days ago, we learned that a certain group of the Obrenovac mafia, 
dealing with the unlawful seizing of construction documents and lots, is 
preparing to hire persons to beat up, and possibly also kill several 
members of the JUL secretariat who were engaged in preventing the 
plunder and seizure of free construction zones in the centre of 
Obrenovac. At issue are very large investments and profits of private 
persons. 
Unfortunately, certain employees of the municipal administrative body 
are also participating in this. 
The most active in this scam are: 
1. A man known in Obrenovac under the nickname Viraga. A private 
entrepreneur, he left active military service prior to the outbreak of 
the war in 1991 in the rank of sergeant. (Viraga is the nickname of 
the author of this book - V.V.) 
2. Slaviša Krsmanović living in Belgrade, employed at the Obrenovac 
Municipality as an architect in the town planning section 
3. Ranko – owner of a private exchange office in Obrenovac. 
 
We ask you, please, to call them in through your service and seriously 
warn them that the highest bodies of the Serbian Interior Ministry have 
been informed about their threats and secret evil intentions towards the 
leadership of JUL in Obrenovac and that they are fully monitoring the 
situation in Obrenovac and taking measures to prevent such excesses 
from happening. 
The persons whom the threats and evil intentions are directed towards 
are: 
1. Ljubomir Dragačevac – chairman of the JUL municipal board and 
member of the town council 
2. Dušan Bratić – vice-chairman of the JUL municipal board and 
member of the town council) and 
3. Slobodan – Bobe Filimonović – member of the Secretariat of the 
JUL municipal board 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
P.S. – In the course of the night, an attempt was made at demolishing the 
passenger vehicle of comrade Slobodan Filimonović. 
 
 
Chairman of the municipal 
Board of JUL Obrenovac 
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Ljubomir Dragačevac 
 
(Instead of Dragačevac, the letter was signed by Dušan Bratić – remark 
of the author) 
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Text of JUL's apology to the author of this book, of February 17, 1999, 
two and-a-half months before his arrest by the Yugoslav Army (Annex no. 
2) 
 
Municipal board of JUL-a 
Obrenovac 
Reg.no.23-99 
February 17, 1999 
Obrenovac 
 
Mr Vladan Vlajković,  
On the basis of your request of February 4, 1999, we inform you about 
the following: 
 
On February 5, 1999, at a session of the municipal board of JUL in 
Obrenovac, after having discussed your request, we inform you:  
 
 
1. That at no session of the existing bodies was it discussed, or 
was a decision taken to send the letter of May 29, 1998 to the 
Serbian Interior Ministry.  
 
2. That the municipal board of JUL in Obrenovac is distancing 
itself from its contents and that this does not represent the stand 
of the municipal board.  
 
3. That we are truly sorry about any unpleasant situations such a 
text may have caused, so that, with no direct guilt on our part, 
but in view of the fact that such a letter was forwarded with the 
seal of the municipal board of JUL Obrenovac, we apologize to 
you and your family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF JUL- 
O B R E N O V A C 
S E C R E T A R Y 
Đorđe 
Komlenski  
 
